ROYCE WILCOXSON-BEY V PROVIDENCE HOSP & MED CENTERS INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROYCE WILCOXSON-BEY, by Next Friend
PEPPER WILCOXSON-BEY, and ROXY
WILCOXSON-BEY, a Stillborn Child, by
PEPPER WILCOXSON-BEY, Personal
Representative, and PEPPER WILCOXSON-BEY,
Individually,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279146
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-524008-NH
PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL & MEDICAL
CENTERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
DEBRA WRIGHT, M.D., and ST. JOHN HEALTH
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Providence Hospital & Medical Centers, Inc., appeals as of right from a
judgment, following a bench trial, awarding plaintiff $3 million in this medical malpractice
action. We reverse.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff was diagnosed with a monoamniotic-monochorionic twin pregnancy, an
extremely rare high-risk pregnancy in which both fetuses share a single amniotic sac. A
monoamniotic twin pregnancy involves increased risks of complications, including the chance
that the two umbilical cords will become entangled and that one or both of the fetuses could die
or be injured as a result of cord compression. Additionally, the death of one twin can lead to
brain injury or death of the other. Tragically, that is what occurred here.
-1-
Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that her treating physician, Dr. Debra Wright,
committed malpractice by failing to order inpatient monitoring at least once a day. Plaintiff’s
expert witness, Curtis Cetrulo, M.D., testified that the standard of care in 2003 required Dr.
Wright to order daily non-stress testing (NST), and that Dr. Wright breached that standard by
ordering NSTs only twice a week. Dr. Cetrulo acknowledged that there is always a risk with
monoamniotic twins because “basically a hundred percent of the time there’s some cord
entanglement.” He denied that the standard of care required that a patient be placed on a
continuous fetal monitor, and acknowledged that, even if an NST were given three times a day, a
patient could still experience an acute cord accident that would cause a poor result. Dr. Cetrulo
believed, however, that data from the available literature suggested that, in a case involving
monoamniotic twins, daily testing “can change the outcome and prevent a poor outcome in that
setting.”
Defendant argues that it was entitled to summary disposition because plaintiff failed to
establish causation. We agree.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim, and it should be granted
if the evidence demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 332; 628
NW2d 33 (2001).
III. ANALYSIS
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action has the burden of proving proximate causation
by showing, at a minimum, that his or her injury was “more probably than not” caused by the
defendant’s negligence. MCL 600.2912a(2); see also Dykes v William Beaumont Hosp, 246
Mich App 471, 477; 633 NW2d 440 (2001). The defendant’s negligence must be a cause in fact
of the plaintiff’s injuries before it can be considered a proximate cause, but it need not be the
sole cause. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 87; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). “It is important to
bear in mind that a plaintiff cannot satisfy this burden by showing only that the defendant may
have caused his injuries. Our case law requires more than a mere possibility or a plausible
explanation.” Id. (emphasis in original). Summary disposition of a plaintiff’s claim is
appropriate where plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
Dykes, supra at 478-479.
Here, Dr. Cetrulo initially testified that the infants’ injuries were likely due to an acute
cord accident, but when specifically asked, Dr. Cetrulo testified that he could not express an
opinion as to whether it was an acute verses a chronic phenomenon.1 Regardless, it could have
1
Deposition of Dr. Cetrulo, M.D., July 12, 2006, pp 101-103:
(continued…)
-2-
caused the fetal death of Roxy in as little as 15 to 20 minutes, and probably caused the brain
injury to Royce within an hour. Dr. Cetrulo stated that the infants’ injuries occurred sometime
(…continued)
Q. [Mr. Lenderman] All right. Let me see if I can refine it.
To detect variable decelerations resulting from cord occlusion or cord
compression, obviously the patient would need to be on a monitor at this point in
time, correct?
A. [Dr. Cetrulo]
Yes.
Q.
And up until and through, actually, the August 22nd monitoring on this
patient, you don’t see any evidence on the fetal monitor tracings that would
suggests that the cords were entangled to the point that there was any element of
occlusion or impairment of blood flow to the fetuses; is that true?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And the cord accident which you described earlier in this case involved
either tightening of the knot or some other entangling of the cord of Twin A such
that there wasn’t adequate blood flow to that fetus, and that it subsequently
resulted in demise, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you have any opinion as to whether that was an acute versus a chronic
phenomenon? And I’ll define those for you.
A.
No.
Q.
Do you have any opinion as to how long that process took to cause the
ultimate demise?
A.
No.
Q.
Could it have been as short as 15 to 20 minutes?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could it have been something longer than a day?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you have any opinion in this case which of those two ends of the
spectrum is more likely?
A.
No.
-3-
between August 22 and August 26, but he could not say with any certainty what date or time the
injuries actually occurred.2
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Wright’s practice of performing NSTs only twice weekly was the
cause of the infants’ injuries. To support this argument, Dr. Cetrulo asserted that rather than the
bi-weekly testing ordered by Dr. Wright, the appropriate standard of care required testing on a
daily basis. However, Dr. Cetrulo acknowledged that the standard of care did not require
continuous fetal monitoring.
As Dr. Cetrulo admitted, the infants’ injuries could have occurred at anytime between
August 22 and August 26, including when plaintiff was in the parking lot leaving the hospital.
Therefore, plaintiff has not established that it was Dr. Wright’s failure to perform daily NSTs
that caused the infants’ injuries.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary
disposition.3
2
Deposition of Dr. Cetrulo, M.D., July 12, 2006, pp 115-116:
Q. [Mr. Lenderman] Do you have any opinion about when the cord accident
occurred in terms of whether it was the 22nd, 23rd, 24th?
A. [Dr. Cetrulo]
Prior to the 26th.
Q.
And After the 22nd?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You have no further information with any greater detail as to what date or
time that was?
A.
No.
Q.
Likewise, you have no opinion and aren’t able to state, based upon any
evidence available, where the patient was geographically when this cord event
occurred, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
It could have happened as she’s in the parking lot leaving the hospital on
August 22nd, true?
A.
Yes.
3
In light of our conclusion, we need not reach the remaining arguments raised by defendant on
appeal.
-4-
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendant. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
