PEOPLE OF MI V DWAYNE ANTONY ROCCA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280295
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 07-009093-FC
DWAYNE ANTONY ROCCA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction following a jury trial of three counts of
armed robbery, MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(a), safe breaking,
MCL 750.531, two counts of torture, MCL 750.85, two counts of animal torture, MCL
750.50b(2), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, impersonating a police officer,
MCL 750.215(3), larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, and one count of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced
as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to two years for the felony-firearm conviction, to be
served consecutively with concurrent terms of 22 years, six months to 75 years for the three
counts of armed robbery, two counts of torture, safe breaking, first-degree home invasion, and
felon in possession of a firearm, as well as concurrent terms of two to 15 years for the two counts
of animal torture, impersonating a police officer, and larceny of a building. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in making his felony-firearm sentence
consecutive to all other sentences imposed. Because defendant failed to preserve this argument
below, we review for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A consecutive sentence may be imposed only if specifically authorized by statute.
People v Lee, 233 Mich App 403, 405; 592 NW2d 779 (1999). MCL 750.227b provides as
follows:
(1) A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he
or she commits or attempts to commit a felony . . . is guilty of a felony, and shall
be imprisoned for 2 years.
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(2) A term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the
sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the
felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of
imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the
felony.
With respect to the felony-firearm charge, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant could
be convicted of the crime if the jury determined that he committed any one of the other 13 felony
counts.
In People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 460-461; 619 NW2d 538 (2000), the defendant was
convicted of fifteen offenses, including two counts of felony-firearm. The judgment of sentence
indicated that the felony-firearm sentences were consecutive to all other convictions. Id. at 462.
However, the information and amended information made clear that the felony-firearm charges
were related to two counts of bomb possession. Id. at 461. Further, the jury was specifically
instructed that to find the defendant guilty of felony-firearm, it had to first find beyond a
reasonable doubt “ ‘that the defendant committed the crime of possession of a bomb with
unlawful intent.’ ” Id. at 462, quoting trial court’s jury instructions. Our Supreme Court
explained that even though “it might appear obvious that the defendant also possessed a firearm
while committing the other crimes of which he was convicted, neither a trial court nor an
appellate court can supply its own findings with regard to the factual elements that have not been
found by a jury.” Id. at 464. Accordingly, the Court remanded for correction of the judgment of
sentence to indicate that “[e]ach felony-firearm sentence is consecutive only to the corresponding
conviction for possession of a bomb with unlawful intent.” Id. at 465.
The information in the case at hand tied the felony-firearm count to the crime of armed
robbery. However, the jury was not instructed that it needed to find that defendant committed or
attempted to commit armed robbery, or to which armed robbery count the felony-firearm count
was appended. Further, the jury was instructed that in order to find defendant guilty of armed
robbery, it needed to find that he “possessed a weapon designed to be dangerous and capable of
causing death or serious injury.” Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that defendant and another
man entered the residence where the crimes were committed carrying two guns and a taser. This
was consistent with the felony information, which indicated that each count of armed robbery
was predicated on the possession of a “gun and/or taser.” The jury did find defendant guilty of
three counts of armed robbery. Thus, it does seem reasonable to conclude that the jury was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with either a gun or a taser.
However, the jury was also instructed that for purposes of the felony-firearm count, “[a] firearm
can include any weapon from which a dangerous object can be propelled and a pistol is
considered to be a firearm for purposes of this crime.” Thus, although the jury must have
concluded that defendant was armed with a gun at some point, it did not necessarily find that he
was armed with a gun during the commission of the armed robberies.
Accordingly, the trial court did commit a plain error in making the felony-firearm
sentence consecutive to all other sentences. Further, the error is prejudicial because it effectively
lengthened the terms imposed for all felonies. Moreover, we conclude that the fairness and
integrity of the judicial proceedings has been compromised. Carines, supra at 763. As Clark
observed, “No language in the [felony-firearm] statute permits consecutive sentencing with
convictions other than the predicate offense.” Clark, supra at 464.
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In light of the trial court’s jury instruction in the case at hand, there is no way for this
Court or the trial court on remand to determine which felony the felony-firearm conviction was
based upon. Thus, we reverse defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence and remand
for a new trial on the charge of felony-firearm.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider on the record his
present and future ability to pay attorney fees. In People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 254-255;
690 NW2d 476 (2004), this Court held that a trial court must indicate on the sentencing record
that it has considered a defendant’s present and future ability to pay before assessing fees for the
reimbursement of attorney fees and when record evidence of such consideration is lacking, a
remand is required. In the instant matter, the trial court assigned attorney’s fees, yet no mention
was made on the record regarding defendant’s present or future ability to pay. Further, as in
Dunbar, “[a]lthough the court had the presentence report before it, the record is devoid of any
indication that the court recognized that defendant’s ability to pay needed to be considered when
imposing a reimbursement requirement, unlike fines and costs.” Id. at 255. Therefore, we
remand for such consideration on the record. The court has the discretion on whether to conduct
an evidentiary hearing. Id. at n 14.
Lastly, defendant argues that the search warrant to search the residence where he was
staying was not based on probable cause and that the trial court erred in failing to quash the
evidence discovered under the search warrant. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo
questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress a search warrant. People v Keller, 479 Mich
467, 476; 739 NW2d 505 (2007). However, the magistrate’s probable cause determination is
entitled to great deference on review. Id. at 476-477.
MCL 780.653 provides:
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based
upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her. The
affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named
or unnamed person if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
(a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the
information.
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the
information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information
is reliable.
Defendant argues the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to provide a nexus
between the place to be searched and the criminal activity. “A search warrant should be upheld
if a substantial basis exists to conclude that there is a fair probability that the items sought will be
found in the stated place.” People v Whitfield, 461 Mich 441, 444; 607 NW2d 61 (2000). When
reviewing an affidavit underlying a search warrant, this Court need only ask “whether a
reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the
finding of probable cause.” Id. Furthermore, the search warrant and underlying affidavit must
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be read in a common sense and realistic manner to determine whether a reasonably cautious
person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause.
Russo, supra at 604.
From the affidavit provided by the police, it is clear that the victims all explained that
they were attacked on November 27, 2006, at approximately 1:30 a.m. Further, according to the
affidavit, a confidential informant and two of the victims told the affiant that defendant’s
codefendant stated that he and defendant had committed the crimes. Finally, the affidavit
describes specifically where defendant was living at the time and that information was confirmed
when the same address showed up on a prior warrant for arrest through OTIS and through a
LEIN search. Accordingly, reading the affidavit in a “commonsense and realistic manner” and
giving great deference to the magistrate’s decision, there is no reason to believe there was not a
substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that there was a fair probability that the evidence
would be found in the place to be searched. Whitfield, supra. Consequently, the search warrant
was issued in compliance with MCL 780.653. The court did not err in denying the motion to
quash.
We reverse defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence and remand for retrial.
On remand, the court should also address defendant’s present or future ability to pay attorney
fees. Defendant’s other convictions and sentences are affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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