PEOPLE OF MI V SALATHIEL REZAR BROWN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279073
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-209679-FH
SALATHIEL REZAR BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury of third-degree fleeing and
eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a(1) and (3). Defendant was sentenced to 1½ to 15 years
in prison. We affirm. This case has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214
(E).
Defendant argues on appeal that because the prosecution failed to submit the videotape
from Officer Taylor’s patrol vehicle into evidence, there was insufficient evidence to support a
verdict of third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer. We disagree.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Hawkins,
245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). “[A] court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Nevertheless, “[t]his Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the
weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. . . . Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of the crime.” People v Passage, 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007).
The statute under which defendant was charged, MCL 750.479a, provides, in part:
(1) A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency
light, or siren a visual or audible signal by a police . . . officer, acting in the lawful
performance of his or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor
vehicle to a stop shall not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the
speed of the vehicle, extinguishing the lights of the vehicle, or otherwise
-1-
attempting to flee or elude the police . . . officer. This subsection does not apply
unless the police . . . officer giving the signal is in uniform and the officer’s
vehicle is identified as an official police vehicle.
***
(3) . . . [A]n individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of thirddegree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 5 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the
following circumstances apply:
(a) The violation results in a collision or accident.
(b) A portion of the violation occurred in an area where the speed limit is
35 miles an hour or less, whether that speed limit is posted or imposed as a matter
of law.
The terms “flee” and “elude” “connote an intent to take affirmative action, not simply fail
to submit.” People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599 NW2d 527 (1999). Moreover, there
is
no requirement that the defendant’s speeding exceed a certain level or that the
speeding occur over a long distance in order for the elements of the statute to be
met. The elements do, however, require the prosecution to demonstrate that the
defendant refused to obey by trying to flee or avoid capture, which . . .
necessitates a finding of some intent on the part of the defendant to flee or avoid
capture. [Id. at 741-742.]
The testimony presented at trial by both Taylor and defendant makes it clear that Taylor
was in uniform and driving a fully marked Southfield Police Department vehicle at the time he
first attempted to pull over defendant’s car on M-10 by flashing his lights. Defendant’s
testimony further indicates that he had the requisite intent to flee and elude – he felt that Taylor
was following him too closely so he did not want to stop. Defendant went so far as to put his
hand out of his car window to signal the officer to “get off my bumper so I can stop.”
Despite his displeasure with Taylor’s actions, defendant claimed that he eventually did
stop his car on the Northland exit, but that Taylor stopped his patrol vehicle in a lane of traffic
and jumped out with his gun drawn. In defendant’s mind, these actions by Taylor provided
justification for him to leave the scene. Taylor, on the other hand, denied getting out of his
vehicle or pointing a gun at defendant. Moreover, defendant has presented no evidence or legal
argument establishing that even if Taylor did draw his weapon, such action justified defendant’s
fleeing and eluding. The prosecution countered with evidence that if Taylor conducted a traffic
stop in this manner, this would have created a traffic hazard and would be a violation of
department protocol that could have resulted in Taylor’s discipline. The prosecution’s point, of
course, was that Taylor, a veteran police officer, surely would not have conducted a traffic stop
-2-
in such an inappropriate way. At any rate, it was the province of the jury to weigh the credibility
of such testimony.
Taylor and defendant also both agreed that after this first attempted stop, a chase ensued,
at which point Taylor turned on his siren. Defendant and Taylor further agree that Taylor then
moved his patrol vehicle alongside of defendant’s car and gave him a verbal direction to pull
over. Instead of pulling over, defendant – according to testimony from Taylor and Sergeant
Porter – swerved his vehicle toward Taylor. Taylor reacted by slamming his patrol vehicle into
defendant’s car, which Porter, a supervisor, termed a “reasonable decision” in light of what he
characterized as “an act of aggression” by defendant. Defendant denied intentionally swerving
toward Taylor’s patrol car. It was the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of the
testimony, and, at any rate, the end result was a collision, which violates MCL 750.479a(3)(b).
The prosecution provided still more evidence of defendant’s fleeing and eluding. After
the collision, defendant continued traveling down the M-10 freeway, pursued by other police
vehicles that had been called for backup. Defendant agreed that he did indeed take such action,
despite his assertion that he was willing to stop for other officers, whom he admitted that he
could see in the distance. Moreover, when defendant finally did stop, he got out of his vehicle
and ran. Therefore, even if, as argued by defendant, the missing videotape showed Taylor
threatening defendant with a gun and this somehow excused defendant from having to stop
initially for Taylor, there was still sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant caused a collision, sped through a residential neighborhood
(where the speed limit is under 35), and fled from several other officers in violation of MCL
750.479a(1) and (3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
