JOSEPH SMITH V GORDON BROOKS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282885
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-079189-NO
GORDON BROOKS and PATRICIA
BROOKS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell, and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition for
defendants in this personal injury action. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff, who had a history of performing odd jobs for defendants and others, went to
defendants’ farm to bow hunt. After hunting, defendant Gordon Brooks (defendant) asked
plaintiff to remove a metal kick plate installed underneath a doorsill in his barn.1 The plate,
which spanned the length of the doorway, was approximately six inches wide, and was wrapped
under the doorsill. Defendant gave plaintiff a pair of tin snips and asked him to cut the metal
flush with the threshold where it went under the sill. Plaintiff, who maintained that he had never
cut tin, told defendant that he was “not a very good straight cut.” However, defendant told him
1
There exists some discrepancy as to whether plaintiff was a volunteer, an employee, or an
independent contractor at the time of his injury. Plaintiff testified that he was laid off from his
regular job in 2001, and returned to regular employment in 2005. In between these periods of
employment, he periodically helped Gordon Brooks perform “odd jobs” around the house and
farm. Plaintiff maintained that in return, “If I needed any help financially on my bills he would
help me.” In addition, plaintiff was given permission to hunt on defendants’ property. He
maintained, however, that, this arrangement was not a formal one. He also claimed that at the
time of the accident, he was initially present on defendants’ property only to hunt, and that
defendant subsequently asked plaintiff to do him a favor. Defendant testified that he did not pay
plaintiff to work on this project. For the purposes of this appeal, we accept plaintiff’s description
of the relationship he had with defendants.
-1-
that he planned to put another piece of metal over the area. Defendant then went into his house.
Plaintiff cut the bottom portion of the strip, and began to cut the remainder of the metal. As he
reached the end of the cut, the metal curled up and struck plaintiff in the eye, causing serious
injury.
Plaintiff brought the instant suit. Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition
asserting that plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of premises liability. Plaintiff
responded that the action was based on general negligence, not premises liability. Defendants
then argued that plaintiff’s claim is deficient because under the undisputed facts presented in this
matter, defendants were not under a duty to protect against the injury sustained by plaintiff. The
trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Smith v
Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Summary disposition is proper
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits and documentary evidence presented, viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co,
451 Mich 358, 362; 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996).
In Lelito v Monroe, 273 Mich App 416; 729 NW2d 564 (2006), this Court presented the
following analysis concerning a claim for a claim of general negligence:
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must show (1)
that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant breached the
duty, (3) that the defendant’s breach of the duty caused the plaintiff injuries, and
(4) that the plaintiff suffered damages. Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 427;
705 NW2d 164 (2005). “Duty” is defined as the legal obligation to conform to a
specific standard of conduct in order to protect others from unreasonable risks of
injury. Burnett v Bruner, 247 Mich App 365, 368; 636 NW2d 773 (2001). “In
deciding whether a duty should be imposed, the court must look at several factors,
including the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden
on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.” Hakari v Ski Brule Inc,
230 Mich App 352, 359; 584 NW2d 345 (1998). There can be no actionable
negligence if no duty exists. Id. The threshold issue of whether a duty exists is
determined by the court as a matter of law. Graves v Warner Bros, 253 Mich App
486, 492; 656 NW2d 195 (2002). [Lelito, supra at 418-419.]
As a general matter, each person is obligated to exercise reasonable care for one’s own safety.
The duty to aid or protect a third party may be found only if the injured party can establish the
existence of a special relationship with the defendant. The notion of a special relationship was
discussed in Dykema v Gus Macker Enterprises, 196 Mich App 6, 9; 492 NW2d 472 (1992):
In a special relationship, one person entrusts himself to the control and protection
of another, with a consequent loss of control to protect himself. The duty to
protect is imposed upon the person in control because he is in the best position to
provide a place of safety. Thus, the determination whether a duty-imposing
special relationship exists in a particular case involves the determination whether
-2-
the plaintiff entrusted himself to the control and protection of the defendant, with
a consequent loss of control to protect himself.
Applying the above-cited principle to the present case, we conclude that the undisputed
evidence fails to establish that plaintiff entrusted himself to the control and protection of
defendant, thereby losing control of his ability to protect himself. While defendant provided
plaintiff the tin snips, the record does not establish that defendant informed plaintiff he was
required to use them. Likewise, the record does not reveal that defendant dictated the manner by
which plaintiff was to remove the kick plate or use the tin snipes. Significantly, plaintiff
observed the tin coiling after effectuating the first cut in the plate. Plaintiff independently and
without direction from defendant elected to hold the metal plate down with his left hand while
using the tin snipes with his right hand. Not surprisingly, when plaintiff reached the point where
his second cut met his initial cut, the metal recoiled, resulting in injury to plaintiff. The record
establishes that plaintiff could have elected to remove the kick plate in any manner he saw fit, or
to simply not remove it at all. We therefore conclude defendant was not under a legal duty to
protect plaintiff from the injury he ultimately sustained while removing the metal plate.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 493-494; 702 NW2d 199
(2005), is misplaced. In Laier, the defendant asked the plaintiff to assist in the repair of a piece
of farm equipment. The plaintiff alleged that in the course of attempting to affect the repair, the
defendant negligently operated the equipment, thereby resulting in death to the plaintiff’s
decedent. In Laier, the plaintiff alleged active negligence against the defendant. By contrast,
defendant in the present case was not in any way assisting in the project that defendant agreed to
undertake. Moreover, the danger presented in Laier was significant -- it involved the repair and
operation of heavy farm equipment. By contrast, the injury sustained by plaintiff arose from the
misuse of a simple tool -- tin snipes. The tin snipes were not defective in any way. The injury
sustained by plaintiff was the result of the manner in which plaintiff elected to use the tin snipes.
Defendant was not responsible for the manner in which plaintiff used the tin snipes.
Accordingly, defendant was not under a duty to guard against the injury sustained by plaintiff.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
