IN RE WALTER AMBERS O'DOWD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of WALTER AMBERS O’DOWD,
Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 280841
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-730955-DL
WALTER AMBERS O’DOWD,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Davis and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A juvenile referee adjudicated respondent, a 14-year-old juvenile, guilty of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), for engaging in sexual contact with a four-yearold girl. That decision was affirmed by a circuit court judge. Respondent now appeals by
delayed leave granted. We affirm.
Respondent argues that the child victim was not competent to testify, that her testimony
was not credible, and that the evidence was therefore insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, respondent argues, the circuit court erred in affirming the
referee’s decision. We disagree.
A judge reviewing a referee’s recommendation must adopt the recommendation unless
the judge would have reached a different result, or the referee committed a clear error of law that
likely affected the outcome or cannot be considered harmless. MCR 3.991(E).
The determination whether a witness is competent to testify is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 583; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). In juvenile
proceedings, the standard of proof at the adjudicative stage, as in criminal proceedings, is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. MCR 3.942(C); In re Weiss, 224 Mich App 37, 42; 568 NW2d 336
(1997). An appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing the evidence de
novo in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); People v Oliver, 242
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Mich App 92, 94-95; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). The standard of review is deferential and this
Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the
verdict. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “Findings of fact by the
trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” MCR 2.613(C); MCR 3.902(A).
A person is guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct if the person engages in
sexual contact with another person who is less than 13 years of age. MCL 750.520c(1)(a).
“Sexual contact” includes “the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts . . . if
that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal
or gratification, [or] done for a sexual purpose[.] MCL 750.520a(q); People v Piper, 223 Mich
App 642, 645; 567 NW2d 483 (1997).
Initially, we reject respondent’s argument that the referee erred in finding that the child
victim was competent to testify. MRE 601 provides:
Unless the court finds after questioning a person that the person does not
have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify
truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
“The test of competency is thus whether the witness has the capacity and sense of obligation to
testify truthfully and understandably. Watson, supra at 583.
During preliminary questioning to evaluate the victim’s competency to testify, the victim
explained the difference between the truth and a lie, and gave examples of each. The victim also
promised that she would tell the truth. Although respondent contends that the victim had
difficulty understanding questions and later gave inconsistent testimony during her examination
at trial, these matters relate to the credibility of her testimony, not her competency to testify.
Watson, supra at 583. Because the victim’s voir dire responses demonstrated that she
understood the difference between a truth and a lie, and that she understood her obligation to
testify truthfully, the referee did not clearly err in finding her competent to testify.
Respondent argues that even if the victim was competent to testify, inconsistencies in her
testimony rendered the testimony unreliable and noncredible. Credibility determinations are
generally for the trier of fact to resolve and will not be resolved anew by this Court. People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The referee acknowledged that there
were inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, but attributed those inconsistencies in part to the
victim’s young age, noting that she lacked the vocabulary to speak on an adult level and that she
sometimes appeared to have difficulty understanding a number of adult questions. The referee
also observed that the victim seemed to tire because of the length of time that she was on the
witness stand. Despite these factors and the presence of some apparent inconsistencies, the
referee found that the victim was clearly attempting to tell the truth and that she was a credible
witness. The referee was in a superior position to evaluate the victim’s credibility and we find
no clear error in the referee’s determination of credibility. People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 130;
748 NW2d 859 (2008), mod 481 Mich 1201 (2008).
Further, a review of the victim’s testimony discloses that, despite some inconsistencies, it
was sufficient to support respondent’s adjudication. As the referee found, “the core of her story
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remained throughout” and her testimony “did refer positively to respondent touching her butt and
crotch area.” The victim testified consistently that respondent pulled down both his pants and
her pants, told her to close her eyes and not to look, and placed his crotch on either her crotch or
butt. She also testified that when respondent placed his crotch on her crotch, it felt hot, and that
respondent wiped something off her butt. Viewed in a light most favorable to petitioner, the
victim’s testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of second-degree CSC beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Contrary to what respondent argues, it was not necessary that petitioner establish a
specific date for the offense. “Time is not of the essence, nor is it a material element, in criminal
sexual conduct cases involving a child victim.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 83; 732
NW2d 546 (2007). Even a defense of alibi does not make time of the essence. Id. Here, the
information charged a six-month time period for the offense. Although much of the testimony at
trial focused on November 14, 2006, the evidence showed that respondent’s family and the
victim’s family were close, and that there were other occasions within the charged time period
when the victim or respondent were at the other’s house. Thus, to the extent that the evidence
raised questions whether the offense could have been committed on November 14, 2006, those
questions did not preclude a finding of guilt, given that it was not necessary to establish that the
offense was committed on that date.
For this reason, the fact that the referee determined that respondent’s sister was a credible
witness did not preclude a finding that respondent committed the offense. The sister’s testimony
focused on November 14, 2006. As the referee observed, the date of the offense was never
clearly established. Because respondent was charged with committing the offense within a sixmonth timeframe and because time was not of the essence, a determination of respondent’s guilt
or innocence did not depend on whether the offense was committed on that particular date.
Further, even with respect to that date, respondent’s sister admitted that the victim may have
gone off on her own for a little while.
Respondent also argues that the referee erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s
statements to her mother under MRE 803A because the delay between the incident and the
victim’s statement was not “excusable as having been caused by fear or other equally effective
circumstance.” We disagree. Fear is only one example of an “effective circumstance.”
Confusion or lack of understanding can have just as much effect on the mind, particularly the
mind of a very young child, as fear. The referee did not err in admitting the testimony on the
basis of this reasoning.
In any event, even if the referee erred in admitting the victim’s statements under this rule,
any such error would have been harmless. A preserved nonconstitutional error does not require
reversal unless it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); see also MCR 3.902(A) and MCR
2.613(A) (an error in the admission of evidence at a delinquency proceeding is not a ground for
reversal unless refusal to take action is inconsistent with substantial justice). Here, the referee
specifically stated that he found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence established
respondent’s guilt of second-degree CSC, and that he “would make this finding without the
803A testimony of Mother.” Thus, it is not more probable than not any error was outcome
determinative and refusal to take action would not be inconsistent with substantial justice.
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Next, respondent argues that he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing under MCR
3.932. Although respondent asserts that he preserved this issue by raising it in a motion to
dismiss, the record discloses that he later withdrew that motion. Accordingly, the issue is not
preserved. Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The rule cited by respondent, MCR 3.932, refers to a preliminary inquiry, which differs
from a preliminary hearing, the latter being governed by MCR 3.935. Where, as here, a juvenile
is not in detention, and detention is not being requested, “the court may conduct a preliminary
inquiry,” which is an “informal review by the court to determine appropriate action on a
petition.” MCR 3.903(A)(22); MCR 3.932(A). Respondent concedes that a preliminary inquiry
was held on March 5, 2007, but argues that he was not afforded an opportunity to attend the
inquiry. However, the juvenile’s presence is not required at a preliminary inquiry unless the
court, in the interest of the juvenile and the public, directs that the juvenile and the parent or
guardian appear for formal inquiry on the petition. MCR 3.932(A)(3). Respondent’s reliance on
Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565; 95 S Ct 729; 42 L Ed 2d 725 (1975), in support of his argument that
he had a due process right to a preliminary hearing is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that it was a violation of due process to suspend students from school without notice or an
opportunity to be heard. In this case, respondent was afforded notice of the charge against him
and afforded a full trial in which he had an opportunity to defend and be heard. Accordingly, his
due process rights were not violated. For these reasons, we find no plain error.
Finally, respondent argues that he was prejudiced in his ability to proceed and defend
against the charge because a complete transcript was not prepared and timely delivered during
trial. Because respondent never raised this issue below, appellate relief is precluded absent a
plain error affecting respondent’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763. The record does not
support respondent’s claim. After the victim testified on June 1, 2007, the referee agreed to
adjourn the trial until a transcript of her testimony was prepared. When the parties next appeared
on July 2, 2007, they agreed that there were problems with the transcript. The referee advised
the parties that the court reporter would use the backup tape to correct the transcripts. Before the
trial concluded, the parties appeared again on July 25, 2007, and defense counsel acknowledged
receiving the corrected transcript. Respondent brought several motions during trial, but no
objection was raised regarding the delivery or content of the corrected transcript. On this record,
respondent has failed to demonstrate either a plain error or shown that his substantial rights were
affected.
For these reasons, the circuit court did not err in affirming the referee’s decision.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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