PEOPLE OF MI V DERRICK E HIGGINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282382
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007531-FH
DERRICK E. HIGGINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion
to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction to resentence defendant. We reverse and remand for
resentencing. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
In a prior appeal, this Court vacated defendant’s sentences of 18 months to 20 years’
imprisonment for his jury conviction of delivery of 50 or more but less than 225 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and 1 to 30 years’ imprisonment for his plea-based conviction
of delivery of 225 or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), and
remanded for resentencing. People v Higgins, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 15, 2007 (Docket Nos. 262756, 263966). Pursuant to MCR
7.215(F)(1)(a), this Court’s judgment became effective on April 12, 2007. Resentencing was
scheduled for August 24, 2007, but defendant requested and received an adjournment to allow
defendant to file a sentencing memorandum. On September 30, 2007, before resentencing
occurred, the Department of Corrections issued a “Parole Board Order for Discharge from
Sentence.” (Appendix A to defendant’s brief.) Relying on the Parole Board’s order and People
v Gregorczyk, 178 Mich App 1; 443 NW2d 816 (1989), defendant argued that because he had
been discharged from the prior invalid sentences by “executive commutation,” resentencing him
according to this Court’s mandate would deny him due process and intrude on separation of
powers. The trial court agreed and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to review and revoke the
parole board discharge and to resentence defendant. This issue presents a question of law, which
we review de novo. People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 423; 531 NW2d 734 (1995).
In People v Lamb (After Remand), 201 Mich App 178; 506 NW2d 7 (1993), and People v
Hill (After Remand), 202 Mich App 520; 509 NW2d 856 (1993), this Court distinguished
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Gregorczyk, supra, and explained that Gregorczyk was limited to its facts. The present case is
distinguishable from Gregorczyk, as well as Lamb and Hill, because here the parole board
discharge was issued after this Court’s prior judgment vacating defendant’s sentences became
final. Assuming, arguendo, that the parole board discharge ordinarily “must operate as ‘a
remission of the remaining portion of his sentence[s],’” Gregorczyk, supra at 12, the remitted
sentences here had already been vacated. Therefore, the discharge order was effectively a
nullity. Unlike in Gregorczyk, resentencing in this situation does not implicate due process or
separation of powers concerns.
Plaintiff argues that this case should be reassigned to a different judge because the trial
court judge has previously erroneously found that defendant was entrapped,1 improperly
sentenced defendant to only a fraction of what was statutorily required, and now has improperly
dismissed the case, suggesting that he is unwilling to set aside his previously formed opinion that
defendant should not be held responsible for his criminal actions.
In deciding whether resentencing should occur before a different judge, this Court
considers (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected on remand to have
substantial difficulty in putting aside previously expressed views or findings determined to be
erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable for
the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out
of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. People v Hill, 221 Mich App
391, 398; 561 NW2d 862 (1997), lv den 456 Mich 913 (1997). Reassignment is not necessary to
preserve the appearance of justice, but it may entail waste or duplication that is out of proportion
to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. Accordingly, we deny plaintiff’s request to
reassign this case to a different judge.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
See People v Higgins, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October
6, 2000 (Docket No. 220697).
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