PEOPLE OF MI V SHANEKA WASHINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 281621
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-400907-FC
SHANEKA WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her convictions for first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b), first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), and third-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(5). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for her first-degree murder
conviction, 120 to 180 months’ imprisonment for her first-degree child abuse conviction, and
203 days in jail for her third-degree child abuse conviction. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
This case arises from the death of one of defendant’s children and serious injuries
suffered by two of her other children. Early in the morning on February 20, 2007, emergency
personnel were summoned to defendant’s residence; one of her daughters was having difficulty
breathing and was unresponsive to treatment. Two days later, the child died from cranial
cerebral trauma, and the death was declared by Dr. Stephen Cohle to have been a homicide.
Defendant’s other children were removed from the home. When medical personnel examined
the children, they found a recent “loop-shaped abrasion across her son’s abdomen; bruises on his
left thigh, bruising on his left buttock, a scar on his right cheek, and an abrasion across his right
clavicle.” Another daughter of defendant’s had bruises and abrasions on her body, and x-rays
revealed that she also had two skull fractures.
Police officers interviewed defendant and inquired about the cause of the trauma to the
children. Defendant offered varying explanations for the childrens’ injuries, including that they
had fallen off a couch or a bed and that she had lifted the deceased child up by her arms and legs
to place her back in the bed. There was evidence that defendant had complained to her
boyfriend, who was incarcerated for reasons unrelated to the children, that she no longer had any
freedom because of the children and that she had not “enjoyed [her]self in three years.”
Defendant also wrote to her boyfriend, with whom she was to have a child, imploring him,
“[p]lease don’t make me keep this baby.” During one visit with her boyfriend, defendant told
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him that “she be whoopin [sic] the kids[,]” that “she throw [sic] them on the floor” when they
cried, and that she had punched one of her children in the eye.
Defendant was charged with first-degree child abuse, felony murder, and second-degree
murder for allegations relating to her deceased daughter. She was also charged with first-degree
child abuse for allegations relating to her other daughter and third-degree child abuse for
allegations relating to her son. At trial, defendant denied causing the injuries to her children,
claiming that “[m]y baby fell off the bed,” and that “anything could happen.” However,
defendant admitted that she was the only adult present when the injuries could have occurred.
Defendant also denied making statements to her boyfriend that she had thrown the children onto
the floor. Defendant claimed that she told her boyfriend that she punched one of the children in
the eye to see how he would react. As to her deceased child, defendant testified: “I thought my
baby had a disable [sic] problem. I was supposed to get on that but I never got a chance to get
around to it.”
The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree child abuse, and
third-degree child abuse. This appeal then ensued.
Defendant argues that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because her trial
counsel failed to raise or preserve an insanity or temporary insanity defense. Because no
evidentiary hearing was held, our review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that defense counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at 58. Defendant must prove that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that but for that deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Id. at 57-58.
Trial counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and
present a meritorious insanity defense. People v Shahideh, 277 Mich App 111, 119; 743 NW2d
233 (2007). MCL 768.21a(1) provides in part: “It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for
a criminal offense that the defendant was legally insane when he or she committed the acts
constituting the offense.” “An individual is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . . or
as a result of being mentally retarded . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or
her conduct to the requirements of the law.” MCL 768.21a(1). A defense of temporary insanity
may arise “when the chemical effects of drugs or alcohol render the defendant temporarily
insane.” People v Caulley, 197 Mich App 177, 187; 494 NW2d 853 (1992).
Defendant has not provided any affidavits or documentation indicating that she had any
medical or psychological condition at the time of the offenses to support her assertion that
exploration of an insanity defense might have been reasonable. “Insanity is a burden-shifting
affirmative defense, placing the burden of going forward with evidence of insanity on the
defendant.” People v Mette, 243 Mich App 318, 328; 621 NW2d 713 (2000). Given the lack of
any evidence that defendant had a history of mental illness, we cannot find within the record
before us, a basis for trial counsel to have raised an insanity defense. Hence, given that there are
no facts indicating that defendant was legally insane when she committed the charged offenses,
and no support for her claim that she had a meritorious insanity defense, defendant failed to
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establish the necessary factual predicate of her ineffective assistance claim. People v Hoag, 460
Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
Moreover, defendant’s defense at trial was to deny injuring her children. While a
defendant may present inconsistent defenses, People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 245; 562 NW2d
447 (1997), such an alternate defense would have undermined her defense. The failure of
defense strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, People v Stewart (On
Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996), and we will not substitute our judgment
for that of trial counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74,
76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional rights by
failing to take into account all mitigating evidence during sentencing. Our review of
unpreserved allegations of sentencing errors is limited to review for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 227-228; 646 NW2d 875
(2002). Defendant has failed to cite or identify any mitigating evidence that the trial court
should have considered. Defendant bore the burden of furnishing this Court with a record to
verify the factual basis of any argument upon which reversal was predicated. People v Elston,
462 Mich 751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). She has not done so here, and we conclude that this
issue is abandoned. People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 136; 687 NW2d 370 (2004).
Nevertheless, we find that the trial court reviewed defendant’s presentence investigation report
(PSIR) and her sentence information report (SIR); thus, there is no evidence that the trial court
failed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence in sentencing defendant. People v Nunez, 242
Mich App 610, 618; 619 NW2d 550 (2000).
Defendant also contends that the trial court committed numerous sentencing errors with
respect to the imposition of her sentence for her first-degree child abuse conviction. We reject
each of these challenges as legally and factually insufficient.
First, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider defendant’s rehabilitative
potential. To support this argument, defendant provides only a self-serving assertion that she has
strong family support. At sentencing, the trial court noted that it reviewed the PSIR, which
contained information regarding defendant’s familial history. Where, as in this case, the record
indicates that the trial court implicitly relied on the sentencing guidelines as provided by the
defendant’s PSIR, the trial court’s articulation requirement is satisfied. People v Conley, 270
Mich App 301, 313; 715 NW2d 377 (2006). Defendant has failed to establish plain error
affecting her substantial rights.
Second, defendant asserts that the trial court should have departed downward in
sentencing defendant, because she had serious mental health issues. A trial court may depart
from the properly calculated guidelines only for “substantial and compelling” reasons. MCL
769.34(3); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 255; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A substantial and
compelling reason is one that is objective and verifiable and irresistibly grabs the court’s
attention; is of considerable worth; and exists only in exceptional cases. People v Claypool, 470
Mich 715, 724; 684 NW2d 278 (2004). There is no evidence indicating that defendant had a
history of mental illness, and defendant’s argument essentially asks this Court to conduct a
psychiatric evaluation based on very limited information. On the record before us, we conclude
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that there is no objective and verifiable information related to any mental health issues that
would irresistibly grab the court’s attention and exists only in an exceptional case. Id.
Third, defendant contends that trial court failed to conduct an assessment of her
rehabilitative potential pursuant to MCR 6.425(A)(5).1 This contention lacks merit because there
is no requirement for a trial court to conduct an assessment of defendant’s rehabilitative potential
under MCR 6.425(A)(5). The PSIR contained no information regarding defendant’s medical and
substance abuse history, and there was no evidence that she ever used or abused drugs or alcohol.
The PSIR also noted that defendant had been evaluated in the past, and the evaluator “found
nothing clinically wrong with her.” Defendant’s PSIR complied with MCR 6.425(A)(5).
Fourth, defendant argues that the trial court imposed her sentence without complete and
accurate information. The record refutes defendant’s argument that her sentence was not based
on accurate information. Defendant failed to object to her PSIR at sentencing. See People v
Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 334; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Even on appeal, defendant does not
claim that the PSIR is inaccurate, but merely provides self-serving conclusory statements that the
trial court sentenced her without accurate information because it failed to assess her
rehabilitative potential. Any allegation of error related to the completeness or accuracy of the
PSIR must be rejected, because defendant may not challenge the accuracy of her PSIR unless she
raised the issue at or before sentencing. People v Bailey, 218 Mich App 645, 647; 554 NW2d
391 (1996).
Fifth, defendant asserts that her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
because it was disproportionate and the trial court failed to assess her rehabilitative potential.
There is no indication that the trial court failed to consider defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
Moreover, defendant’s sentence for first-degree child abuse is within the applicable guidelines
range; thus, that sentence is presumed proportionate. People v Bennett, 241 Mich App 511, 515516; 616 NW2d 703 (2000). A sentence falling within the sentencing guidelines or a
proportionate sentence does not constitute a cruel of unusual punishment. People v Drohan, 264
Mich App 77, 92; 689 NW2d 750 (2004).
Sixth, defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider all of the factors used to
determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Generally, a sentencing court should consider the
following factors: “(1) reformation of the offender, (2) protection of society, (3) punishment of
the offender, and (4) deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” People v Rice, 235
Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). “[T]here is no requirement that the trial court
expressly mention each goal of sentencing when imposing sentence.” Id. Thus, defendant’s
claim of error lacks merit.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court’s sentence violated the principles
expressed in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). Our
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MCR 6.425(A)(5) provides in pertinent part that a presentence report must include “the
defendant’s medical history, substance abuse history, if any, and, if indicated, a current
psychological or psychiatric report.”
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Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a contention, holding that Michigan’s indeterminate
sentencing scheme is unaffected by Blakely principles. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676678, 698; 739 NW2d 563 (2007).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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