JOSEPH A FOSTER V BERRIEN HILLS COUNTRY CLUB
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH A. FOSTER, W. TIMOTHY YAGGI,
SCOTT I. DEJONG, and THOMAS M.
ELLSPERMANN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 282650
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-000061-CR
BERRIEN HILLS COUNTRY CLUB,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the events giving rise to these proceedings, defendant was a non-profit
private country club.1 Plaintiffs were members of defendant country club. In its later years of
operation, defendant began to have financial difficulties when the income from member dues
could not keep pace with the club’s operating expenses. Declining membership exacerbated the
club’s financial crisis. The club began to borrow significant amounts of money and incurred
about $1 million in debt in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to keep the club afloat. In June
2005, defendant established a new membership plan to attempt to increase revenue to the club.
Under the plan, current members were given the option to remain as equity (shareholding)
members or move to a non-equity position. In order to remain equity members, members were
required to select that option and sign and authorize a “Selection of Equity Status” form and pay
$825. Plaintiffs Thomas M. Ellspermann and W. Timothy Yaggi elected to pay the additional
$825 to remain equity members; plaintiffs Joseph A. Foster and Scott I. DeJong did not.
1
Defendant country club dissolved on July 12, 2006.
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Between October 31, 2005, and January 10, 2006, plaintiffs each tendered separate
written resignations from defendant country club. Article VIII of defendant’s bylaws, which
governs resignation of members, provides:
Section 1. RESIGNATIONS. Any person may voluntarily resign their
membership by tendering such resignation in writing addressed to the President or
Secretary. No resignation shall be accepted unless the member is, at the time of
tendering such resignation, in good standing and has paid all indebtedness to the
Club, including dues for the full month in which his resignation is tendered. The
member(s) must deliver and surrender their stock certificate to the Secretary. The
value of the stock, as stated on the Stock Certificate, less an
administrative/processing fee, shall be paid to the stockholder. Resignations will
not be in effect until accepted by the Board of Directors. The termination of
membership for any cause whatsoever shall operate as release of all the right, title
to or interest in the property and assets of the Club and the membership certificate
shall become null and void.
Defendant wrote each plaintiff a letter indicating that the board had accepted their
resignation and that plaintiffs would be put on the wait list for processing stock refunds.
Defendant thereafter issued checks to each plaintiff. The stock refund checks issued to plaintiffs
Foster, Yaggi and Ellspermann included a reduction of $270 for dues for the month in which
defendant accepted their resignations. Plaintiff DeJong had set up automatic dues payments
through his Visa credit card, which paid his $270 dues for the month in which defendant
accepted his resignation. None of the plaintiffs cashed the check that defendant issued to them.
On March 6, 2006, defendant received a formal offer from Chris Neuser to purchase
defendant country club. Although the offer itself was silent regarding the full amount of the
offer, Neuser paid $1.2 million in earnest money when he made the offer, and an article
appearing in a local newspaper on March 30, 2006, stated that Neuser was purchasing the club
for $4.2 million. The amount of the offer was unexpectedly high and, according to defendant’s
appellate brief, would result in an estimated payout to defendant’s equity members of $25,000.2
On April 20, 2006, each plaintiff wrote separate but nearly identical letters to defendant
purporting to revoke their resignations from the club. In the letters, plaintiffs claimed that their
resignation letters constituted an offer to resign and that defendant’s response was not an
acceptance, but a counter-offer that was not accepted by plaintiffs. Thus, according to plaintiffs’
letters, plaintiffs were withdrawing their offers to resign. Counsel for plaintiff candidly
acknowledged on the record at the summary disposition hearing that “after being members of
[defendant] club for many, many years, [plaintiffs] wanted to share in the windfall of the sale . . .
.”
2
We note that because plaintiffs Foster and DeJong did not elect to become equity members and
did not pay $825 under defendant’s new membership plan of June 2005, they would not be
entitled to share in the proceeds from any sale of defendant country club even if they had not
resigned.
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Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
that plaintiffs each offered to resign their memberships with defendant in accordance with
Article VIII, Section 1 of defendant’s bylaws, and defendant responded by making a counteroffer that plaintiffs’ resignations would be accepted if plaintiffs each agreed to pay dues for an
extra month in the amount of $270. The complaint further alleged that each plaintiff rejected
defendant’s counter-offer, revoked their offer to resign and tendered dues payments to make
them current. According to the complaint, defendant rejected plaintiffs’ payments and claimed
that plaintiffs’ actions did not restore them to equity status. Plaintiffs sought to recover from
defendant “their full distributive share as full equity members and/or shareholders of
Defendant[.]”
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). According
to defendant, plaintiffs resigned pursuant to defendant’s bylaws, and defendant accepted
plaintiffs’ resignations. Defendant maintained that the real dispute between the parties
concerned whether defendant could, under its bylaws, charge resigning members dues for the
month in which defendant accepted the member’s resignation. Defendant asserted that charging
the members $270 for the month in which defendant’s board accepted the member’s resignation
did not amount to a counter-offer. Defendant further observed that because plaintiffs Foster and
DeJong did not elect to become equity members or pay $825 under the new membership plan
established in June 2005, they were not equity members of defendant country club.
The trial court agreed with defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ resignation letters were
not offers to resign, but rather an unconditional resignation effective immediately, and granted
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. According to the trial court, the only issue for it to
resolve was whether plaintiffs were required to pay the $270 dues for the month in which the
board accepted their resignation. The trial court ruled that defendant’s bylaws did not permit
defendant to charge plaintiffs dues for the month it accepted their resignations and ordered
defendant to refund plaintiffs such amounts.
II. Standard of Review
Although plaintiffs moved for summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(10), it appears that the trial court considered documents other than the pleadings in making its
decision. Therefore, we review whether summary disposition was proper under MCR
2.116(C)(10). This Court’s review of a trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) is as follows:
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual support for a claim. Downey v Charlevoix Co Rd Comm’rs, 227
Mich App 621, 625; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). The pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the
parties must be considered by the court when ruling on a motion brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Downey, supra at 626; MCR 2.116(G)(5). When reviewing
a decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this
Court “must consider the documentary evidence presented to the trial court ‘in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” DeBrow v Century 21 Great
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Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463 Mich 534, 539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001), quoting
Harts v Farmers Ins Exchange, 461 Mich 1, 5; 597 NW2d 47 (1999). A trial
court has properly granted a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) “if the affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is
no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362;
547 NW2d 314 (1996). [Clerc v Chippewa Co War Mem Hosp, 267 Mich App
597, 601; 705 NW2d 703 (2005), remanded in part 477 Mich 1067 (2007).]
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to
defendant. According to plaintiffs, their resignation letters constituted offers to resign,
and defendant’s response, to send stock refund checks reduced by $270 for dues for the
month in which defendant accepted each plaintiff’s resignation, constituted a counteroffer rather than an acceptance. Thus, plaintiffs contend, they had the right to revoke
their offers to resign since defendant did not accept them. And, according to plaintiffs,
they did revoke their offer to resign in separate letters to defendant dated April 20, 2006.
We reject plaintiffs’ contention that their resignations from defendant country
club constituted a contractual offer to resign. Rather, each plaintiff’s resignation was an
unequivocal resignation from defendant country club pursuant to the club’s bylaws. Each
letter clearly and unequivocally communicated plaintiffs’ intent to resign from defendant
country club. For example, plaintiff Ellspermann’s resignation letter stated: “We are
writing this letter to inform you of our decision to no longer be members of Berrien Hills
Country Club. . . . Please process our membership withdrawal effective today January
10th, 2006.” Plaintiff DeJong’s resignation stated: “Please accept this letter as my
official resignation as a Member at Berrien Hills Country Club, effective immediately.”
Plaintiff Foster’s resignation stated: “After much thought, I have decided to resign from
BHCC. . . . My dues are paid up through December and I assume I have a zero balance
so the Board can approve my resignation.” Plaintiff Yaggi’s resignation stated: “Please .
. . accept this as our letter of resignation from Berrien Hills Country Club.” In light of
the clear language in each plaintiff’s resignation letter, we reject plaintiffs’ claim that
their resignation letters were merely an offer to resign. The unequivocal language in the
resignations negates any such claim. Furthermore, defendant clearly accepted each
plaintiff’s resignation pursuant to its bylaws and communicated to each plaintiff that their
unequivocal resignations had been accepted.
Plaintiffs argue that Wiljamaa v Bd of Ed, 50 Mich App 688; 213 NW2d 830
(1950), establishes that a resignation is akin to an offer to rescind a contract and that an
offeree who purports to accept an offer of resignation with terms different than the terms
contained in the offer has, under the law, made a counter-offer. In Wiljamaa, the
plaintiff, a tenured teacher who had an employment contract with the Flint Board of
Education, sought to resign from her teaching position. She submitted her resignation
effective November 23, 1970, on a form supplied by the school board. The next day
someone changed the effective date of the plaintiff’s resignation to November 20, 1970,
without the plaintiff’s knowledge and consent. This Court stated that the plaintiff’s
resignation was akin to an offer to rescind her employment contract on November 23,
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1970, and that by changing the effective date of the resignation to November 20, 1970,
the board made a counter-offer. Id. at 690. According to the Court, the counter-offer was
not communicated to or accepted by the plaintiff, so there was no meeting of the minds
on plaintiff’s offer to resign or on the board’s counter-offer. Id. Thus, “the contract
between the plaintiff and the board was not rescinded by the tender of plaintiff’s
resignation.” Id.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Wiljamaa for the proposition that a resignation constitutes
an offer to rescind a contract is misplaced because of a critical factual distinction between
the facts in this case and the facts in Wiljamaa. In Wiljamaa, the plaintiff was an
employee with an employment contract who sought to resign from her teaching position.
Thus, her resignation was an offer to rescind the employment contract. Id. This case is
different, however, because plaintiffs were not resigning pursuant to an employment
contract, and unlike the plaintiff’s offer to resign in Wiljamaa, plaintiffs were not offering
to rescind a contract at all. Rather, plaintiffs were resigning in accordance with
defendant’s bylaws.
Although bylaws are a contract between a corporation and its shareholders, Allied
Supermarkets, Inc v Grocer’s Dairy Co, 45 Mich App 310, 315; 206 NW2d 490 (1973),
aff’d 391 Mich 729 (1974), we reject any suggestion that plaintiffs’ resignations under
the bylaws constituted offers to resign and essentially create a secondary contractual
relationship under the bylaws. Even if plaintiffs’ resignations did constitute offers to
resign, however, we find that whether defendant charged plaintiffs dues for the month in
which defendant accepted plaintiffs’ resignations was not a material term of the offers.
“For a response to an offer to be deemed an acceptance as opposed to a counteroffer, the
material terms of the agreement cannot be altered.” Zurcher v Herveat, 238 Mich App
267, 296; 605 NW2d 329 (1999). In this case, plaintiffs’ resignation letters all indicate
unequivocally that each plaintiff intended to resign from defendant country club. None
of the resignation letters indicate that plaintiffs’ resignations were contingent upon
defendant not charging dues for the month in which defendant accepted plaintiffs’
resignations. Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs’ resignation letters constituted offers to
resign, defendant’s response, which included charging each plaintiff $270 for dues for the
month in which defendant accepted the member’s resignation, did not materially change
the offer and transform defendant’s response into a counter-offer. If plaintiffs’ letters
were offers to resign, defendant accepted those offers.
As the trial court recognized, the real issue in this case is whether, under the
bylaws, defendant was authorized to charge resigning members dues for the month in
which defendant accepted the member’s resignation. “Bylaws are generally construed in
accordance with the same rules used for statutory construction.” Slatterly v Madiol, 257
Mich App 242, 250, 255; 668 NW2d 154 (2003). Courts must look at the specific
language of the bylaws. Id. at 255. “If the language is unambiguous, the drafters are
presumed to have intended the meaning plainly expressed.” Id. at 255-256.
We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of defendant’s bylaws in this regard.
Defendant’s bylaws specifically allow defendant to charge resigning members dues for
the month in which the member tenders their resignation. However, while the bylaws
provide that “[r]esignations will not be in effect until accepted by the Board of
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Directors[,]” the bylaws do not contain a provision requiring the resigning member to pay
dues for the month in which defendant accepts the member’s resignation. Just as courts
must not read into a clear statute a provision that is not derived from the manifest
intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself, Griswold
Properties, LLC v Lexington Ins Co, 276 Mich App 551, 564; 741 NW2d 549 (2007), we
decline to read into defendant’s bylaws a provision requiring resigning members to pay
dues for the month in which the board accepts the member’s resignation when such a
provision cannot be derived from the plain language of the bylaws themselves. The trial
court properly concluded that defendant’s bylaws did not permit defendant to charge
resigning members dues for the month in which defendant accepted the member’s
resignation.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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