ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CORP V CMS ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CMS ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY,
No. 282127
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006064-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of summary disposition in favor of defendant on
plaintiff’s unfair competition claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s business of consulting and brokering energy products commenced in 1991.
Plaintiff, however, engaged in minimal business activities in the last few years before the instant
dispute. Defendant is also engaged in the brokering of energy products and was formed in 1996
under the name CMS Marketing, Services and Trading Company. According to plaintiff, the
two parties were involved in several marketing deals with each other in the 1990s and generally
peacefully co-existed in the marketplace.
This changed, however, in 2004 when defendant changed its name to CMS Energy
Management Company. Plaintiff sent defendant a cease and desist letter stating that defendant’s
new name constituted unfair competition by the use of a similar name and a trademark or service
mark infringement. Defendant’s refusal to do so led to the instant lawsuit, which alleged two
counts: (1) unfair competition through improper use of corporate name and symbol and (2)
tortious interference with advantageous business relationships. The trial court granted summary
disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to
defendant on the unfair competition claim. We disagree. We review the grant or denial of a
motion for summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d
817 (1999). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
complaint and, after reviewing affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law if the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Maiden,
supra at 118.
The trial court cited a number of reasons to support the grant of summary disposition to
defendant. First, the trial court concluded that there could be no unfair competition because
there was no evidence of actual competition between plaintiff and defendant. See Ex-Cell-O
Corp v Sage, 347 Mich 210, 213; 79 NW2d 497 (1956). The trial court noted that defendant had
exited the retail market at the time it changed its name, while plaintiff considers itself a broker in
the retail market. The trial court additionally noted that plaintiff’s presence in that market was
minimal at best: in the seven years preceding defendant’s name change, plaintiff had only one
contract for the sale of natural gas, which expired two years before the name change, and no
contracts for the sale of electricity. Plaintiff had no sales after 2002. Second, the trial court
concluded that there was no confusion between the names, focusing in particular on the fact that
the first word or term in defendant’s name, CMS, does not appear in plaintiff’s name. See
Educational Subscription Services, Inc v American Educational Services, Inc, 115 Mich App
413, 423; 320 NW2d 684 (1982).
Both of those arguments certainly support the grant of summary disposition. Plaintiff has
made no factual showing that it is in actual competition with defendant. Indeed, there is no
evidence that plaintiff was in competition with anyone after 2002. The purpose of invoking a
remedy for the misappropriation of a corporate name is to prevent injury to the plaintiff. 220
Bagley Corp v Julius Freud Land Co, 317 Mich 470, 477; 27 NW2d 59 (1947). Although
plaintiff makes the bald assertion that it has been injured by defendant’s name change, plaintiff
points us to no evidence of any loss of business to plaintiff caused by the name change.
Furthermore, as indicated in Educational Subscription Services, supra, absent a corporate name
obtaining a secondary meaning, corporate names are not confusingly similar if the first word in
each name is obviously different. Id. at 423.
Thus, the subsidiary question that must be addressed is whether plaintiff’s name has
acquired a secondary meaning. The trial court concluded that there is no evidence to support a
conclusion that such a secondary meaning has arisen. We agree with the trial court. No actual
competition need be shown where a trade name has established a secondary meaning. Thrifty
Acres, Inc v Al-Naimi, 119 Mich App 462, 466; 326 NW2d 400 (1982). In short, it is improper
to take unfair advantage of a trade name developed by another business to the point that potential
customers associate with that business. This is true even if the customers would not necessarily
do business with the company whose name is being misappropriated. It is sufficient if the
company that is improperly using another company’s trade name is obtaining customers it might
not otherwise obtain because of the misuse of the name. Id. at 466-467.
In the case at bar, plaintiff makes absolutely no showing that its trade name is so wellestablished in the industry that it has established a secondary meaning with plaintiff’s business or
that defendant has obtained any customers because those customers believed that they were
dealing with plaintiff instead of defendant. Indeed, the fact that plaintiff had failed to obtain any
new customers for several years before defendant changed its name would strongly suggest that
there exists no secondary meaning to plaintiff’s name nor did defendant obtain any customers as
a result of the name change who thought they were dealing with plaintiff.
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Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on its
tortious interference claim. We disagree. The trial court concluded that there was no evidence
of either any actual interference or even any intent to interfere. The parties agree that this case is
controlled by Winiemko v Valenti, 203 Mich App 411; 513 NW2d 181 (1994). Actual
interference that causes or induces a breach or termination of the business relationship or
expectancy is required. Id. at 416. Plaintiff makes no showing of the existence of such a
relationship or expectancy, beyond the unsubstantiated assertion that it expected to someday do
business again. There is no indication that that expectancy was grounded in reality or, more
importantly, that any actions by defendant diminished the possibility of that expectancy
becoming reality.
Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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