PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH ALLEN GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
KENNETH ALLEN GREEN, a/k/a KENNETH
GREEN,
No. 279327
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 06-016206-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d
(force or coercion). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL
769.11, to 5 to 30 years’ imprisonment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm, but remand
for correction of defendant’s judgment of sentence.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On November 8, 2006, defendant sexually assaulted “RW” at Jason Churches’s home in
Putnam Township. The record reflects that, on the night of the assault, RW used cocaine with
defendant and Churches. After Churches went to bed, defendant pulled RW toward him on a
pullout sofa bed. RW testified that she was scared and confused because she had known
defendant for 21 years and had never had a romantic relationship with him. Defendant started to
kiss RW and he held RW down as she tried to protest and pull away. Thereafter, he pulled RW’s
leg out of her pajamas, held her down with his hand on her throat, and engaged in intercourse
with her. After defendant ejaculated, RW went into the bathroom. When she returned, she and
defendant snorted another line of cocaine and defendant again forced her to engage in sexual
intercourse. At trial, defendant maintained that RW consented to the intercourse. The jury
acquitted defendant of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b, but
convicted him of the lesser offense of third-degree criminal sexual conduct on the remaining
first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge.
I. Analysis
A. Admission of Evidence of Prior Convictions
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Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted, as impeachment evidence,
some of his and Churches’s prior convictions. However, defendant has waived this claim
because the record shows that defendant and Churches testified about their prior convictions
during their direct examinations rather than on cross-examination. Ohler v United States, 529
US 753, 760; 120 S Ct 1851; 146 L Ed 2d 826 (2000) (“a defendant who preemptively
introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the
admission of such evidence was error.”); see also People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 716;
645 NW2d 294 (2001).
Were we to find that defendant did not waive this issue, his arguments nonetheless lack
merit. MRE 609(a) provides that evidence of a witness’s prior convictions is admissible on
cross-examination for purposes of attacking credibility if:
(1) the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or
(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and
(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or
death under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant probative value
on the issue of credibility and, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial,
the court further determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.
Thus, a trial court must first determine whether the conviction involves an element of dishonesty
or false statement. People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 241; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). “If so, the
evidence is automatically admissible” under MRE 609(a)(1). Id. If the conviction lacks an
element of dishonesty or false statement, “the court must determine whether the conviction
contained an element of theft,” and, if so, whether “the crime was punishable by more than one
year in prison, and, if the witness is a criminal defendant, whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. at 241-242. In determining the probative value of
a prior conviction,
the court shall consider only the age of the conviction and the degree to which a
conviction of the crime is indicative of veracity. If a determination of prejudicial
effect is required, the court shall consider only the conviction’s similarity to the
charged offense and the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the
evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify. [MRE 609(b).]
Here, defendant complains that the trial court erroneously ruled that the probative value
of his prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. In 1997, defendant was convicted of
larceny of a firearm and breaking and entering a vehicle with intent to steal property worth over
$5. The convictions were nearly ten years old at the time of trial, and the trial court
acknowledged that the convictions were dissimilar to the charged offenses. The trial court
opined that defense counsel could argue these factors to the jury to minimize the weight of the
evidence. Further, though the trial court did not speculate whether its ruling would deter
defendant from testifying, it had no such deterrent effect. Moreover, the probative value of the
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evidence was particularly significant in this case because the primary issue was one of
credibility. The sole question before the jury was whether it should believe defendant or RW
because their versions of events differed. Accordingly, any prejudicial effect of the prior
convictions did not outweigh their probative value.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of Churches’s
conviction for witness intimidation. Defendant claims the crime does not contain an element of
theft, false statement, or dishonesty. It appears from the record that Churches was convicted of
violating MCL 750.122, which prohibits, inter alia, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with
a witness’s testimony. This Court has previously recognized that “[t]he unifying theme among
the[] subsections [of § 122] is an attempt to identify and criminalize the many ways individuals
can prevent or attempt to prevent a witness from appearing and providing truthful information in
some sort of official proceeding[.]” People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 438; 661 NW2d 616
(2003). Therefore, contrary to defendant’s argument, Churches’s prior conviction contains an
element of dishonesty or false statement and was admissible for impeachment purposes under
MRE 609(a)(1).
B. Admission of Other Acts Evidence
Defendant maintains that the trial court erroneously admitted other acts evidence related
to his physical abuse of Marcella Nelson in 1995. Because defendant did not timely object to the
introduction of the evidence, our review is limited to plain error affecting his substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Knapp, 244 Mich
App 361, 375; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).1
Whether other acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b)(1) depends on four factors.
First, the evidence must be offered for a permissible purpose, i.e., one other than showing
character or a propensity to commit the charged crime. Knox, supra at 509. Second, the
evidence must be relevant under MRE 402. Id. Third, unfair prejudice must not substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence under MRE 403. Id. Fourth, the trial court, if
requested, may provide a limiting instruction to the jury under MRE 105. Id.
Here, the prosecutor offered evidence about defendant’s physical abuse of Nelson for a
proper purpose―to explain why RW did not yell for help when defendant sexually assaulted her
even though Churches was in the next room. RW testified that she did not yell for help because
she had witnessed defendant beat Nelson with a baseball bat and she did not want to make
defendant angry. The evidence was also relevant because RW’s testimony about defendant’s
assault on Nelson supported her claim that defendant sexually assaulted her despite her failure to
call for help. Because the evidence was probative of RW’s credibility, a central issue in this
case, it was relevant. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 72; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod on other
grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
1
Reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in conviction despite defendant’s actual
innocence or if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings, independent of his innocence. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674 NW2d 366
(2004).
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Defendant claims that the evidence failed to meet the third requirement for admissibility
on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly
prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
“The danger the rule seeks to avoid is that of unfair prejudice, not prejudice that stems only from
the abhorrent nature of the crime itself.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 500; 577 NW2d 673
(1998). As explained, the evidence of defendant’s assault on Nelson was directly probative of
RW’s credibility and was significant for the jury to determine the ultimate issue, i.e., whether
defendant committed the sexual assaults or whether RW engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse. While prejudicial, any danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the significant
probative value of the evidence.
Despite satisfying the requirements for admissibility, defendant contends that the trial
court should have excluded the evidence because, under MRE 404(b)(2), the prosecutor failed to
give proper notice of her intent to introduce it during trial. While this constitutes plain error,
reversal is not required. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 453-455; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
As in Hawkins, the evidence of defendant’s assault on Nelson was highly probative, it was not
unduly prejudicial, and defendant “has never suggested how he would have reacted differently to
this evidence had the prosecutor given notice.” Id. at 455. Further, defendant cannot claim
surprise because the prosecutor introduced the same evidence for the same purpose during
defendant’s preliminary examination. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that the
error warrants reversal.2
C. Sentence
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously sentenced him as a fourth habitual
offender. However, the record reflects that the trial court actually sentenced defendant as a third
habitual offender. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to resentencing, but we remand this
case to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment of sentence to reflect
that defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender.
Defendant further argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s score of ten
points for offense variable 4 (OV 4). Defendant’s sentencing guidelines range was 51 to 127
months, and the trial court sentenced him within that range to a minimum term of 60 months in
prison. “[I]f [a] sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, it is only
appealable if there was a scoring error or inaccurate information was relied upon in determining
the sentence and the issue was raised at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion
to remand.” People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004); see also MCL
769.34(10). Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by raising it through one of these
three methods, we affirm defendant’s sentence. MCL 769.34(10).
2
For the same reasons, to the extent defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of the evidence, he has failed to establish prejudice. People v
Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).
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In any event, defendant’s argument lacks merit. MCL 777.34(1) allows a trial court to
score ten points under OV 4 for “psychological injury” if “[s]erious psychological injury
requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.” Subsection (2) of MCL 777.34 authorizes
a trial court to score ten points if “the serious psychological injury may require professional
treatment.” (Emphasis added.) The record shows that RW was unable to sleep for days
following the incident and that her doctor prescribed sleep medication for her. RW also testified
that she moved so that defendant would not know where she lived and that she locked herself in
her bedroom and placed chairs in front of her doors. She further testified that she attends
counseling sessions once a week. For these reasons, the record supports the score of ten points
for OV 4.3
Defendant also claims that his sentence is too long in light of his background and the
circumstances of this case. Again, however, defendant’s sentence is within the appropriate
guidelines range and, therefore, it is appealable only if he raised his claim at sentencing, in a
motion for resentencing, or a in motion for remand. MCL 769.34(10). Defendant failed to do so
and we, therefore, affirm his sentence.4
Affirmed and remanded for correction of defendant’s judgment of sentence to reflect his
sentencing as a third habitual offender. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
3
Defendant claims that the trial court wrongly interpreted MCL 777.34, but he fails to explain
his argument. A defendant “may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for his claims . . . .” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59;
687 NW2d 342 (2004) (citation and quotations omitted). Accordingly, defendant has abandoned
this issue.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court increased his
sentence on the basis of facts not found by a jury, citing Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124
S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). Our Supreme Court has held that Blakely does not apply to
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 683; 739
NW2d 563 (2007); People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 163-164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
Therefore, defendant’s argument lacks merit.
4
We also reject defendant’s claim that his sentence violates the federal and state constitutions.
A sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively proportionate and a proportionate
sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318,
323; 750 NW2d 607 (2008).
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