CATHY S SHATTUCK V HOTEL BARONETTE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CATHY S. SHATTUCK and DANIEL P.
SHATTUCK,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 281065
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-079093-NO
HOTEL BARONETTE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary
disposition in this premises liability case. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s1 claim arises from a November 29, 2003 stay at the Hotel Baronette in Novi,
Michigan, during which she broke her wrist after she slipped and fell climbing out of her hotel
room’s bathtub. Plaintiff brought a negligence suit on a premises liability theory, alleging that
defendant breached its duty to plaintiff as an invitee by negligently installing a hard tile step next
to an extra-deep bathtub. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that she slipped on the hard tile step
abutting the exterior of the bathtub. However, during her deposition testimony plaintiff could
not state with certainty whether she slipped on the interior of the bathtub, or the tile step on the
exterior of the bathtub. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), contending that plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
causation, and alternatively that any wet, slippery surface near or inside of the bathtub
constituted an open and obvious danger. The trial court granted defendant’s motion on both
grounds. On appeal plaintiff contends that the danger presented by either the interior of the
bathtub or the exterior step was not an open and obvious hazard, and even if the danger was open
and obvious, special aspects of the bathtub and tile floor made the hazard unreasonably
dangerous. In addition, plaintiff argues there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation.
1
Because Daniel Shattuck’s interest in this case is derivative of that of his wife, Cathy
Shattuck’s case, the use of the singular word “plaintiff” will refer to Cathy Shattuck only.
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We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Brown
v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). When reviewing a motion brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider “the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the
parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 551-552. A moving party is
entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “[e]xcept as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” See Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512,
520; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open an issue on which
reasonable minds could differ.” Campbell v Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 229-230; 731 NW2d
112 (2006). The existence of a disputed fact must be established by admissible evidence as
opposed to a mere possibility that the claim might be supported by evidence at trial. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Our review is limited to the evidence that
had been presented to the trial court at the time the motion was decided. Pena v Ingham Co Rd
Comm, 255 Mich App 299, 313 n 4; 660 NW2d 351 (2003).
In a negligence action a plaintiff must prove “(1) that defendant owed [plaintiff] a duty of
care, (2) that defendant breached that duty, (3) that plaintiffs were injured, and (4) that
defendant’s breach caused plaintiffs’ injuries.” Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701
NW2d 684 (2005). The duty an owner or occupier of land owes to a guest is dependent on the
status of that guest. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596; 614 NW2d 88
(2000). One who enters another’s land on invitation for a commercial purpose where the essence
of the relationship is a pecuniary interest on the part of a landowner is considered an invitee. Id.
at 596-597, 604-605. Generally, “a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise
reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous
condition on the land.” Lugo, supra at 516. “However, this duty does not generally encompass
removal of open and obvious dangers.” Id. An open and obvious danger is a danger and risk
presented by that danger that an “average user of ordinary intelligence [would] have been able to
discover…upon casual inspection.” Novotney v Burger King (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470,
475; 499 NW2d 379 (1993). This test is objective, and we look “not to whether plaintiff should
have known that the [condition] was hazardous, but to whether a reasonable person in
[plaintiff’s] position would foresee the danger.” Hughes v PMG Bldg, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 11;
574 NW2d 691 (1997). Only if special aspects of a condition make an open and obvious risk
unreasonably dangerous does the premises possessor have a duty to undertake reasonable
precautions to protect invitees from that risk. Lugo, supra at 517.
Although plaintiff’s complaint alleges she slipped on the hard “glazed” tile step on the
exterior of the bathtub, during deposition testimony plaintiff offered conflicting testimony as to
the surface on which she slipped. Plaintiff first stated that she slipped on the exterior step, then,
when asked what caused her to fall, she stated “[t]he tub was slippery, the floor was slippery, the
step was slippery.” She also stated “I don’t know if it was [the exterior step] or if it was the step
inside the tub that caused [the fall].” Regardless whether plaintiff slipped on the floor, the
exterior step, or the interior step, we find that all three surfaces posed open and obvious dangers
without special aspects.
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Plaintiff testified that when she was entering the bathtub, the floor, the exterior step and
the interior of the bathtub were dry and not slippery. When plaintiff finished bathing she pulled
the plug on the bathtub’s drain. She did not wait for the water to fully empty before exiting the
tub, and she did not dry off before stepping out of the bathtub. Plaintiff further testified that she
was aware the exterior step was constructed of hard tile and that it did not have a non-slip surface
on it; yet despite this awareness, she did not place a towel on the exterior step or floor
surrounding the bathtub to absorb water and help protect her from slipping. Instead, plaintiff
stepped out of the bathtub with wet feet and with water still on her body. Wet hard tile and a wet
interior bathtub step, each present an open and obvious hazard. Plaintiff acknowledged this
hazard when she admitted during her testimony that stepping on a hard “glazed” tile surface with
a wet foot increases one’s chances of slipping. An “average user of ordinary intelligence
[would] have been able to discover…upon casual inspection” the risk posed by hard wet tile or
the wet interior of a bathtub. Novotney, supra at 475. In addition, “a reasonable person in
[plaintiff’s] position would foresee the danger” posed by stepping out of a bathtub of water with
wet feet onto a hard tile step or floor, or a hard interior bathtub step in a wet bathtub without
waiting for the bathtub to fully drain or drying oneself off, or placing a towel or other apparatus
in place to absorb the water. Hughes, supra at 11. No genuine issue of material fact existed on
the issue whether the alleged dangerous conditions were open or obvious.
Plaintiff also did not present evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
hard tile surrounding the exterior of the bathtub, and the interior bathtub step had special aspects
that served to create an “unreasonably dangerous” condition. Lugo, supra at 517. In Lugo, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated that special aspects “might involve” an open and obvious danger
that is “effectively unavoidable” or possesses characteristics that “impose an unreasonably high
risk of severe harm.” Id. at 517-518. Here, plaintiff could have avoided any slippery surface she
was about to encounter as she finished bathing by simply waiting for the tub to drain, drying her
feet off before exiting the bathtub, or placing a towel on the step next to the bathtub to absorb
water and provide a non-slip surface to step onto. Furthermore, the risk posed by the slippery
surfaces did not pose an unreasonably high risk of severe harm. The Lugo Court provided an
illustration of such a condition, “consider an unguarded thirty foot deep pit in the middle of a
parking lot…this situation would present such a substantial risk of death or severe injury to one
who fell in the pit that it would be unreasonably dangerous…” Lugo, supra at 518. In the
instant case, while a slippery floor or step presents a danger, unlike a thirty-foot fall, plaintiff
only faced a short fall to the ground and “[f]alling [even] several feet to the ground is not the
same as falling an extended distance such as into a thirty-foot deep pit.” Corey v Davenport
College of Bus, 251 Mich App 1, 7; 649 NW2d 392 (2002). Accordingly, we conclude on the
record before us, the risk did not present an unreasonably high risk of severe harm. Because
there were no special aspects making the risks posed by either the hard tiled surface, or the
interior bathtub step unreasonably dangerous, these conditions were not removed from the open
and obvious doctrine. Lugo, supra at 518.
We conclude that any risk posed by the slippery surfaces in the hotel bathroom were open
and obvious dangers without any special aspects. Plaintiff’s claim was therefore barred, and the
trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on this basis. See Lugo,
supra at 520-521. Because we affirm summary disposition on this ground, we need not address
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the issue of whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to causation.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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