PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN RICHARDSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272367
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-002364-01
BRIAN RICHARDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Davis and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less
than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver less than 50
grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (third offense), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as an
habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 10 months to 40
years each for the possession of cocaine and heroin convictions, six months to eight years for the
possession of marijuana conviction, and six months to ten years for the felon in possession
conviction, to be served consecutive to a ten-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Police officers executed a search warrant at an apartment rented by Andrena Simmons
and discovered defendant sitting at a table counting assorted bags containing drugs. On the table
were 30 clear plastic Ziploc packets containing an off-white lumpy material, 17 white paper
packages containing an off-white powder, and two clear plastic Ziploc packets containing
suspected marijuana. The substances were later analyzed and tested positive for cocaine, heroin,
and marijuana, respectively. A loaded firearm was discovered under the seat cushion of the chair
that defendant was sitting in. Defendant had more than $1,400 in cash on his person.
At trial, the defense attempted to shift blame to Simmons, suggesting that she possessed
the drugs because they were in her apartment. During cross-examination by defense counsel,
Officer Jerold Blanding testified that Simmons was issued a ticket in relation to operating or
occupying a place of illegal activity. At one point, Officer Blanding stated that Simmons told
-1-
him that she permitted defendant to sell drugs from the apartment. Defendant did not object to or
move to strike that statement.
The defense presented defendant’s ex-girlfriend, Aisha Penick, who testified that
defendant agreed to help her move on the day of his arrest, and that he went to Simmons’s
apartment to look for additional people to help him move her heavy appliances and furniture.
II
Defendant first argues that Officer Blanding’s testimony that Simmons told him that she
allowed defendant to sell drugs from her apartment was inadmissible hearsay and violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
As defendant concedes, there was no objection to this testimony at trial and, therefore,
the issue is unpreserved. We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Coy, 258 Mich
App 1, 12; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the testimony and requesting that it be stricken. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his attorney’s performance was objectively
unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms and (2) that, but for his attorney’s error, a
different outcome reasonably would have resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600;
623 NW2d 884 (2001);
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE
801(c); People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 651; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence. MRE 802; McLaughlin, supra.
Simmons’s statement to Blanding was an out-of-court statement and was not offered under any
hearsay exception. We agree that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.
Furthermore, the statement qualifies as a “testimonial statement” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. In Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 53-54; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed
2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment bars testimonial
statements by a witness who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Court held that “[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Id. at 6869. A pretrial statement is testimonial if the declarant should have reasonably expected the
statement to be used in a prosecutorial manner, and if the statement is made under circumstances
that would cause an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial. Id. at 51-52; People v Lonsby, 268 Mich App 375, 377; 707 NW2d 610
(2005). Here, an objective witness reasonably would expect that a statement to a police officer
that she permitted a person to sell illegal drugs from her apartment would be used in a
prosecutorial manner. Thus, the statement qualifies as testimonial and its admission at trial
violated defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.
For these reasons, Officer Blanding’s testimony regarding Simmons’s out-of-court
statement was plain error. Additionally, it was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel not
-2-
to object to the statement and move to have it stricken. Indeed, defense counsel conceded at a
posttrial Ginther1 hearing that he should have moved to strike the statement. We conclude,
however, that the plain error did not affect defendant’s substantial rights and that defendant was
not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object.
The significance of the objectionable testimony was that it linked defendant to the drugs
found in the apartment. But the statement pales in comparison to the officers’ testimony that,
when they entered the apartment, defendant was leaning over the table counting the assorted
bags of drugs. Further, a fully loaded handgun was discovered under the cushion of the chair
defendant had been sitting in when the police entered the apartment. Finally, although the
defense argued that defendant was present at the apartment only to get additional people to help
him move his ex-girlfriend’s furniture, there was no one else at the apartment other than a
woman and an older, bedridden man. The defense theory did not address why defendant was
found seated at a table counting bags of drugs. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different had
Simmons’s statement not been received, or if defense counsel had moved to strike the statement.
Reversal is not required on this ground.
III
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit from
defense witness Penick that she allegedly gave defendant $1,700 on the day he was arrested,
which was to be used to pay her rent and security deposit at her new apartment. We disagree.
Such evidence only would have explained why defendant had more than $1,400 in cash in his
possession at the time of his arrest. It would not have explained why he was seated at a table
counting assorted bags of drugs when the police entered the apartment. Further, testimony that
Penick entrusted defendant with a large sum of cash likely would have been viewed with
suspicion, considering that Penick testified at trial that she did not come forward sooner with
potentially exculpable information because she did not know what defendant had been arrested
for and did not discuss his arrest with him, because they were not getting along at the time.
Under these circumstances, we find no basis for concluding that defense counsel erred by failing
to elicit this information, or that defendant was prejudiced by its omission. Accordingly,
defendant has not established that defense counsel was ineffective. Carbin, supra at 599-600.
IV
Defendant lastly argues that misconduct by the prosecutor denied him a fair trial.
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s conduct at trial. Therefore, this issue is not
preserved. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 638; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). We review
unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. McLaughlin, supra at 645.
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-3-
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a
prosecution witness and improperly characterized Penick as a liar. We disagree. A prosecutor
may not vouch for a witness’s credibility or suggest that the government has some special
knowledge that a witness’s testimony is truthful. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 382; 624
NW2d 227 (2001). But a prosecutor may argue from the facts that a witness is credible or that
the defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528,
548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
In this case, the prosecutor’s argument that Penick’s testimony was not worthy of belief
was based on the evidence. The prosecutor referred to the fact that Penick waited until the eve of
trial to come forward with her purportedly exculpatory information, and the fact that defendant’s
presence and activities in the apartment were inconsistent with Penick’s explanation. Similarly,
the prosecutor’s argument that the officers’ testimony was credible was also based on the
evidence. The prosecutor referred to the officers’ testimony to explain why it showed that their
testimony was credible. The prosecutor did not make any statements suggesting that she had
some special knowledge or information that their testimony was truthful. Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s comments were not improper and there was no plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.