IN RE STEVEN ROBERT HINES MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of STEVEN ROBERT HINES,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286289
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000229-NA
STEVEN LESLIE HINES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
HEATHER ANN MILLER,
Respondent.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Bandstra and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Steven Leslie Hines appeals as of right from the order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) [“conditions that led to the
adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age”].1 We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
The initial petition filed in this matter alleged that on March 22, 2007, the involved
child’s mother used cocaine, passed out while a younger child was present in the home, and
subsequently refused treatment. The petition further alleged that respondent had been
1
Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j). After reviewing the trial court record, we find
that the trial court relied solely on MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Thus, this is the only statutory basis
we will consider on appeal.
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incarcerated at the Mound Road Facility for seven years, and failed to provide either financial or
emotional support for the child.
At the preliminary hearing conducted on March 23, 2007, respondent’s attorney
confirmed respondent’s incarceration, but conveyed to the court respondent’s interest in
obtaining visitation with the minor child upon release from prison. Respondent’s attorney also
reported to the court that respondent was participating in parenting classes while incarcerated.
At the time of this hearing, the minor child was approximately ten years of age and had
interacted with respondent on only three occasions. Respondent attributed his lack of
involvement and interaction with the minor child to interference and lack of cooperation on the
part of the child’s mother.
Due to his continuing incarceration, respondent failed to attend a pre-trial hearing
conducted on April 30, 2007. Respondent remained in prison when review hearings were
subsequently conducted on June 18, 2007 and September 13, 2007. Respondent’s attorney
continued to assert his client’s interest in planning for his son, and asserted that respondent had
not received a parent-agency agreement from the Department of Human Services (DHS).
Respondent’s attorney further indicated that respondent would attempt to procure a
psychological evaluation while in prison. When respondent’s attorney was unable to verify
respondent’s release date, the court set the case for a permanency planning hearing and
dismissed respondent’s counsel.
Respondent was released from prison and personally attended the December 12, 2007
permanency planning hearing. Tracey Rodriguez, a foster care worker, informed the court that
respondent had entered into a parent agency agreement which required respondent to:
(a) obtain and maintain emotional stability; (b) obtain appropriate parenting skills;
(c) obtain and maintain a substance free lifestyle; (d) obtain and maintain a legal
source of income; (e) keep regular contact with the DHS worker; (f) maintain a
safe and suitable home environment; and (g) attend visitation.
Rodriguez represented that respondent had expressed awareness of the need to quickly
demonstrate compliance with the plan, and recommended that the court afford respondent an
opportunity to establish a relationship with the minor child. When queried by the court,
respondent acknowledged that he had last seen his son “two and a half years ago.” Respondent
advised the court that he had been involved in parenting classes while in prison, but that the
classes had initiated too late for him to obtain a certificate of completion. The guardian ad litem
for the minor child recommended giving respondent a brief time period to demonstrate his
“capability” to become involved in the parent agency agreement. The court continued the
hearing until February 21, 2008 to permit respondent to avail himself of the offered services.
At the next hearing date, Rodriguez reported that despite respondent’s verbal
reassurances regarding his interest in participating in the parent agency agreement, respondent
had failed to take any definitive action.2 Specifically, respondent failed to (1) secure or schedule
2
Respondent was arrested on January 13, 2008, for receiving a stolen vehicle and, therefore, was
(continued…)
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a psychological evaluation; (2) arrange for participation in parenting classes; (3) complete either
any drug screens or parenting assessments; (4) provide proof of employment, or (5) visit with the
minor child despite transportation having been arranged by DHS.
Respondent and his counsel attended the May 28, 2008, termination hearing. Rodriguez
opined that the child would be at risk of harm if placed in respondent’s care, and that termination
was in the child’s best interests. The child’s therapist, Nathaniel Spears, testified that he met
with respondent on December 12, 2007 and had arranged for visitation with the minor child, but
respondent failed to take advantage of any of these opportunities to see his son. Spears
acknowledged that he had encountered problems communicating with respondent, and had lost
contact with him. Spears indicated that the minor child did not have a bond with respondent and
opined it was in the child’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Petitioner
offered into evidence certified copies of respondent’s various criminal convictions, ranging from
1988 until 2008.
When asked about the testimony of Rodriguez and Spears, respondent opined it was in
his son’s best interests that he be afforded another opportunity, and indicated a willingness to
work through a facilitator to establish a bond with his son. Respondent attributed his failure to
visit the minor child to lack of prior opportunities due to interference caused by the child’s
biological mother. Respondent acknowledged that he had been incarcerated for five of the past
eight years, but asserted he had attempted to maintain contact and a bond with his son. He
contended that, in the past, he made some child support payments through the Friend of the
Court, and obtained an order granting him parenting time every other weekend. According to
respondent, the child’s biological mother routinely denied him access to his son, the police
indicated they were unable to enforce the parenting time order, and he lacked the funds to go to
court to seek enforcement of his parenting time. While acknowledging his failure to comply
with the parent agency agreement, respondent attributed his noncompliance to problems
pertaining to transportation, his incarceration, and lack of knowledge regarding the services
offered by DHS. Respondent averred that he had purchased a home on a land contract, but failed
to produce any documentation verifying this purchase. Respondent also informed the court that
he had secured employment after leaving jail but currently received worker’s compensation due
to an injury. Although respondent claimed income of $2,500 per month, this testimony also
remained unverified. Finally, respondent asserted that, despite his extensive criminal record, he
had reformed, no longer associated with questionable individuals, and felt ready to both provide
for his son and make him a priority in his life.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered termination of respondent’s
parental rights. The trial court found, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions that
led to the adjudication continue to exist and there’s no reasonable likelihood the conditions will
be rectified within a reasonable time, considering the age of the child.” Specifically, the trial
court stated, in relevant part:
Now, with respect to the father, the petition, the initial petition states that
the father of Steven has been incarcerated, I think he was [at] the Mound Road
(…continued)
not present for this hearing but was represented by counsel.
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facility, since March of 2000, or approximately March of 2000, and that he has
not provided financial or emotional support. That was strictly the allegation
against the father. There was no allegation that he was using drugs or anything
like that, primarily it was that he wasn’t around for Steven, at the time. I do
believe that those conditions continue to exist today only because I know that you
were just let out of jail about a week and a half ago. So, during the course of
these proceedings, during the last almost 18 months, 14 months, something like
that, that Steven’s been in care, there has been a significant period of time that the
father has not been available to parent because he’s been incarcerated. So, I do
feel that the conditions that brought the child into care continue to exist today and
with regards to whether I feel there’s a reasonable likelihood that these conditions
can be rectified, you know, I just don’t know at this point. I have to say that the
last eight years are probably, for the reasonable mind, indicative of what’s likely
to happen in the future. He says no. He says that he’s, you know, he wants to
turn his life around. But, you know, I’ve got to go, right now, with what I think is
likely to happen and, based on past history, I do not feel that it’s likely to be
rectified in the reasonable future.
The court then addressed the child’s best interests and determined that termination was
appropriate.
II. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court shall terminate parental rights unless it
finds that the termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child.3 Id. at 353 (footnote
added). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. In re
Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
III. Analysis
The initial petition alleged that respondent was incarcerated and had not provided
financial or emotional support for his child over a prolonged time period. Respondent had been
incarcerated for five years out of the past eight and, in the past, demonstrated minimal interest in
the minor child. Notably, during the course of these proceedings, respondent was arrested for
engaging in criminal activity, seriously calling into question his contention that he had reformed
in his behavior and would be able to remain out of the prison system for a sufficient duration to
consistently parent his son.
3
MCL 712A.19b(5) has been amended, effective July 11, 2008, to require that the trial court
make an affirmative finding that termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of
the child. 2008 PA 199. The amended statute does not affect the instant case because the
termination order was entered on May 29, 2008.
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Respondent acknowledged at the permanency planning hearing that he had not seen his
son for approximately two and a half years. Although respondent attributed this lack of contact
to interference by the child’s natural mother, the evidence demonstrated that following
respondent’s release from prison and despite the proffered assistance of DHS, respondent still
failed to emotionally support his child or exercise his right to visitation. Even after the DHS
made transportation arrangements allowing respondent to visit with the child, respondent
disregarded the opportunity to spend time with the child. Notably, respondent attributed his lack
of contact with the minor child to extraneous forces, and assumed no responsibility for his own
role in the failure to maintain contact or establish a bond with the minor child.
The child’s therapist opined that respondent and the child had not bonded and testified
that the child expressed that he was not “comfortable” around respondent. Further, respondent
failed to demonstrate any measure of compliance with the parent agency agreement. He failed to
secure a psychological evaluation, neglected to schedule or participate in parenting classes, never
provided sufficient verification of employment or a stable home environment for the child. This
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the conditions that led to adjudication, i.e.,
respondent’s failure to financially and emotionally support his child, continued to exist and that
there reasonable likelihood existed that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
Further, we are struck by respondent’s assertions regarding his desire to have a
relationship with his son and his singular lack of focus on the best interests of the child.
Although respondent argues that he maintained a very strong desire to create a bond with his son,
his behavior calls into serious question his sincerity, given his repeated failures to take advantage
of the proffered opportunities for visitation. In addition, the child’s therapist testified that the
child exhibited considerable anxiety with regard to possible visitation with respondent. The
foster care worker testified that the child was doing well in his current placement, and was
“adjusted” and doing well in school. This testimony implied that contact with respondent would
be unwelcome by the child and unnecessarily disruptive. The opinions of the therapist and the
foster care worker amply support the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights served the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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