RENEE J SCHAFER V DUANE W SCHAFER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RENEE J. SCHAFER,
UNPUBLISHED
January 20, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287435
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 06-019283-DM
DUANE W. SCHAFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the divorce judgment issued by the circuit court. The
circuit court based the judgment of divorce on a mediation agreement signed by both parties and
their attorneys. We affirm.
I. Facts
This divorce action was commenced in November 2006. Mediation took place on April
28, 2008, and the parties came to an agreement regarding the terms of the divorce, which was
reduced to a four-page writing and signed by both parties, as well as their respective counsel.
The parties agreed, among other things, that defendant would pay plaintiff $750 in spousal
support per month for four years and $350 per month for support of their youngest child.
After mediation, plaintiff’s counsel prepared a judgment of divorce that comported with
the agreement reached at mediation and scheduled the matter for a pro confesso hearing.
However, in the interim, the Friend of the Court issued a recommendation suggested that
defendant pay a lesser amount per month for both child support and spousal support than that
agreed to at mediation. The Friend of the Court based its recommendation on its imputation of
income to plaintiff in the amount of $14.50 per hour, which was far more than the minimum
wage used at mediation. Therefore, defendant attempted to disavow the mediation agreement,
asserting mutual mistake.
The pro confesso hearing was held on June 2, 2008. After hearing oral arguments
regarding defendant’s objections to entry of the judgment, the circuit court concluded that there
was no mutual mistake because both parties understood that plaintiff was imputed income of
minimum wage for 40 hours a week for the purposes of the mediation agreement. The trial court
then gave defendant an opportunity to review the mediation agreement and compare it to the
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proposed judgment of divorce to ensure that they were consistent with each other and proofs
were taken from plaintiff. When defendant refused to sign the judgment of divorce, the trial
court recommended that plaintiff file it under the “seven-day rule,” MCR 2.602(B)(3), and noted
that defendant may object to provisions of the judgment and provide an alternative proposed
judgment as provided by the court rule. Plaintiff submitted the judgment under the seven-day
rule, and defendant objected, asserting that that the mediation agreement is voidable due to
misrepresentation, fraud, and mistake, that there was no trial or settlement agreement placed on
the record, and that provisions about taxation, when child support begins, and health insurance
were not consistent with the mediation agreement .
On August 13, 2008, a hearing was held on defendant’s objections. The circuit court
refused to permit defendant to testify. After hearing arguments, the court overruled defendant’s
objections to the proposed judgment and signed the judgment of divorce. The court held that it
must follow court rules and case law that mandate that the mediation agreement be upheld and
the judgment entered.1 The court continued on to state that pleadings must be filed based on
reasonable inquiry, well founded in fact, and warranted by existing law.2 The court found that
defendant’s pleadings did not meet this standard and sanctioned defendant $1,000 for protracting
the litigation. Defendant now appeals.
II. Judgment of Divorce
Defendant first argues that the circuit court erred in using the disputed mediation
agreement as a basis for the judgment of divorce. We disagree.
A judgment of divorce is reviewed in light of the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 200; 748 NW2d 258 (2008). A trial
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, which occurs when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. at 204. A trial court commits legal error when it incorrectly chooses,
interprets, or applies the law. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 881; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
The trial court’s findings concerning the validity of the parties’ consent to a settlement
agreement are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Keyser v Keyser, 182 Mich App 268, 270;
451 NW2d 587 (1990). Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it selects a
reasonable and principled outcome. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719
NW2d 809 (2006).
The parties participated in domestic relations mediation as governed by MCR 3.216 et
seq. The mediation procedure provisions provide, in part:
1
The court referred to MCR 3.216(H)(7) and Wyskowski v Wyskowski, 211 Mich App 699; 536
NW2d 603 (1995), in support of its ruling.
2
MCR 2.114(D)(2).
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If a settlement is reached as a result of the mediation, to be binding, the terms of
that settlement must be reduced to a signed writing by the parties or
acknowledged by the parties on an audio or video recording. After a settlement
has been reached, the parties shall take steps necessary to enter judgment as in the
case of other settlements. [MCR 3.216(H)(7).]
The court heard testimony from plaintiff that the mediation resulted in an agreement regarding
custody, parenting time, personal property, child support, and alimony. Plaintiff further testified
that both parties and their attorneys signed the agreement. Defendant’s attorney even informed
the court that she and defendant signed the agreement. The circuit court found that there was a
successful mediation that was signed by both parties and their attorneys on all pages and this was
not disputed. This finding was not clear error, and according to MCR 3.216(H)(7), the mediation
agreement became binding when it was signed.
Until defendant or his attorney signed the agreement or the settlement was established in
open court, they were free to disavow their oral agreement. Gojcaj v Moser, 140 Mich App 828,
835; 366 NW2d 54 (1985). Any claim that defendant retained the option of breaching the
agreement up until the time it was placed on the record is without merit. Thomas v Michigan
Mut Ins Co, 138 Mich App 117, 120; 358 NW2d 902 (1984). Courts must uphold divorce
property settlements reached through negotiation and agreement of the parties because
modifications of property settlements in divorce judgments are disfavored. Baker v Baker, 268
Mich App 578, 586; 710 NW2d 555 (2005). This rule applies even when the settlement had not
yet been formally entered as part of the divorce judgment. Keyser, supra at 270.
MCR 2.507 pertains to the conduct of trials. It addresses agreements between parties as
follows:
Agreements to be in Writing. An agreement or consent between the parties or
their attorneys respecting the proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by
either party, is not binding unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of
the agreement is in writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement
is offered or by that party’s attorney. [MCR 2.507(G).]
This rule applies to settlement agreements and requires a writing agreed to by defendant or his
attorney for agreements made outside of an open court. Metro Life Ins Co v Goolsby, 165 Mich
App 126, 128-129; 418 NW2d 700 (1987). In the instant case, the mediation agreement was
enforceable when it was signed and the parties were bound to take steps to enter it in a judgment.
See MCR 3.216(H)(7).
In Wyskowski v Wyskowski, 211 Mich App 699; 536 NW2d 603 (1995), the defendant
refused to consent to a judgment of divorce that was based on a mediated settlement that was
written and signed by both parties and their attorneys. Id. at 700. The defendant came to believe
that the agreement was unfair and challenged its validity because the signatures were not
notarized and the court rules at that time required that the settlement agreement be
“acknowledged by the parties.” Id. at 701-702. This Court determined that the court rule did not
demand notarized signatures and upheld the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to plaintiff
enforcing the agreement in the judgment of divorce despite defendant’s disavowing the
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mediation agreement. Id. at 700-702. The facts are similar to the instant case, except that no
mistake or fraud was alleged.
However, divorce settlement agreements reached through negotiation by the parties do
not have to be upheld if they were the product of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. Keyser, supra
at 269-270. Here, defendant initially alleged mutual mistake and also fraud in determining the
amount of income to impute to plaintiff. This figure was entered into a formula to arrive at a
recommended level of child and spousal support. During a hearing, defendant said the mutual
mistake was that both parties thought that plaintiff was making the minimum wage and did not
realize what the other party made. The circuit court found there was no mutual mistake because
the parties agreed to impute income to plaintiff at the minimum wage for 40 hours a week for the
purposes of the mediation and this figure was not a mistake. In the absence of an actual income
figure for plaintiff, the parties and their attorneys agreed to ascribe her some income. It was not
clear error for the circuit court to find an absence of mutual mistake in this circumstance.
A settlement agreement cannot be set aside because defendant had a “change of heart.”
See Metro Life Ins Co, supra at 128; Thomas, supra at 119-120. Rather, the question for this
Court is whether defendant “freely, voluntarily and understandingly entered into and signed the
agreement.” Keyser, supra at 271. Absent fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, courts must uphold
divorce property settlements reached through negotiation and agreement of the parties. Calo v
Calo, 143 Mich App 749, 753-754; 373 NW2d 207 (1985). Having made a valid agreement, it
was the responsibility of the parties to “take steps necessary to enter judgment as in the case of
other settlements.” MCR 3.216(H)(7). The circuit court’s use of the mediation agreement as a
basis for the divorce judgment was not clearly erroneous.
III. Defendant’s Due Process Rights
Next, defendant argues that his right to be heard was violated because the circuit court
refused to hear his testimony about the mediation agreement. Again, we disagree. The
determination whether a party has been afforded due process is a question of law subject to de
novo review. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 157; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).
No person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. US
Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 629; 625 NW2d 10
(2001). The essence of the right of due process is the principle of fundamental fairness. In re
Adams Estate, 257 Mich App 230, 233-234; 667 NW2d 904 (2003). “‘Due process in civil cases
generally requires notice of the nature of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful time and manner, and an impartial decision maker.’” Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc,
v Dep’t of Community Health, 261 Mich App 604, 606; 683 NW2d 759 (2004) (citation omitted).
The concept is flexible, and analysis of what process is due in a particular proceeding depends on
the nature of the proceeding, the risks involved, and the private and governmental interests that
might be affected. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993).
Due process demands some form of hearing before the deprivation of a property interest.
Brandon Twp v Tomkow, 211 Mich App 275, 282-283; 535 NW2d 268 (1995). However, due
process does not always require a prior hearing or an adversarial proceeding. Westland
Convalescent Ctr v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 414 Mich 247, 269; 324 NW2d 851
(1982) (Fitzgerald, J.). The opportunity to be heard does not require a full trial-like proceeding,
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but requires a hearing to the extent that a party has a chance to know and address the evidence.
Id. at 270-271; Hinky Dinky Supermarket, supra at 606. Defendant was able to present his
arguments regarding the mediation agreement to the judge in chambers and in his objection, and
argued the issue in two hearings. Defendant was heard on the issue, and defendant’s testimony
was unnecessary to the court’s determination.
Defendant argues that the circuit court made a one-sided determination of events because
only plaintiff was permitted to testify. However, defendant refused an invitation to question
plaintiff at that time. Further, plaintiff testified to the proofs required to establish a divorce and
that there was a signed mediation agreement—facts that are not contested. She did not testify
about the amount of income imputed to her at the mediation.
A trial court is obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve an ambiguity or a
factual dispute that arises in a proceeding related to a divorce when a party specifically asks for
an evidentiary hearing. Mitchell v Mitchell, 198 Mich App 393, 399; 499 NW2d 386 (1993).
When the parties agree to a standard version of mediation, the case will proceed to trial only if
both parties do not accept the mediator’s recommendation. Marvin v Marvin, 203 Mich App
154, 157; 511 NW2d 708 (1993). In Fear v Rogers, 207 Mich App 642, 644-645; 526 NW2d
197 (1994), cited by defendant, the trial court had to proceed with an evidentiary hearing because
there was no mediation agreement due to the lack of a signed writing. Here, the parties reached
and signed an agreement that resolved the dispute and obviated the need for an evidentiary
hearing.
The interest involved was the determination of whether a mediation agreement was
influenced by fraud or mutual mistake. After hearing defendant’s arguments to the contrary, the
circuit court found that the mediation agreement was valid. The circuit court then followed the
procedures of MCR 2.602(B)(3), the seven-day rule, which allows for the submission of a
proposed judgment for review by the other party. Defendant had seven days to object to the
proposed judgment, did so, and these objections were again heard in another hearing. The circuit
court followed Wyskowski, supra, and the court rules and properly entered the judgment.
IV. Attorney Sanctions
Defendant also protests the circuit court’s imposition of sanctions. A trial court’s
decision to impose a sanction is reviewed to determine if it is clearly erroneous. Schadewald v
Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 41; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). A decision is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
An attorney is under an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into both the
factual and legal basis of a document before it is signed. LaRose Market, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc,
209 Mich App 201, 210; 530 NW2d 505 (1995). An attorney’s signature on a document is a
certification that the document is “well grounded in fact and . . . warranted by existing law or a
good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law” and that “the
document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” MCR 2.114(D); In re Pitre, 202 Mich App
241, 243-244; 508 NW2d 140 (1993). Filing a signed document that is not well grounded in fact
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and law subjects an attorney to sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114(E). Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of
Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 407; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). MCR 2.114(E) states that the trial
court “shall” impose appropriate sanctions when a document has been signed in violation of the
rule. Therefore, if MCR 2.114(D) is violated, then the sanctions provided for by MCR 2.114(E)
are mandatory. Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 678; ___ NW2d ___ (2008).
In the instant case, the circuit court found that defendant’s objections to the proposed
divorce judgment were not “based on reasonable inquiry, well founded in fact, and warranted by
existing law” and that they protracted the litigation. The essence of defendant’s objections in the
June 12, 2008 document, that the mediation agreement was not valid, were heard in the June 2,
2008 pro confesso hearing to establish grounds for divorce and enter the proposed judgment.
The circuit court found in that hearing that the mediation agreement was valid and not obtained
by any mistake or fraud. The court then asked if defense counsel had reviewed the mediation
agreement and compared it with the proposed judgment of divorce she received on May 15,
2008, so that any differences could be noted.
When defense counsel said that she instead disagreed with the judgment of divorce, the
court ordered her to compare the documents and note any objections she had or be found in
contempt. Defense counsel then indicated that she could not sign the judgment of divorce that
day, and the judge decided to proceed under the seven-day rule, MCR 2.602(B)(3), and asked for
an alternative proposed judgment if she had objections. This gave defense counsel a third
opportunity to compare the documents and resulted in the defendant’s objections, which were
again overruled. Defendant did not argue about any differences in the mediation agreement and
the judgment of divorce during the hearing on the objections or in defendant’s brief on appeal,
instead arguing only that the mediation agreement was invalid. As a result, the April 2008
mediation agreement could not be entered as a judgment of divorce until August 2008.
The purpose of MCR 2.114(E) is to deter attorneys and parties from filing documents or
asserting claims and defenses that have not been sufficiently investigated and researched or
which are intended to serve an improper purpose, without sacrificing zealous representation.
FMB-First Michigan Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich App 711, 719; 591 NW2d 676 (1998). An
appropriate sanction may include an order to pay the opposing party the reasonable attorney fees
that resulted from the frivolous document. Id. at 726-727. Here, the circuit court’s order for
defendant to pay $1,000 to plaintiff’s attorney as the reasonable cost for protracting the litigation
was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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