PEOPLE OF MI V GARY O'NEIL HAMILTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278877
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001279-FH
GARY O’NEIL HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and O’Connell and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1), and one count of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (victim between 13 and 16 years of
age). Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to
concurrent terms of 12 months’ imprisonment and was placed on probation beginning on May 9,
2007, with a discharge date of May 9, 2012. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from defendant’s improper touching of the 16-year-old complainant in
her bedroom. Defendant, a social acquaintance of the complainant’s mother, Bernadine
Rougeau, and her stepfather, was at Rougeau’s home for a social gathering that lasted late in the
evening. The complainant went to sleep in her bedroom at approximately 11:00 p.m. Defendant
remained at the gathering, socializing and drinking alcohol.
Around the time the gathering disbanded, defendant asked Rougeau if he could stay the
night in the home. Rougeau agreed, gave defendant a blanket, and told him to sleep downstairs.
Rougeau then went to bed.
Soon thereafter, defendant went upstairs, entered the complainant’s room as she slept,
and began fondling her and exposing his genitals. The complainant woke up, moved her body
against the headboard of her bed, and asked defendant who he was. When defendant gave his
nickname, the complainant ordered him out of her room. Defendant left the house, and the
complainant, who was crying and upset, immediately told Rougeau that defendant had fondled
her.
When Rougeau learned what had happened, she got up and went downstairs in search of
defendant. Finding that he had left the house, Rougeau called the police and told a neighbor,
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Anglique Townsend, what had happened and asked her to drive down the street to find
defendant. Rougeau, Townsend, and two others left in Townsend’s car to find defendant.
According to Rougeau, the group spotted defendant and immediately saw a sheriff’s car nearby.
They stopped the sheriff’s car and told Deputy McVicker that defendant had fondled the
complainant. McVicker found defendant and placed him in his cruiser, and he accompanied the
group back to Rougeau’s home.
Annette Coppock and Jon McDonagh, officers with the Ypsilanti Police Department,
arrived at the house just before 5:00 a.m. in response to a radio dispatch from the Washtenaw
County Sheriff’s Department. McDonagh testified that he spoke to Rougeau and Townsend
while Coppock spoke with the complainant. Coppock and McDonagh then took defendant into
custody.
The complainant later talked with Marty Cole, defendant’s nephew, about the case. She
claimed that he told her not to testify and asked her not to “get my uncle locked up.” Chris
Tubbs, an acquaintance of the complainant and a close friend of Cole, claimed that he saw the
complainant approximately two weeks before trial. At their meeting, Cole claimed the
complainant told him that defendant did not touch her and that she would not testify at trial
unless her mother made her.
First, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial and that his constitutional right of
confrontation was violated when the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony.1
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). “Hearsay is
not admissible except as provide by” the rules of evidence. MRE 802. In addressing defendant’s
hearsay objections, the trial court cited both the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are set forth in MRE 803(1) and (2) respectively.2
1
We review the trial court’s ruling admitting evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Hine,
467 Mich 242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). Defendant did not challenge the admission of one
piece of testimony now challenged on appeal, and he did not raise the argument predicated on
Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). Thus, we review
these matters for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1,
10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007).
2
MRE 803 states, in pertinent part,
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.
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Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because Rougeau vouched for the
complainant’s credibility in the following exchange:
Q. [W]hy are you getting in [Townsend’s] car and why do you want to—
A. Because he touched my child. I mean, I—I always taught my children, I don’t
care if it’s an uncle, aunt, cousin, your daddy, my dad, your grandpa, they
touch you in the wrong spot, you let somebody know. I was done—it was
done to me as a child, and that’s why I am so protective of my kids.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge.
[PROSECUTOR] (CONTINUING):
A. [Defendant] knew how protective of my children—how protective I was of
my kids.
“It is generally improper for a witness to comment or provide an opinion on the
credibility of another witness, because credibility matters are to be determined by the jury.”
People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). However, “unresponsive
testimony by a prosecution witness does not justify a mistrial unless the prosecutor knew in
advance that the witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the prosecutor conspired with
or encouraged the witness to give that testimony.” People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531;
455 NW2d 358 (1990). Here, Rougeau’s testimony does not address the prosecutor’s question
regarding why she got into Townsend’s car. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor
knew that Rougeau would respond in the manner she did. Moreover, the trial court properly
sustained defense counsel’s objection and instructed the jury that it must decide the case based
only on the admitted evidence and that it should disregard “excluded stricken testimony, that was
heard.” “[J]urors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476,
486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Therefore, we assume that the jurors did not take Rougeau’s
unsolicited statements into consideration when they weighed the evidence and agreed on
defendant’s guilt.
Defendant also argues that the following exchange between Rougeau and defense counsel
constitutes “poisonous hearsay”:
Q. Did you see her come out of the house?
A. No. Why are you making things so—difficulty [sic]?
Q. Well, I—I’m trying not to.
A. Yes, you are.
Q. I’m trying to make them simple, so let me try again. When—
A. You’re trying to make it easy on this man and what he did to my child.
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However, Rougeau’s comments do not recount statements made by another outside of
trial; rather, they are simply her opinions. The first two comments address the motives of
defense counsel, while the last can be seen as her opinion concerning defendant’s guilt.
Although Rougeau’s remarks are admittedly improper, see People v Parks, 57 Mich App 738,
750; 226 NW2d 710 (1975) (referencing the “settled and long-established rule that a witness
cannot express an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of a defendant”), the trial court
sustained defense counsel’s objection and told the jury not to consider the contested statements.
Graves, supra at 486. Further, in light of the other evidence adduced, especially the
complainant’s testimony, we do not find Rougeau’s unsolicited commentary to be outcome
determinative. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
We also conclude that defendant’s challenges to the admission of Townsend’s and
McDonagh’s testimony lack merit because the contested statements are admissible as excited
utterances. Townsend’s contested testimony is as follows:
Q. And where did you drive, around the neighborhood?
A. We drove [a description of the route taken is testified to] . . . . [S]he say, he
right over there hiding behind a tree. So when I did that, the Sheriffs got out
and they asked her, what—what was going on, what was the problem? And
she told them, you need to stop him right there, and she said he did something
to her daughter.
McDonagh testified that after Rougeau returned to her home, she “was yelling out, he touched
my daughter’s private parts, he touched my daughter’s private parts.”
A statement may be admitted as an excited utterance if two requirements are met: “1)
that there be a startling event, and 2) that the resulting statement be made while under the
excitement caused by the event.” People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998).
“[I]t is the lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate, that is the focus of the
excited utterance rule. The question is not strictly one of time, but of the possibility for
conscious reflection.” Id. at 551. “The trial court’s determination whether the declarant was still
under the stress of the event is given wide discretion.” Id. at 552. “Physical factors, such as
shock, unconsciousness, or pain, may prolong the period in which the risk of fabrication is
reduced to an acceptable minimum.” Id. at 551-552, quoting 5 Weinstein, Evidence (2d ed), §
803.04[4], p 803-24. Further, “there is no express time limit for excited utterances.” Id. at 551.
The complainant’s statements to Rougeau regarding defendant’s actions, made moments
after defendant had left her bedroom, clearly fall under this exception. Similarly, Rougeau was
obviously startled to learn that defendant had fondled her daughter. However, defendant argues
that Rougeau’s statements should not have been admitted because she made the challenged
statements 45 minutes to one hour after the alleged event, and therefore had the opportunity to
fabricate and embellish her statements.
In this case, Rougeau asked Townsend for a ride and continued to search for defendant
for 30 to 45 minutes following the complainant’s revelation. While still in the midst of chasing
defendant and under the stress of her daughter’s declaration, Rougeau made the challenged
statement to McVicker, which Townsend then repeated at trial. Similarly, McDonagh stated that
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when Rougeau returned to her home, she was “very upset” and that she was “screaming and
yelling” with “tears in her eyes.” These facts indicate that Rougeau was still under the
excitement caused by the event when she spoke to McVicker and McDonagh. Thus, defendant
fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the testimony under
MRE 803(2).
Next, defendant challenges the admission of Coppock’s testimony concerning
McVicker’s statements to Rougeau after she had located defendant.3 The challenged testimony
is as follows:
Q. And who did you—make contact with you [sic] when you arrived at
[Rougeau’s home]?
A. The Sheriff’s Department was actually there—Washtenaw County Sheriff’s
Department, Deputy McVicker.
Q. And what involvement, if any, did he have in the investigation?
A. The county stumbled across this incident, but it had occurred in our city so,
therefore, we’re responsible for taking the call because it happened in our
jurisdiction and the deputies got flagged down in their jurisdiction stating that
there is a male that was walking down the street that was a suspect in
inappropriate touching of a young girl, and they transported that subject from
their jurisdiction back to [Rougeau’s home], in our city, where the incident
happened.
Coppock’s statements were not hearsay. “Where a witness testifies that a statement was made,
rather than about the truth of the statement itself, the testimony is not hearsay.” People v Harris,
201 Mich App 147, 151; 505 NW2d 889 (1993). In People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 11;
742 NW2d 610 (2007), this Court observed, “[A] statement offered to show why police officers
acted as they did is not hearsay.” Here, the prosecution elicited the challenged testimony to help
the jury understand the sequence of events and explain the circumstances under which the
Sheriff’s Department became involved. The line of questioning was not an attempt to elicit
testimony regarding whether the alleged assault had actually occurred. Indeed, Coppock stated
that McVicker was investigating a “suspect,” not a perpetrator. Accordingly, defendant fails to
establish plain error.
Defendant also argues that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because
the statements recounted above were testimonial in nature. However, in Chambers, this Court
observed that “a statement offered to show the effect of the out-of-court statement on the hearer
does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” Id. In this case, the declarants appeared at trial and
were subject to cross-examination. Thus, defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated.
3
Because defendant failed to raise this issue at trial, it is not preserved, and we review it for
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Chambers, supra at 10.
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Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony from Rougeau
regarding defendant’s alleged refusal to take a polygraph test and testimony that God knew what
happened to complainant. Defendant’s claim of error arises from the following testimony in
which Rougeau discussed her attempts to find police assistance and locate defendant following
the inappropriate touching:
Q. But you made contact with the police when you found [defendant]?
A. But it wasn’t nobody but God that sent the police behind that car, I’m telling
you, and I know it wasn’t nobody. . . . And I tell you that I didn’t see no
police nowhere in sight and nobody—was nobody because God knew that
man had touched my baby and he hurted (sic) her and something bad was
going to happen. When I seen the police, I jumped out the car and I stopped
them, and I told them, I said, will you please catch him? ‘Cause I say, he just
touched my daughter in the wrong spot and he’s running from her. So that’s
when the polices [sic] in the brown and gray car, they stopped him.
Q. The Sheriff’s Department?
A. The Sheriff’s Department caught him. Now while I’m standing up there
talking, you know, talking to the police, telling then what happened, he’s
sitting in the car looking dead at me, telling me he’s sorry.
Q. The Defendant?
A. The Defendant. Now, if you sorry—if you didn’t do nothing to my child, why
are you telling me you’re sorry for something you didn’t do? If you don’t
want to take a lie detector test, you didn’t—then you ain’t got nothing to
worry about.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor. That’s a—that’s a—
THE COURT: Objection sustained. The jury will disregard that statement.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I’m—I’m sorry.
THE COURT: There’s no evident—no, there’s no evidence that there was or
wasn’t. In any event, a lie detector’s not admissible, so it’s not an issue.
BY [PROSECUTOR] (CONTINUING):
Q. So he says to you—as you’re standing, talking to the deputy from the Sheriff’s
Department, he’s telling you, I’m sorry?
A. He’s telling me, I’m sorry for what I did. Yes, he did. I’ll put all—I’ll take a
lie detector test. I’ll put my hand on some Bibles.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.
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BY [PROSECUTOR] (CONTINUING):
A. He was in the window telling me, I’m sorry for what I did to [the
complainant].
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
Initially, defendant challenged the witness’s reference to a polygraph test.4 References to
a polygraph test are not admissible in a criminal prosecution. People v Kahley, 277 Mich App
182, 183; 744 NW2d 194 (2007). “However, not every reference to a polygraph examination
requires reversal.” Id. at 183-184. We may consider the following factors to determine whether
mention of a defendant’s failure to take a polygraph examination requires reversal: “(1) whether
defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was
inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt
to bolster a witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than
merely the fact that a test had been conducted.” People v Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 9; 312 NW2d
657 (1981).
Rougeau twice referred to a polygraph examination, and in context, the first reference can
be seen as an attempt to bolster the complainant’s credibility.5 However, although we do not
characterize Rougeau’s references as inadvertent, they were not responsive to the questions
posed by the prosecutor and, therefore, do not justify a mistrial. See Hackney, supra at 531.
Further, the trial court twice sustained defendant’s timely objections and told the jury to
disregard Rougeau’s references to a polygraph, not only because there was no evidence that such
a test was administered, but also because “a lie detector’s not admissible.” Finally, any prejudice
resulting from the unresponsive remarks was mitigated; the trial court properly instructed the
jury that it must decide the case based only on the admitted evidence and should disregard
“excluded stricken testimony, that was heard.” Again, juries are presumed to follow the court’s
instructions. Graves, supra at 486. Accordingly, Rougeau’s statements regarding polygraphs
did not deny defendant a fair trial.
Defendant also challenges Rougeau’s statement that “God knew that man had touched
my baby and he hurted (sic) her and something bad was going to happened” because, he claims,
she was improperly vouching for the complainant’s credibility.6 Yet this testimony was also
unresponsive to the questions posed. Again, such testimony “does not justify a mistrial unless
the prosecutor knew in advance that the witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the
prosecutor conspired with or encouraged the witness to give that testimony.” Hackney, supra at
4
We review this claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo to determine whether defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. See People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 450-451; 709 NW2d 152
(2005).
5
In the second reference, Rougeau attempts to bolster her own credibility.
6
At trial, defendant did not challenge Rougeau’s testimony concerning God’s omniscience, so
we review this claim for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
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531. There is no indication in the record that the prosecutor knew that Rougeau would respond
the way she did. Further, as with the polygraph references, any prejudice resulting from the
unresponsive remarks was mitigated when the jury was instructed that it must decide the case
based only on the admitted evidence and that it should disregard stricken testimony that it heard.
See Graves, supra at 486.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments denied
him a fair trial. First, defendant challenges the following comments made about Tubbs:
And with reference to Chris Tubbs, you take his testimony for whatever
you want, but I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, the witness who came in
yesterday, brought by the Defendant, came back today with the Defendant’s
cousin or nephew who he would lie for, is nothing but a thug and a little punk.
He’s here two days in court and has contact with the deputies out in the hallway
yesterday. So you take his testimony for what it’s worth. That, ironically, two
weeks before the trial, where the Defendant’s on trial for assaulting [the
complainant], he happened to run into [the complainant] at a party store.
A prosecutor’s attack on a defense witness’s credibility constitutes grounds for reversal
where there is no support on the record. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 545-546; 575
NW2d 16 (1997). Further, “[a] prosecutor may not inject unfounded and prejudicial innuendo
into a trial.” Dobek, supra at 79, citing People v Burrell, 127 Mich App 721, 726; 339 NW2d
239 (1983).
The pertinent section of the prosecutor’s closing argument references Tubbs’ testimony
that he would lie for Cole. The prosecutor was also apparently referring to Tubbs’ crossexamination when he noted that Tubbs had contact with court deputies outside the courtroom.
The prosecutor asked if Tubbs and Cole were “upstairs checking the doors, trying to get into
different offices?” Tubbs had responded that they were not.
Although the prosecutor engaged in improper name-calling by calling Tubbs “a thug and
a little punk,” which could be characterized as innuendo, defendant has not shown that this
unpreserved issue resulted in prejudicial error. Tubbs admitted that he would lie in certain
situations and that he had contact with the courthouse deputies, although he denied that he and
Cole were trying to get into upstairs courthouse offices. Regardless, the court instructed the
jurors that they alone had the responsibility to assess witness credibility. Again, jurors are
presumed to follow the court’s instructions. Graves, supra at 486.
Next, defendant challenges the prosecutor’s comments concerning defense requests to
include an instruction on accidental touching. In particular, defendant challenges the following
portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:
And so the theory that defense counsel called it, that the Defendant has—
that he fell into bed with her is the most ridiculous, absurd thing that I have ever
heard, and—and they’ve taken it a step further and they’ll have an instruction.
They’ve requested an instruction from this Judge that with regard to Count I, that
if you find it was an accident, that you find him not guilty. And so you know
what that means, that means they’re saying if I touched her, it was an accident. If
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I touched her and moved her panties and poked at her private parts, if I did it, if
you believe that I did it, it was an accident. So which is it? He wants it both
ways. He wants you to find him not guilty because he didn’t touch her, he might
have touched her when he yawned; but if you find that he touched her, find that it
was an accident and find him not guilty. It makes me think of a saying my mother
used to tell me when I was child, if you believe that, I have a bridge to sell you.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor attempted to disparage him and his counsel by
suggesting that they were trying to mislead the jury. “A prosecutor may not suggest that defense
counsel is intentionally attempting to mislead the jury.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572,
592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). In his closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that if
defendant touched the complainant, the touching was accidental. This argument reconciled
defendant’s two statements on the matter: in one statement, he claimed that he never touched
her, while in the other statement, he claimed that he touched her by accident. In the disputed
portion of the closing argument, the prosecutor was attempting to point out the weaknesses in
defense counsel’s attempt to reconcile these alternative theories. However, the prosecutor never
blatantly characterized defendant’s theory as, for example, “‘a bunch of lies’” or “‘fabrication of
evidence.’” See People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 579; 419 NW2d 609 (1988) (finding
that the prosecutor’s argument that “the whole defense was a ‘pack of lies’” was improper
because in making this argument, the prosecutor chastised defense counsel and defendant’s
entire defense). The prosecutor’s remarks treaded close to the line, but they did not cross it.
Further, the court instructed the jury to decide the case based on the evidence, which did not
include the comments of counsel, so we presume that the jury did not take the prosecutor’s
comments into consideration when weighing the evidence. See Graves, supra at 486. Reversal
of defendant’s conviction is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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