PEOPLE OF MI V CAL DUANE CLARK II
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282539
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-215703-FH
CAL DUANE CLARK, II,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Cal Duane Clark pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver 50 grams
or more but less than 450 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), among other offenses.1
He was sentenced, in a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, to six months’ to 20
years’ incarceration. Plaintiff appeals this sentence by delayed leave granted. We vacate that
sentence, and remand for resentencing on the possession with intent to deliver conviction. This
appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant entered his plea pursuant to Cobbs, supra, and the trial court stated that if it
could not agree that substantial and compelling reasons existed to depart downward from the
guidelines for the possession with intent to deliver offense, defendant would be entitled to
withdraw his plea. However, at sentencing, the trial court concluded that it could not depart
below the minimum sentence range recommended in the guidelines: 57 to 95 months for the
possession with intent to deliver offense. Defendant and his counsel decided to proceed with the
sentencing. Specifically, after conferring with his counsel, defendant indicated to the court that
he understood he had a right to withdraw his plea but elected not to do so. Defendant stated he
understood he could be facing a substantial period of incarceration. Defendant indicated he was
acting freely and voluntarily.
1
Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or
more but less than 450 grams of cocaine, one count of second-degree fleeing and eluding,
MCL 257.602a(4), one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, one count of
possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d), and two counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (“felony-firearm”), MCL 750.227b.
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At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that substantial and compelling
reasons existed to depart downward from the recommended range set forth in the guidelines
because defendant was only 19 years old, had a history of employment, was involved in
volunteer work in the community, took responsibility for his actions, and had reported for nearly
all his required drug tests (and contested one positive result for cocaine). Defendant also
maintained that an older, known drug dealer had convinced him to engage in the actions that
resulted in his convictions in this case. In response, the prosecutor asserted that no substantial
and compelling reasons existed to justify a downward departure. The prosecutor noted that
officers had discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic handgun under the driver’s seat of the
vehicle defendant was driving, and defendant had tested positive for marijuana and cocaine at
some of his drug tests.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s original indication that it would not deviate downward
from the sentencing guidelines, it did just that and sentenced defendant to two-years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions, to be served consecutively to defendant’s
sentences of six months to 20 years for the possession with intent to deliver conviction, six
months to 10 years for the fleeing and eluding conviction, six months to five years for the
carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and two days for the possession of marijuana
conviction, with credit for two days’ time served. The trial court cited defendant’s work history,
volunteer work in the community, and strong family ties as reasons for departing downward
from the guidelines range of 57 to 95 months’ imprisonment for the possession with intent to
deliver conviction. The trial court also adopted the reasons given by defense counsel in support
of departure, which focused primarily on defendant’s youth and lack of a criminal record.
As a general rule, a trial court must impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines
unless a substantial and compelling reason exists to depart from the guidelines.2 People v Horn,
279 Mich App 31, 43; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Substantial and compelling reasons for departure
must be based on objective and verifiable factors. “The reasons for departure must also
irresistibly attract the attention of the court, and must be of considerable worth in deciding the
length of the sentence. To be objective and verifiable, a reason must be based on actions or
occurrences external to the minds of those involved in the decision, and must be capable of being
2
We review the trial court’s decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines for clear error.
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). We review de novo the
determination that a factor supporting a departure is objective and verifiable, and we review the
trial court’s determination that objective and verifiable factors merited departure from the
guidelines for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 264-265. A trial court may depart from the
guidelines for nondiscriminatory reasons based on an offense or offender characteristic that was
already considered in calculating the guidelines if the trial court concludes that the characteristic
was given inadequate or disproportionate weight. MCL 769.34(3)(b). The trial court abuses its
discretion when it imposes a sentence that is not within the range of principled outcomes.
Babcock, supra at 269. We defer to the trial court’s sentencing determinations regarding
whether substantial and compelling reasons exist to merit departure from the sentencing
guidelines. Id. at 270.
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confirmed.” Id. at 43 n 6 (internal citations omitted). The trial court must articulate the reason
for the departure on the record. MCL 769.34(3). A substantial and compelling reason
articulated by a trial court to merit a departure from the sentencing guidelines must justify the
particular departure at issue. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 259; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). If
the stated reasons are partially invalid and the appellate court cannot ascertain whether the trial
court would have departed to the same extent regardless of the invalid factors, remand for
resentencing or rearticulation is necessary. Id. at 260-261.
[I]n considering whether to depart from the guidelines, the trial court must
ascertain whether taking into account an allegedly substantial and compelling
reason would contribute to a more proportionate criminal sentence than is
available within the guidelines range. In other words, if there are substantial and
compelling reasons that lead the trial court to believe that a sentence within the
guidelines range is not proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct
and to the seriousness of his criminal history, the trial court should depart from
the guidelines. Additionally, in departing from the guidelines range, the trial
court must consider whether its sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the
defendant’s conduct and his criminal history because, if it is not, the trial court’s
departure is necessarily not justified by a substantial and compelling reason. [Id.
at 264.]
We vacate defendant’s sentence of six months to 20 years for possession with intent to
deliver cocaine and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing on that conviction. The
trial court based its decision to depart downward from the guidelines, in part, on defendant’s
young age and lack of a prior criminal record. Although a defendant’s age is an objective and
verifiable factor, age alone is not a factor that keenly or irresistibly grabs one’s attention. People
v Young, 276 Mich App 446, 457; 740 NW2d 347 (2007). Moreover, at the age of 19, defendant
was not particularly old to have a significant criminal record. See id.; People v Claypool, 470
Mich 715, 727; 684 NW2d 278 (2004). Furthermore, defendant’s lack of a prior record was
accounted for in the Prior Record Variables, and the trial court did not assert that the guidelines
did not give adequate weight to defendant’s lack of a prior record. See MCL 769.34(3)(b). We
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that defendant’s young age
and lack of a prior record warranted a downward departure from the guidelines.
The trial court also based its decision to depart downward in part on defendant’s
employment history, activity in the community, and community ties. However, defendant’s
employment history (part-time at a restaurant and as an unpaid trainee at a mortgage company)
was not lengthy or noteworthy, and defendant was unemployed at the time he was sentenced.
The trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that defendant’s employment history
constituted a substantial and compelling reason for departing downward from the guidelines.
See Young, supra at 456-457. Defendant’s activity in the community and community ties are
objective and verifiable, but the trial court did not explain why it considered defendant’s
community activities and ties to be substantial and compelling reasons for departing downward
from the guidelines. Hence, these reasons are insufficient to justify a downward departure.
The trial court also relied on other reasons stated by defense counsel as support for its
decision to depart downward from the guidelines, including defendant’s claim that an older,
known drug dealer persuaded him to engage in the criminal activities at issue in this case, and the
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fact that defendant had appeared for most of his required drug tests (and that he contested one
positive result). However, at the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged that he knowingly
participated in criminal activities. Moreover, the parties did not dispute that at least one drug test
performed after defendant’s arrest resulted in a positive reading for cocaine. We conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion by finding that defendant’s willing participation in criminal
activities, even at the behest of an older person, and defendant’s imperfect drug-test record,
constituted substantial and compelling reasons for departing downward from the guidelines.
The guidelines recommended a minimum sentence of 57 to 95 months for the possession
with intent to deliver offense, but the trial court departed downward and imposed a minimum
term of six months. This minimum term of six months was just over ten percent of the low end
of the guidelines. The trial court did not specify why it concluded that a six-month minimum
term would be more proportionate to the offense and defendant’s circumstances than a minimum
term within the guidelines.
The trial court abused its discretion by departing downward from the guidelines range
based on factors that were not substantial and compelling. We vacate defendant’s sentence for
the conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and remand this case for resentencing
for that conviction. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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