PEOPLE OF MI V SYLVESTER STEVEN KEYS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277649
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-014069-01
SYLVESTER STEVEN KEYS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to life in prison for his first-degree murder
conviction, one to five years in prison for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and
two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals his first-degree murder
conviction as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial judge and presiding judge of the criminal division
reversibly erred when they denied defense counsel’s request for an adjournment, thereby denying
him an opportunity to adequately prepare for trial, and in turn, denying him his constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision on
whether to grant an adjournment for an abuse of discretion. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545,
556; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the decision results in an
outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes.” People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App
614, 617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006) (quotation and citation omitted).
To invoke the trial court’s discretion to grant an adjournment, a defendant must show
both good cause and due diligence. MCR 2.503(B)(1); People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 18; 669
NW2d 831 (2003). Even if good cause and due diligence are shown, a trial court’s erroneous
denial of a request for an adjournment is not grounds for reversal unless the defendant
demonstrates prejudice as a result of the erroneous denial. Id. at 18-19. When reviewing a
court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for an adjournment, a reviewing court considers:
(1) [W]hether the defendant is asserting a constitutional right, (2) whether the
defendant has a legitimate reason for asserting the right, such as a bona fide
dispute with his attorney, (3) whether the defendant was negligent in asserting his
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right, (4) whether the defendant is merely attempting to delay trial, and (5)
whether the defendant demonstrated prejudice resulting from the trial court’s
decision. [People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 369; 592 NW2d 737 (1999).]
In determining whether the denial prejudiced an accused, a court must balance the benefits of
granting the adjournment against the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration
of justice. Akins, supra at 557.
After filing an appearance on the record, but prior to being substituted as counsel and
moving for an adjournment, defense counsel told the trial judge that if prior trial counsel (Robert
Elsey) filed a motion for an adjournment that was denied, defense counsel was still “ready to go
and we can pick a jury.” After Elsey informed the trial judge that defense counsel had been (1)
visiting with defendant in jail, (2) had appeared with defendant at a proceeding the prior week,
(3) had been advising defendant, and (4) had been talking to witnesses, who as a result would no
longer talk to Elsey, Elsey moved to withdraw as counsel. After the trial judge acknowledged
that defense counsel had been in court the previous week at defendant’s proceedings, the court
granted the substitution of counsel because defense counsel indicated that he was “ready to
proceed with the case.” Defense counsel then immediately requested that he be allowed to “go
before the presiding judge” to request an adjournment “to protect the defendant.” Defense
counsel’s request was granted, and while appearing before the presiding judge, defense counsel
indicated that he had been in contact with defendant for the past six days and that, although trial
was scheduled to begin “today,” he was “ready to go.” The presiding judge denied defense
counsel’s motion, indicating that pursuant to an administrative order he did not have the
authority to grant an adjournment, as his power was limited to reviewing prosecutor requests to
review orders granting adjournments.1
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record shows that defense counsel (1)
had been working with defendant for at least six days, (2) had already appeared at court
proceedings with defendant, and (3) had indicated to the trial judge and the presiding judge that
he was prepared to proceed with trial. Furthermore, defense counsel sufficiently addressed
multiple preliminary matters immediately after the motion for an adjournment was denied, and
subsequently rigorously cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses regarding inconsistencies
between their trial testimony and prior written statements and preliminary examination
testimony. Consequently, defendant neither showed good cause for the adjournment nor that he
was prejudiced by the denial. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243 n 10; 733 NW2d 713 (2007).
Therefore, neither the trial judge nor the presiding judge abused his respective discretion when
denying defendant’s motion to adjourn, and the denial of the adjournment did not deny defendant
1
Third Judicial Circuit Court Rule 6.100(C) provides that only the presiding judge of the
criminal division can adjourn a trial:
No trial of a criminal case shall be adjourned except by the presiding
judge for good cause shown upon motion of the party seeking the adjournment or
by the presiding judge for good cause.
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his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Akins, supra at 556-557; Coy,
supra at 17-19.2
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it
failed to give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. We disagree. We review for
an abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination whether a jury instruction was applicable to
the facts of the case. People v Hawthorne, 265 Mich App 47, 50; 692 NW2d 879 (2005), rev’d
on other grounds 474 Mich 1108 (2006). However, whether an offense is a lesser-included
offense is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 531;
664 NW2d 685 (2003). Finally, a jury’s conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder when
also instructed on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder reflects an unwillingness
to convict on another lesser included offense, and thus the failure to instruct on further lesser
included offenses, like manslaughter, is harmless. People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 483; 563
NW2d 709 (1997).
Here, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, despite also being instructed
on second-degree murder. Thus, even if we assume instructional error occurred, it would have
been harmless error and would not merit reversal. Id.3
We also reject defendant’s argument that his trial counsel’s performance was so deficient
that it denied defendant his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. When
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when an evidentiary hearing is not
previously held, we conduct a de novo review of the existing record. People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d
96 (2002).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Decisions regarding
what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of
trial strategy. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). Counsel does
not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise futile objections. People v Ackerman, 257
Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
2
Even though the presiding judge denied defendant’s motion to adjourn on the erroneous ground
that he did not have authority to grant an adjournment, see Third Circuit Rule 6.100(C), supra,
because the denial of the adjournment was not improper, we nonetheless affirm the presiding
judge’s decision. See People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 406; 585 NW2d 1 (1998) (holding
that this Court does “not reverse where the trial court reaches the right result for a wrong
reason.”).
3
Because defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury instructions that were given, we
also conclude that defendant has waived his arguments regarding the trial court’s aiding and
abetting instruction, and the trial court’s first- and second-degree murder instructions. See
People v Hall (On Remand), 256 Mich App 674, 679; 671 NW2d 545 (2003).
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Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s aiding and
abetting instruction. To prove aiding and abetting of a crime, a prosecutor must show: (1) that
the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) that the defendant
performed acts or gave encouragement which assisted in the commission of the crime; and (3)
that the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge of the other’s intent at
the time he gave the aid or encouragement. People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 67; 679 NW2d 41
(2004).
In relevant part, the trial court’s aiding and abetting instruction stated that in order to
convict defendant as an aider and abettor, the jury had to find that someone committed the
charged crime, that defendant assisted in the commission of the crime, and that at the time
defendant gave assistance “he intended to help someone else commit the crime.” Because one
cannot intend to help someone else commit murder (the crime), unless one intends to commit
murder (the crime) or at the very least know that the person you are helping intends to commit
murder (the crime), the trial court’s instructions imply that defendant could only be found guilty
under an aiding and abetting theory if he intended to commit murder or knew that the person he
assisted intended to commit murder. Therefore, the trial court properly instructed the jury on
what it must find in order for it to convict defendant under an aiding and abetting theory. Moore,
supra at 67; Hawthorne, supra at 51, 57. Any objection to the trial court’s aiding and abetting
instruction would have been futile, so counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to
make such an objection. Ackerman, supra at 455.
We also reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court’s first- and second-degree murder instructions, which failed to instruct
the jury that the prosecution must establish that “the killing was not justified, excused, or done
under circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.” The commentary to CJI2d 16.1 (firstdegree premeditated murder) and CJI2d 16.5 (second-degree murder) provide that although the
instruction can be read after the respective murder instructions, it is “more commonly given at a
later time.”
After the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of first- and second-degree
murder, and before it instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, it instructed the jury that the
prosecution must establish “that the defendant caused the death without lawful excuse or
justification.” The trial court’s instructions, taken as whole, properly instructed the jury on the
elements of first- and second-degree murder. See CJI2d 16.1 and CJI2d 16.5. Accordingly, the
trial court’s first- and second-degree murder instructions were not erroneous. Hawthorne, supra
at 51. Any objection to the instructions would have been futile, and thus counsel did not render
ineffective assistance by failing to make such an objection. Ackerman, supra at 455.4
4
We likewise reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court’s failure to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Even if such an
instruction was warranted, since defense counsel requested the instruction, his performance
could not have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, defense
counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Toma, supra at 302-303.
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We additionally reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to cross-examine Antoine Shaw with his preliminary examination testimony that he did
not see defendant with a gun on the night of the shooting. At trial, Shaw testified that he never
saw defendant with a gun on the night of the shooting. In response to Shaw’s trial testimony, the
prosecution impeached Shaw by introducing his statement to the police that he saw defendant
run out of his house and start shooting. Although Shaw admitted that he told the police that he
saw defendant fire a gun on the night of the shooting, he testified that he only told the police that
because he was confused and was trying to get the police out of his house.
Given that Shaw testified that he did not see defendant with a gun on the night of the
shooting, Shaw’s preliminary examination testimony to the same effect would have been merely
cumulative. Furthermore, although introduction of the testimony may have bolstered Shaw’s
trial testimony, it still would not have changed the fact that Shaw told the police that he saw
defendant fire a gun on the night of the shooting. Finally, Shaw provided a reason why his trial
testimony was different from what he told the police. Defendant has therefore failed to establish
that defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine Shaw with his preliminary examination testimony
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that doing so would have affected the
outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective. Toma, supra at 302303.
Additionally, because (1) eyewitnesses saw defendant in the proximate area of the
shooting immediately after gunshots were heard, and one witness even told the police that he saw
defendant fire a gun, and (2) defendant has failed to establish who could have provided alibi
testimony, defense counsel’s failure to present an alibi defense did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Nor was presenting a self-defense theory plausible since (1) no
evidence was presented that would suggest that defendant acted in self-defense, and (2)
defendant failed to establish what evidence could have been presented that would have suggested
that defendant acted in self-defense. We therefore conclude that defense counsel likewise did
not provide ineffective assistance when he failed to present either an alibi defense or self-defense
theory. Id.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred when it precluded defendant from
presenting evidence regarding the victim’s reputation for violence. Once again we disagree.
Generally we review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v
Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). However, when a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence involves a preliminary question of law, such as whether a rule of evidence precludes
the admission of evidence, we review a trial court’s decision under a de novo standard of review.
Id. Thus, when preliminary questions of law are at issue, we will find an abuse of discretion
when a trial court admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Id.
The relevance of a victim’s aggressive character depends on whether it is used as proof of
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or whether it falls within an exception to
MRE 404(a)’s propensity rule. People v Harris, 458 Mich 310, 315-317; 583 NW2d 680 (1998).
MRE 404(a)(2) creates an exception for the admission of circumstantial character evidence of
the victim only “[w]hen self-defense is an issue in a charge of homicide[.]”
Although defense counsel stated that the prosecution failed to establish that the crime
occurred “under circumstances that are not excused or justified” because nobody knew “what
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happened,” defendant never presented a theory of self-defense. A defendant can be found to
have acted in self-defense “if, under all the circumstances, he honestly and reasonably believe[d]
that he [was] in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it [was] necessary for
him to exercise deadly force.” People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119; 649 NW2d 30 (2002).
Here, the record establishes that during the verbal altercation between the victim and
defendant, the victim stated that he was going to call people from the east side to presumably
help the victim fight defendant. However, no evidence was presented that the victim actually
called anyone from the east side. In fact, the evidence presented established that shortly before
the victim was shot, he and his girlfriend returned home unaccompanied by anyone else.
Furthermore, although the record establishes that the victim asked his brother for a gun, no
evidence was presented that defendant was aware of the fact. And, even though Shaw testified
that he saw the victim with “something” in his hand shortly before the incident, no gun was
found on the victim’s person after he was shot, no one ever saw the victim with a gun, and the
victim told his brother that he was unable to procure a gun. Hence, no evidence was presented to
establish that at the time the victim was murdered, defendant could have honestly and reasonably
believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it was necessary
for him to exercise deadly force. Therefore, the MRE 404(a)(2) exception does not apply. Id.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded testimony pertaining to the
victim’s character. MRE 404(a)(2); Harris, supra at 317.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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