PEOPLE OF MI V DEXTER DURRELL COOPER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 280024
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-002306-FC
DEXTER DURRELL COOPER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Davis and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This is the second time this matter has been brought before this Court for a determination
of the defendant’s sentence. In the underlying action, on September 11, 1998, a jury convicted
defendant of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, assault with intent to rob while armed,
MCL 750.89, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 to 30 years in prison for each of the
armed robbery and assault with intent to rob while armed convictions and two years in prison for
the felony-firearm conviction.1 This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences, but
remanded for correction of the PSIR. People v Cooper, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued October 9, 2001 (Docket No. 216492).
Following our prior opinion, on June 19, 2003, the trial court informed defendant that his
motion for relief from judgment where he claimed for the first time that the trial court improperly
relied on uncharged acts to depart from the minimum sentencing guidelines by noting his
“7411”2 probation, was not filed properly. Defendant then filed a petition for writ of habeas
1
The jury also convicted defendant’s codefendant, Yashica Nicole Cooper, of two counts of
armed robbery and assault with intent to rob while armed. The trial court sentenced her to 15 to
30 years in prison for each of these convictions. This Court affirmed these convictions and
sentences. People v Cooper, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
October 9, 2001 (Docket No. 216180).
2
MCL 333.7411 provides:
[w]hen an individual who has not previously been convicted of [a controlled
substance offense] pleads guilty to . . . [certain controlled substance offenses], the
(continued…)
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corpus with the Eastern District of Michigan on August 25, 2003, which was denied. Then, on
February 8, 2006, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment. He claimed that he had
good cause for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal and could demonstrate actual prejudice.
Defendant maintained that his 7411 proceedings had been dismissed and claimed he was
innocent of the OUIL conviction listed in the PSIR. Thus, he argued that it was improper to
consider these convictions at sentencing.
In a July 31, 2007, opinion, the lower court noted that a term of probation pursuant to
7411 does not result in a conviction. The court cited People v James, 267 Mich App 675, 678679; 705 NW2d 724 (2005) and Carr v Midland Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, 259
Mich App 428; 674 NW2d 709 (2003), for the propositions that the 7411 proceedings did not
constitute a conviction and that 7411 probation makes a guilty plea a nullity. Given the
construction of the statute and its purpose, the court concluded that consideration of defendant’s
7411 proceedings at sentencing was improper.
Next, the court analyzed whether good cause and prejudice existed to proceed with the
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.508(D). It noted that the appellate courts
had not yet addressed the consideration of 7411 proceedings at the time of sentencing, but
nevertheless, it concluded that there was no sound appellate strategy for failing to raise the 7411
objection on appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that appellate counsel erred and defendant
demonstrated good cause. It also concluded that the improper consideration of defendant’s 7411
probation made the sentence invalid, satisfying the prejudice prong. Consequently, the court
granted defendant’s motion for relief from judgment and ordered resentencing. Thereafter, the
prosecutor appealed and this Court granted leave in a subsequent order granting defendant’s
motion for relief from judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of the
trial court.
The prosecutor’s first argument on appeal is that the lower court should not have
considered defendant’s motion for relief from judgment because he waived any challenges to the
PSIR when he told the trial court that he had no additions or corrections. We review the
prosecutor’s unpreserved argument for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 766-768; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
An unpreserved challenge is waived where a party intentionally relinquishes or abandons
a known right. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). At sentencing,
defendant affirmatively approved the PSIR, which included the fact that he pleaded guilty to
(…continued)
court, without entering a judgment of guilt with the consent of the accused, may
defer further proceedings and place the individual on probation . . . . Upon
fulfillment of the terms and conditions [of probation], the court shall discharge the
individual and dismiss the proceedings. Discharge and dismissal under this
section shall be without adjudication of guilt and . . . is not a conviction for
purposes of this section or for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed
by law upon conviction of a crime . . . . [People v James, 267 Mich App 675,
678-679; 705 NW2d 724 (2005), quoting MCL 333.7411.]
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possession of cocaine and, after successfully serving three years probation, his proceedings were
discharged under MCL 333.7411. Therefore, he arguably abandoned the right to further review
of the PSIR. Nevertheless, in his motion for relief from judgment, defendant argued that the trial
court improperly considered the 7411 proceedings in sentencing him to the high-end of the
minimum sentencing guidelines range. Defendant did not affirmatively approve the trial court’s
considerations or sentence. Therefore, the court lower did not plainly err in considering the
motion for relief from judgment on the ground that it was waived.
The prosecutor’s second argument on appeal is that defendant should have been
precluded from moving for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(2). This Court
reviews a trial court’s grant of relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and findings of
fact supporting its ruling for clear error. People v McSwain, 259 Mich App 654, 681; 676 NW2d
236 (2003).
[U]nder MCR 6.508(D)(2), a court may not grant relief from judgment if the
criminal defendant’s motion alleges grounds for relief that were decided against
the defendant in a prior appeal or proceeding under MCR 6.500, “unless the
defendant establishes that a retroactive change in the law has undermined the
prior decision.” [McSwain, supra at 679, citing MCR 6.508(D)(2).]
In defendant’s prior appeal, he made a preserved challenge to the PSIR’s accuracy
because it referenced selling and using drugs, jail time he could not recall for an OUIL offense
and gang-affiliated material. Cooper, supra, slip op, at 17-18. This Court remanded for these
inaccuracies to be removed from the PSIR. Id. at 19-20. Defendant made two additional
unpreserved challenges to the PSIR’s accuracy regarding George Cook’s name and his visit to
Pearl Ruffin’s home, which this Court refused to review. Id. In the prior appeal, defendant did
not argue, and the Court did not decide, whether a trial court may consider 7411 proceedings in
determining a defendant’s sentence for a subsequent offense. Therefore, even though defendant
made sentencing challenges in both his prior appeal and motion for relief from judgment, the
grounds for sentencing relief in these actions differed. As a result, MCR 6.508(D)(2) did not
preclude relief on this ground.
The prosecutor’s third argument on appeal is that, because defendant failed to
demonstrate good cause, he should have been precluded from moving for relief from judgment
pursuant to MCR 2.508(D)(3).
Pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3), a court may not grant relief from judgment if the criminal
defendant’s motion alleges a ground for relief that could have been raised on appeal from the
conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under MCR 6.500. McSwain, supra at 685-686.
However, a criminal defendant can avoid this bar to relief by satisfying the following
requirements:
(a) [a demonstration of] good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or
in the prior motion, and
(b) [a demonstration of] actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that
support the claim for relief. [Id. at 686.]
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“[C]ollateral proceedings are intended as extraordinary protection against unreliable factfinding
and unjust convictions.” People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 387; 535 NW2d 496 (1995).
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, namely appellate counsel’s failure to raise a
meritorious issue on direct appeal, may satisfy the good cause requirement. Reed, supra at 382.
The test for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that applicable to a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id., People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 430; 656 NW2d
866 (2002). Hence, a defendant must show that appellate counsel’s decision not to raise a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
prejudiced his appeal. The test is not whether, in hindsight, appellate counsel failed to raise all
arguable or colorable claims. Reed, supra at 382. Such a test would “undermine the strategic
and discretionary decisions that are the essence of skillful lawyering.” Id. at 386-387.
Even if this Court found that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s 7411
proceedings at sentencing and appellate counsel’s failure to argue this claim on direct appeal fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced
under the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test. “[W]hen the alleged
inaccuracies would have no determinative effect on the sentence, they may be harmless.” People
v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 473; 616 NW2d 203 (2000).
Defendant’s 7411 proceedings had no determinative effect on his sentence. In making its
sentencing determination at the high-end of the minimum sentencing guidelines range, the trial
court focused its attention on the circumstances surrounding defendant’s armed robbery offenses.
It noted that defendant chose a “highly visible” bank and terrorized patrons and tellers with a
weapon. As to defendant’s contention that the trial court impermissibly considered defendant’s
7411 probation, we note that the trial court stated that defendant’s 7411 probation and prior
OUIL probation were “probably of little consequence.” However, the trial court noted that the
probationary periods “tell me that a person who has been exposed to the criminal justice system
ought to have received a message.” Had the trial court excluded the 7411 probation from its
consideration, however, defendant’s OUIL probation would have indicated the same failure to
learn from past experience. Defendant’s codefendant’s sentence also indicates that the 7411
proceedings had no determinative effect on his sentence. Defendant’s codefendant had no prior
offenses or probation. Nevertheless, the trial court sentenced her to the same 15 to 30-year
sentence as it sentenced defendant. Because we are of the opinion that the trial court’s
consideration of defendant’s 7411 proceedings had no determinative effect on his sentence, he
did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Absent ineffective assistance, defendant
had no good cause for failing to raise the 7411 challenge on direct appeal. Consequently,
defendant should have been barred from relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3).
Therefore, the lower court abused its discretion when it granted defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment.
In light of our conclusion above, this Court need not address the prosecutor’s final
argument on appeal because defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, he should have
been precluded from moving for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 2.508(D)(3).
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Reversed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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