PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY CLIFFORD GATES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
ANTHONY CLIFFORD GATES, a/k/a DEION
BURKE,
No. 281205
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-000145-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Anthony Clifford Gates, was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree
home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and assault (domestic), MCL 750.81(2). He was sentenced as
an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to concurrent sentences of 8 to 30 years’
imprisonment for first-degree home invasion and to 120 days in jail for the assault. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
The facts presented at trial established that defendant, at about 3:00 p.m. on January 1,
2007, called the victim, his exgirlfriend, and asked if they could meet to talk. The victim told
defendant she could not meet, but that she would call defendant when she returned home. When
she returned home at 9:30 p.m., defendant had left three voice messages for her including, “You
f--king bitch just call me,” and “Please call me back don’t you know shut me out. Call me
back.” The victim spoke with defendant later that night at 11:00 p.m. and told defendant not to
come by the house. The victim and defendant previously shared her home for the 3-½ years they
were dating, but defendant moved out of the residence and subsequently returned the house keys
to the victim when their relationship ended in November 2006. Before the victim went to bed,
she heard defendant approach the house in a van. Defendant walked up to the house from the
parked van three times, knocking on several doors, requesting to be let inside the home. Using a
cordless telephone, the victim called her friend, who called the police and remained on the
telephone with the victim during the incident. The victim had hoped defendant “would just get
tired of knocking and leave,” but instead, defendant entered the home while the victim was
upstairs near her bedroom. She “freaked out” and yelled at defendant repeatedly asking him
“Why are you here? How did you get in here? Get out!” When defendant climbed the stairs to
approach the victim, the victim raised her arm and stretched it out to maneuver to get past
-1-
defendant; defendant grabbed her arm and pushed her, causing her to lose her balance and fall
onto her bed. He said to the victim “I just want to talk to you.” The victim got up from the bed
and walked past defendant downstairs; defendant followed her asking the victim “not to call the
police on him” as he “just wanted to talk.” When the police arrived at the home, they found
defendant intoxicated, pleading with the victim, kneeling on the kitchen floor with hands that
were bloodied from an unrelated previous incident. The victim had checked all of the doors that
evening and was certain that they were locked, so she was unclear at trial how defendant entered
the home. There were no broken windows, but a tire iron was found near one of her doors and
three witnesses, the responding police officer, the victim and the victim’s friend all expressed
their belief that the door had been jimmied with the tire iron.
Defendant at trial requested that the lesser offense instruction for misdemeanor entry
without owner’s permission, MCL 750.115, see also CJI2d 25.4, be given as a necessarily lesser
included offense to the charge of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant
asserted that the lesser included offense instruction was proper because there was sufficient
evidence that defendant did not intend to assault the victim, pushed the victim in self-defense
when they encountered each other at the top of the stairs, and that defendant only wanted to talk
to the victim. The defense also asserted that it was unclear if defendant needed to “break and
enter” in order to enter the home, suggesting he may have entered with a key. The trial court
declined to give the instruction. Defendant argues on appeal that the denial of this lesser offense
instruction was an abuse of discretion.
Preserved instructional errors are reviewed de novo. People v Marion, 250 Mich App
446, 448; 647 NW2d 521 (2002). A trial court’s determination regarding the applicability of an
instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712
NW2d 419 (2006). Nevertheless, the failure to give a requested instruction on a lesser included
offense may be harmless error. Id. at 140 n 18. The validity of the verdict is presumed, and
defendant bears the burden of showing that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, in that,
after examination of the entire case, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that
the error was outcome determinative. People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 362-364; 646 NW2d 127
(2002); MCL 769.26; MCR 2.613(A). Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo. People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 116; 734 NW2d 548 (2007). When interpreting statutes, our
Court’s “goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by applying the plain language of
the statute.” Id.
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to give the requested jury instruction
on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor entry without permission, MCL 750.115, and only
instructed the jury for the offenses of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and assault,
MCL 750.81(2). Our Supreme Court has recognized that misdemeanor entry without permission
is a necessarily lesser included offense of first-degree home invasion, People v Silver, 466 Mich
386, 392; 646 NW2d 150 (2002), and that a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser
offense is proper when “the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual
element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would
support [the lesser included offense].” Cornell, supra at 337. Therefore, if either party requests
an instruction regarding a necessarily included offense, the court must instruct the jury on the
-2-
lesser offense; the “failure to instruct the jury regarding such a necessarily lesser included
offense is error requiring reversal, and retrial with a properly instructed jury, if, after reviewing
the entire cause, the reviewing court is satisfied that the evidence presented at trial ‘clearly’
supported the lesser included instruction.” Silver, supra at 388. Proof of an element
“ ‘differentiating the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently
find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense.’ ” Cornell,
supra at 352, quoting United States v Whitaker, 447 P2d 314 (1971).
The fundamental, distinguishing factual dispute between the application of MCL
750.110a(2) and MCL 750.115 to the facts of this case is specifically whether an assault
occurred while defendant was present in the home. Defendant’s method of entry into the home
was not a distinguishing feature. To convict defendant under the theory at issue pursuant to
MCL 750.110a(2), defendant had to have broken and entered the victim’s residence.1 MCL
750.115, as a lesser included offense, can be accomplished by breaking and entering. Whether
defendant effected entry without breaking, an alternative for conviction under MCL 750.115,
was not a critical distinction between the greater and lesser offenses in this case. The distinct
element distinguishing the crimes in this case was whether defendant committed an assault after
entering the dwelling. The trial court’s denial of the lesser included offense instruction was not
proper because the charged greater offense required the jury to find that an assault was
committed, which element is not part of the lesser offense, and a rational view of the evidence
would have supported the lesser offense. Cornell, supra. There was testimony that defendant
grabbed the victim’s arm only in self-defense, that he entered the residence only to speak with
the victim, and the victim’s testimony raised some question as to whether there was an assault
because she acknowledged that she was the first to “raise a hand” when defendant and the victim
encountered each other and that she fell when she lost her balance. We conclude, therefore, that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested lesser offense instruction.
In this case, however, the denial of the instruction was harmless error. Harmless error
analysis applies to instructional errors involving lesser included offenses. Gillis, supra at 140 n
18. Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error resulted in a miscarriage of
justice and it must affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was
outcome determinative. Cornell, supra at 362-364.
Upon a review of the entire cause, it is clear that the omitted lesser included offense
instruction was not outcome determinative, because the jury independently established the
disputed fact, specifically whether an assault occurred, when it convicted defendant of domestic
assault. On the record, defendant cannot show that it was more probable than not that the error
was outcome determinative where the jury unequivocally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
that an assault took place. Defendant has not met his burden of proof to show that a miscarriage
1
The prosecutor pursued a theory that defendant broke and entered, and while present in the
dwelling, committed an assault.
-3-
of justice occurred in this case. The denial of the instruction was harmless error and reversal of
defendant’s convictions is not required. MCL 769.26; MCR 2.613(A).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.