PEOPLE OF MI V KEENAN OMAR KING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279809
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 07-003708-FC
KEENAN OMAR KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, one
count of unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, and two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of 18 to 40 years for each of the armed robbery convictions and eight to 15 years for the
unlawful imprisonment conviction, to be served consecutive to two concurrent two-year terms of
imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Defendant’s convictions arose from a robbery at the home of Germaine Overton on
March 25, 2007. Three intruders entered Overton’s house shortly after Overton, Carita Keene,
and Overton’s two sons arrived home late that night. Overton identified one of the intruders as
defendant. According to Overton, defendant and another intruder rushed at him and knocked
him to the ground. Defendant then hit Overton over the head with a gun and knelt over him, still
holding the gun. While defendant and another man dragged Overton into the dining room and
pointed a gun to his neck, a third intruder swung a gun at Keene to hit her, but she moved out of
the way. Keene tried to escape with the two boys, but one of the intruders stopped them in the
kitchen. The gunmen held Keene and the boys on the floor, against the wall, and demanded
Keene’s jewelry and cell phone. Defendant and his two accomplices then took Overton, Keene,
and the two boys upstairs into a bedroom. They took Overton’s jewelry and then searched his
pockets, taking approximately $800 in cash.
Police officers investigating other activity on the street observed suspicious activity in
Overton’s house and went to investigate. Officer Ralph Morgan looked through a window and
saw a person on the ground with another person kneeling over him and holding a gun. After the
police knocked at the door, defendant gave his gun to another intruder and told Overton to get rid
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of the police. Defendant then escorted Overton downstairs. The officers eventually entered the
house and arrested defendant. The other intruders apparently escaped through an upstairs
window.
II. Scoring of the Sentencing Guidelines
Defendant argues that offense variables (“OVs”) 7, 8, and 16 of the sentencing guidelines
were improperly scored. Because defendant did not challenge the scoring of these offense
variables in the trial court, this issue is not preserved. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311;
684 NW2d 669 (2004). We may, however, review the issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Id. at 312. Further, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the scoring of OVs 7 and 16. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable in light of
prevailing professional norms and that but for his attorney’s error, a different outcome
reasonably would have resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884
(2001); People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 534; 659 NW2d 688 (2002).
Armed robbery is categorized as a class A crime against a person. MCL 777.16y. As
scored by the trial court, defendant received 25 total prior record variable points and 105 total
OV points, placing him in the D-VI cell of the class A grid, for which the sentencing guidelines
range is 171 to 285 months. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s scoring of 50
points for OV 7, 15 points for OV 8, and five points for OV 16.
“A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored,
provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Endres, 269
Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). We will uphold a trial court’s scoring decision if
there is any evidence supporting the score. Id. Questions concerning the interpretation of the
statutory sentencing guidelines are questions of law subject to de novo review. Id.
A. OV 7
MCL 777.37(1)(a) provides that 50 points may be scored for OV 7 if “[a] victim was
treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to substantially increase
the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” Each person who was placed in
danger of injury or loss of life is considered a victim for purposes of OV 7. MCL 777.37(2). It
is proper to consider the entirety of a defendant’s conduct when scoring the sentencing
guidelines. See People v Cook, 254 Mich App 635, 641; 658 NW2d 184 (2003).
MCL 777.37(3) defines “sadism” as “conduct that subjects a victim to extreme or
prolonged pain or humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender’s
gratification.” We agree that defendant’s conduct does not meet the definition of sadism,
because there is no evidence that a victim was subjected to extreme or prolonged pain or
humiliation. The terms “torture” and “brutality” are not defined in the statute, but Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) defines “torture” as “the act of inflicting
excruciating pain, as punishment or revenge, as a means of getting a confession or information,
or for sheer cruelty,” and defines “brutality” as “the quality of being brutal.” “Brutal,” in turn, is
defined as “savage; cruel; inhuman” or “harsh; severe.” Id.
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Defendant’s conduct throughout the course of the robbery can reasonably be described as
excessively cruel, harsh, and severe. In People v Wilson, 252 Mich App 390, 396; 652 NW2d
488 (2002), this Court held that a defendant’s excessive brutality in beating a victim in front of
her family, or pointing a gun at the victim’s son, was evidence supporting a 50-point score for
OV 7. Here, in addition to confronting Overton and Keene with a gun in Overton’s home in the
presence of his two children, ages 9 and 11, defendant hit Overton over the head with the gun,
forced him to the floor, pointed the gun at his neck while kneeling over him and demanding
money, and then dragged him throughout the house. Additionally, one of defendant’s
accomplices attempted to strike Keene with a gun. Keene and the two children were also forced
against a wall at gunpoint and then taken upstairs. Overton testified that the experience was very
traumatic for him and his children. This entire continuum of conduct can reasonably be
described as “excessively brutal.” Accordingly, there was no plain error in scoring 50 points for
OV 7, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of this variable.
B. OV 8
Defendant argues that the trial court miscored OV 8 (victim asported to another place or
situation of greater danger), MCL 777.38(1)(a), because the statute provides that this variable is
not to be scored if the sentencing offense is kidnapping. MCL 777.38(2)(b). Although
defendant contends that unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, is a form of kidnapping, the
trial court did not score the guidelines for the offense of unlawful imprisonment. Instead,
pursuant to MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii) and MCL 777.21(2), the court scored the guidelines only for
armed robbery, the crime having the highest crime class. Accordingly, there was no plain error.
C. OV 16
OV 16 may be scored at five points if the value of property obtained is between $1,000
and $20,000. MCL 777.46(1)(c). Although this variable is to be scored for all crimes against
property, it is not to be scored for crimes against a person, except for home invasion. MCL
777.22(1) and (2). Armed robbery is a crime against a person, MCL 777.16y. Therefore, the
trial court clearly erred in scoring five points for OV 16. But because a five-point reduction in
defendant’s total OV score would not affect the appropriate guidelines range, the error is
harmless and resentencing is not required. People v Davis, 468 Mich 77, 83; 658 NW2d 800
(2003). Further, because defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object, his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as well.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant argues that his convictions for two counts of armed robbery and two counts of
felony-firearm violate his constitutional double jeopardy protections. The Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in
jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.
People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). A double jeopardy challenge presents a
constitutional issue reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. at 573.
The constitutional protections against double jeopardy do not prohibit separate
convictions for crimes committed against different victims, even if the crimes occurred during
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the same criminal transaction. Here, both Overton and Keene were robbery victims, and each
was robbed at gunpoint. Therefore, defendant’s convictions of two counts of armed robbery and
two counts of felony-firearm do not violate double jeopardy protections. People v Hall, 249
Mich App 262, 273; 643 NW2d 253 (2002). Defendant’s reliance on cases holding that a
defendant cannot be convicted and sentenced for both felony-murder and the predicate felony is
misplaced. That theory has no relevance here, where defendant was convicted of separate
offenses against separate victims.1 Accordingly, there is no merit to this issue.
IV. Restitution
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution of $800.
Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this issue by objecting to the restitution award
at sentencing, but argues that the trial court’s restitution order constitutes plain error affecting his
substantial rights, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), because the
record clearly reflects that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving the amount of the
loss and because the trial court failed to make factual findings on the issue.
When sentencing a defendant in a criminal action, the trial court must “order . . . that the
defendant make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise
to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.” MCL 769.1a(2). Additionally, MCL 780.767
provides, in part:
(1) In determining the amount of restitution to order under section 16, the court
shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the
offense.
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(4) Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by
the court by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the
prosecuting attorney.
But as explained in People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 243; 565 NW2d 389 (1997),
the language of [MCL 780.767] does not require the trial judge to make a separate
factual inquiry and individual findings on the record. When determining
restitution, whether it is included in the plea agreement or is statutorily imposed at
the discretion of the trial court, the statute requires the court “to consider” the
enumerated factors in light of all the information available at the time of the
sentencing hearing and then impose the sentence. Only an actual dispute,
properly raised at the sentencing hearing in respect to the type or amount of
1
Moreover, our Supreme Court recently overruled this rule in People v Ream, 481 Mich 223;
750 NW2d 536 (2008).
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restitution, triggers the need to resolve the dispute by a preponderance of the
evidence. MCL 780.767(4). [Emphasis added.]
Here, there was no actual dispute regarding the amount of restitution, so the trial court
was not required to determine whether the prosecutor had proven the amount by a preponderance
of the evidence. Moreover, in light of Overton and Keene’s trial testimony that jewelry valued at
more than $1,000 and $800 in cash was stolen, and the information in the presentence report that
Overton had filed an insurance claim with a deductible amount of $1,000, there was no plain
error in awarding restitution of $800.
V. Jury Array
Defendant argues that his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community was violated because his jury array included only one African-American. In People
v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 161-162; 670 NW2d 254 (2003), this Court stated:
To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement,
the defendant bears the burden of proving “that a distinctive group was
underrepresented in his venire or jury pool, and that the underrepresentation was
the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection process.”
People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203, 615 NW2d 1 (2000), citing Duren v
Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979).
However, to properly preserve a challenge to the jury array, a party must
raise this issue before the jury is empaneled and sworn. People v Dixon, 217
Mich App 400, 404; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). A review of the record in this case
indicates that defendant failed to make any objections regarding the composition
of her jury array. Further, there is no evidence in the lower court record to
support defendant’s argument. Consequently, we have no means of conducting a
meaningful review of defendant’s allegations on appeal.
In this case, not only did defendant fail to object to the jury array at trial, his counsel
stated, “we are satisfied with this jury.” Because defendant failed to raise this issue below, no
record was developed. On appeal, defendant has not identified any evidence suggesting that any
underrepresentation of African-Americans in his particular jury was due to systematic exclusion.
Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the fair cross-section requirement was violated.
Furthermore, defense counsel expressed his satisfaction with the jury. As our Supreme
Court explained in People v Riley, 465 Mich 442, 449; 636 NW2d 514 (2001), “[w]hen a court
proceeds in a manner acceptable to all parties, it is not resolving a disputed point and thus does
not ordinarily render a ruling susceptible to reversal.” Defense counsel’s affirmative approval of
the jury waived any claim of error. Id.; People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d
144 (2000).
VI. Juror Partiality
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury when a
juror who admitted to having previously met Overton was allowed to remain on the jury.
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After the jurors were selected, but before they were administered their oath, the
prosecutor revealed that Overton had disclosed that he may have had a conversation about the
case with one of the prospective jurors. The trial court agreed to question the juror and the
following exchange occurred:
Q. [T]he prosecutor is indicating that Mr. Overton had indicated maybe he had
spoke to you about the case?
A. Um . . . . . no, not really.
Q. All right. You don’t recall anything about being told anything about the facts
-A. Hum-um
Q. --either from him or anybody else?
A. No. Yeah, I heard about it on the streets.
***
Q. And you’ll be able to put that out of your mind, and upon deliberating in this
matter, only consider what comes to you in the course of this trial, right?
A. Yes.
The juror further stated that she “just heard that it had happened,” and denied hearing any
specific details. When defense counsel asked the juror whether she had any conversation with
Overton in which the robbery was mentioned, the juror denied this. The trial court commented,
“I don’t see any big problem based on what you’ve said. She can listen to what goes on here. So
we’ll proceed with the twelve that we have.”
Defendant now argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial or at least
investigated the matter further by questioning Overton. Because defendant did not move for a
mistrial below or otherwise object to the juror’s continued presence on the jury, this issue is
unpreserved and our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Carines, supra at 763-764.
A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial jury. People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88;
566 NW2d 229 (1997). Additionally, where a defendant contends that a jury was exposed to
extraneous influences, the defendant must show that the jury was exposed to such influences, and
further, that there is a real and substantial possibility that they could have affected the jury’s
verdict. Id. at 88-89. In People v Schram, 378 Mich 145, 159-160; 142 NW2d 662 (1966), our
Supreme Court held that outside contact between a juror and an attorney for one of the parties
did not require reversal unless the defendant could demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the
contact. A mere possibility of prejudice was deemed insufficient to require reversal. Id. at 159.
In this case, upon inquiry by the trial court, the juror denied having a conversation about
the case with Overton, and indicated that she had only heard “on the streets” that it had
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happened, but did not hear any of the details. The juror indicated that she could set aside what
little she had heard and decide the case only on the evidence presented at trial. In light of the
juror’s responses, there is no basis for concluding that the juror’s prior exposure to information
would cloud her impartiality, or that there is a real and substantial possibility that the jury’s
verdict was tainted by extraneous influences. Further, we are satisfied that the trial court made
an appropriate inquiry. Both parties were apparently satisfied with the juror’s responses and did
not request any further inquiry. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial or
investigate the matter further was not plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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