MEISNER & ASSOCIATES PC V STAMPER & COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MEISNER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 280190
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000906-CZ
STAMPER & COMPANY and JEFFREY J.
PODOLSKI,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this defamation case, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s orders granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and denying
plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint to add two additional claims based on conduct
committed in 1999. We affirm.
I. Plaintiff ’s Original Complaint
Plaintiff was retained as legal counsel for Woodside Meadows Condominium
Association. Defendant Stamper & Company was the managing agent for Woodside until
Woodside terminated the relationship in February 2006. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that in
January 2006, Stamper’s assistant vice president and senior property manager, defendant Jeffrey
Podolski, made defamatory statements regarding plaintiff in the following email that he sent to
Woodside’s board members:
One more thing. I just received the invoice that you sent to me via fax for
Meisner. My first observation is that the amount being charged to the Association
for the hourly rate is very high. Given that it is partially our job to assist the
Board in looking at cost saving measures, I would suggest potentially switching
attorneys to a legal firm that is equally qualified and significantly cheaper in
hourly rate. If the Board chooses to continue to use Meisner, the Board should
seriously consider adding more money to the budget for legal expenses to offset
the future inflated legal bills that the Association will continue to incur. By
adding money to cover the legal expenses, other areas of the budget will likely be
underfunded and therefore the dues will ultimately have to be raised as a result of
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legal expenses alone. The general membership of Co-Owners may find it
troubling to pay exorbitant amounts of money for legal bills when legal services
can be obtained for much less elsewhere. Please review this email with the rest of
the Board and let me know your thoughts.
In response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, the trial court concluded that
Podolski’s statements were not defamatory because they were mere expressions of opinion,
because the statements were generally true, and because they were subject to a qualified
privilege. Accordingly, it granted defendants’ motion.
This Court reviews a trial court’s summary disposition decision de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The trial court granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support for a claim. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). Summary
disposition should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455-456 n 2;
597 NW2d 28 (1999); Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995).
A claim for defamation requires proof of the following elements:
(1) [A] false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an
unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of
special harm caused by publication. Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek
(After Remand), 440 Mich 238, 251; 487 NW2d 205 (1992) (libel); Ledl v Quik
Pik Food Stores, Inc, 133 Mich App 583, 589; 349 NW2d 529 (1984)
(defamation). [Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).]
“A communication is defamatory if, under all the circumstances, it tends to so harm the
reputation of an individual that it lowers the individual’s reputation in the community or deters
others from associating or dealing with the individual.” Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611,
617; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). But
not all defamatory statements are actionable. If a statement cannot be reasonably
interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff, it is protected by the First
Amendment. Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 20; 110 S Ct 2695; 111
L Ed 2d 1 (1990); Garvelink v Detroit News, 206 Mich App 604, 608-609; 522
NW2d 883 (1994). Thus, at least some expressions of opinion are protected.
Milkovich, at 18-20. [Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App 607, 614; 584 NW2d
632 (1998).]
“A court may determine, as a matter of law, whether a statement is actually capable of
defamatory meaning.” Kevorkian v American Medical Ass’n, 237 Mich App 1, 9; 602 NW2d
233 (1999). “Where no such meaning is possible, summary disposition is appropriate.” Id.
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Viewing Podolski’s email in its entirety, it is apparent that Podolski was advising
Woodside that plaintiff ’s fees were higher than other law firms and that Woodside could save
money by switching to another law firm that charged a lower hourly rate. Although this portion
of Podolski’s email can be considered factual, the evidence established that there were other law
firms who charged lesser hourly rates than plaintiff. Therefore, this portion of Podolski’s email
has not been shown to be false. Podolski’s statements about saving money and the prospect of
future legal expenses were primarily expressions of opinion about the relative cost of plaintiff ’s
services.
Plaintiff places great emphasis on Podolski’s references to plaintiff ’s bills as “inflated”
and the expectation that Woodside would be paying “exorbitant” amounts to plaintiff for legal
services if Woodside continued to use plaintiff ’s services. Plaintiff attempts to isolate these
terms to argue that Podolski’s comments were intended to show that plaintiff charged fees for
work it never performed, or that its fees did not conform to standards set by the profession.
When Podolski’s statements are read in context, however, a jury could not reasonably find that
the statements are defamatory in the way plaintiff suggests. It is apparent that Podolski took
issue with plaintiff ’s higher rate and believed that Woodside could save money by switching to
another law firm. Podolski’s comments cannot reasonably be interpreted as impugning the
character of the services actually provided by plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
finding that the statements were not capable of defamatory meaning.
We also agree with the trial court’s determination that the statements were subject to a
qualified privilege.
“[A] qualified privilege extends to all communications made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
to a person having a corresponding interest or duty and embraces cases where the duty is not a
legal one but is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation.” Hall v Pizza Hut of
America, Inc, 153 Mich App 609, 619; 396 NW2d 809 (1986).
The elements necessary for a qualified privilege are
(1) good faith, (2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement limited in its scope to
this purpose, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) publication in a proper manner and to
proper parties only. [Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 15; 483 NW2d 629
(1992).]
The plaintiff may overcome a qualified privilege only by showing that the statement was made
with actual malice or with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Id.
“General allegations of malice are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
“Reckless disregard for the truth is not established merely by showing that the statements were
made with preconceived objectives or insufficient investigation.” Grebner v Runyon, 132 Mich
App 327, 333; 347 NW2d 741 (1984).
We find no merit to plaintiff’s argument that a qualified privilege may not be found
because Woodside had fired Stamper as its managing agent before the email was sent on January
5, 2006. Although there was evidence that Woodside notified Stamper before the date of the
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email that Stamper’s contract with Woodside was not being renewed, plaintiff concedes that the
Woodside/Stamper contract did not end until February 28, 2006. Thus, Stamper was still
working as Woodside’s management firm at the time the email was sent. Indeed, the second
sentence of the email mentions that Woodside had just faxed Stamper a copy of plaintiff ’s
invoice.
We agree with the trial court that all elements for a qualified privilege were shown to
exist. It is apparent from the face of the email that Woodside sent plaintiff’s invoice to Podolski
for payment. Defendants, as Woodside’s management company at the time, had an interest in
helping Woodside contain its expenses and clearly could convey that Woodside could save
money by switching to another law firm. At his deposition, Podolski testified that his duties
included assisting Woodside with its budget and, when he reviewed plaintiff ’s invoice before
paying it, he thought the hourly rates seemed high in comparison to the hourly rates charged by
other law firms that other clients regularly used. Podolski’s comments were limited in scope to
this purpose and were made on a proper occasion when Podolski was asked to pay plaintiff ’s
invoice. Further, Podolski’s email was sent only to members of Woodside’s board, not to other
persons.
In sum, Podolski, as Woodside’s management agent charged with paying plaintiff’s
invoice, had a qualified privilege to comment on the nature of plaintiff ’s fees, and the evidence
established that Podolski’s statements were properly limited in scope and purpose, and
sufficiently restricted to appropriate parties, to be subject to a qualified privilege. Further,
plaintiff failed to produce evidence of actual malice to overcome this privilege. Even if
Podolski’s statements were made without adequate investigation, as plaintiff alleges, this is
insufficient to prove reckless disregard for the truth or to establish actual malice. Grebner, supra
at 333.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s defamation claim
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
II. Plaintiff ’s Motion to Amend
Plaintiff alleges that during discovery, it learned that defendants made similar statements
in 1999 to plaintiff ’s former client, Schultz Estates II Condominium Association. Plaintiff
sought to amend its complaint to add new claims for defamation and tortious interference with
contractual relations based on defendants’ conduct in 1999. Plaintiff does not dispute that,
absent some tolling provision, its new claims would be barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. Plaintiff relied on fraudulent concealment, MCL 600.5855, to argue that the statutes
of limitation were tolled. The trial court found that there was no basis for concluding that any
claim was fraudulently concealed and, therefore, denied plaintiff’s motion to amend.
A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to amend the pleadings will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 53; 684
NW2d 320 (2004).
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MCL 600.5855 provides:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the
existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim
from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the action may be
commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is entitled to bring the
action discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim or the
identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would
otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
In order for the statute of limitations to be tolled due to fraudulent concealment, the acts
relied on must be fraudulent and of an affirmative character. Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop
of the Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 642; 692 NW2d 398 (2004). “The plaintiff
must prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were
designed to prevent subsequent discovery. Mere silence is insufficient.” Sills v Oakland Gen
Hosp, 220 Mich App 303, 310; 559 NW2d 348 (1996). The plaintiff is also charged with the
discovery of facts that, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he ought to have discovered.
Shember v Univ of Michigan Medical Ctr, 280 Mich App 309, 316; ___ NW2d ___ (2008), lv
pending. “The plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that
comprised the fraudulent concealment.” Sills, supra.
In DeHaan v Winter, 258 Mich 293, 296; 241 NW 923 (1932), the Supreme Court
defined fraudulent concealment as follows:
“Fraudulent concealment means employment of artifice, planned to
prevent inquiry or escape investigation, and mislead or hinder acquirement of
information disclosing a right of action. The acts relied on must be of an
affirmative character and fraudulent.”
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing that defendants committed any
affirmative acts or made any misrepresentations that prevented it from discovering or acquiring
information regarding Schultz Estates’s decision to terminate plaintiff ’s services. Although
plaintiff asserts that defendants did not reveal why Schultz Estates decided to terminate
plaintiff ’s contract, mere silence does not establish fraudulent concealment. There is no
evidence, and plaintiff does not allege, that defendants falsely informed plaintiff that its services
were terminated for some other reason. The trial court properly found that plaintiff’s claims
were not fraudulently concealed, that the statutes of limitations therefore were not tolled, and
thus any amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiff’s motion to amend.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s ruling was premature because discovery was
ongoing. However, it was plaintiff who sought a decision on its motion to amend, and
amendment depended on plaintiff establishing fraudulent concealment. Without plaintiff
showing fraudulent concealment, there was no basis for the trial court to grant plaintiff’s motion.
Moreover, although plaintiff asserted that it had served a subpoena requesting information from
Schultz Estates, fraudulent concealment must be based on actions by a defendant directed at the
plaintiff. Plaintiff did not offer any reason for believing that Schultz Estates would have
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information that could establish how defendants fraudulently concealed a cause of action from
plaintiff. For these reasons, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by
prematurely ruling on plaintiff’s own motion to amend.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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