PEOPLE OF MI V RIGOBERTO CARDENAS-BORBON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277639
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-004728-FC
RIGOBERTO CARDENAS-BORBON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Jansen and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver
1,000 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to possess with intent to
deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). He was
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 16 to 40 years for each conviction. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We
disagree. When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). We will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining
the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514. Rather, “a reviewing court is
required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury
verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
A. Conspiracy to Deliver 1,000 or More Grams of Cocaine
Under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), it is unlawful for a person to deliver 1,000 or more grams
of cocaine. A “person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense
prohibited by law . . . is guilty of the crime of conspiracy[.]” MCL 750.157a; People v Mass,
464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, requiring the
intent to combine with others and the intent to accomplish an illegal objective. Id. To prove the
intent to combine with others, it must be shown that the intent, including knowledge, was
possessed by more than one person. People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 482; 505 NW2d 843
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(1993). For intent to exist, the defendant must know of the conspiracy, know of the objective of
the conspiracy, and intend to participate cooperatively to further that objective. Id. at 485.
Direct proof of a conspiracy is not essential. Rather, a conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence or by reasonable inference, and no overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy is required. People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 347; 562 NW2d 652
(1997); People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 393; 478 NW2d 681 (1991).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable
a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired with
others to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine. Defendant and the charged coconspirators
came to Michigan from Arizona. While in Arizona, through Jesus Ramon Cottleon, Jamie
Cardenas met with codefendant Hugo Moran-Dopico to discuss trafficking a large quantity of
cocaine in the Detroit area. Thereafter, Moran-Dopico and Cottleon flew from Arizona to
Detroit together and met with their drug connection. In Detroit, the codefendants arranged a deal
for the delivery of ten kilograms of cocaine to be delivered within a few days. Moran-Dopico
remained in Detroit, while Cottleon returned to Arizona. Soon thereafter, an Explorer containing
the cocaine, driven by codefendant Antonio Perez-Chica, left Arizona. Defendant and Cottleon
also left Arizona en route to Michigan in a white Durango, following the Explorer for the
purpose of delivering the cocaine. Defendant told Cottleon that the cocaine was in the Explorer.
Once in Detroit, defendant and Cottleon met Moran-Dopico and their drug connection.
Defendant had been communicating with Perez-Chica via cellular phone. Defendant ultimately
contacted Perez-Chica to learn the location of the Explorer, and advised Cottleon that he would
drive the Explorer with the cocaine to the drug distributor’s house. Defendant then traveled with
Cottleon to a hotel, where Cottleon took control of the Explorer as planned. When Cottleon was
arrested, he was en route to meet Moran-Dopico to deliver the cocaine to the drug distributor.
Two days after the police seized the cocaine in the Explorer, the Durango was stopped heading
toward Arizona. Defendant was in the vehicle with Moran-Dopico.
This evidence established a basis for the jury to conclude that defendant conspired with
others to deliver the cocaine found in the Explorer. Defendant’s behavior and his associates’
interactions provided evidence of their concert of action, which created an inference of
conspiracy. See Cotton, supra at 393-394. Further, the credibility of Cottleon’s testimony was
for the jury to determine. Wolfe, supra at 514. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to deliver 1,000 or more
grams of cocaine.
B. Possession with Intent to Deliver 1,000 or More Grams of Cocaine
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the cocaine,
because there was no evidence that he knew about the cocaine transaction.1 We disagree.
1
The elements of possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine are: (1) the
recovered substance was cocaine, (2) the cocaine was in a mixture weighing more than 1,000
grams, (3) the defendant was not authorized to possess the cocaine, and (4) the defendant
knowingly possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); Wolfe,
supra at 516-517.
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Possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive, and may be joint as
well as exclusive. Wolfe, supra at 519-520. Constructive possession exists when the totality of
the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband. Id. at
520. “The essential question is whether the defendant had dominion or control over the
controlled substance.” People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence are sufficient to
establish possession. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
At trial, the prosecutor advanced the theory that defendant was guilty as a principal or as
an aider and abettor. A person who aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted
and punished as if he directly committed the offense. MCL 767.39. “‘To support a finding that
a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the prosecution must show that (1) the crime charged was
committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave
encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time
he gave aid and encouragement.’” People v Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich App 490, 495-496;
633 NW2d 18 (2001) (citation omitted).
“Aiding and abetting” describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a
crime and comprehends all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the
commission of a crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Rockwell, 188 Mich App 405, 411-412; 470 NW2d 673 (1991). “The quantum of aid or advice
is immaterial as long as it had the effect of inducing the crime.” People v Lawton, 196 Mich
App 341, 352; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from
all the facts and circumstances, including a close association between the defendant and the
principal, and the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime. Carines,
supra at 758.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the same evidence that enabled the
jury to conclude that defendant conspired with others to possess and deliver the cocaine also
established a proper basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it. A jury could have reasonably inferred from
defendant’s actions and associations that he constructively possessed the cocaine or assisted
others in possessing the cocaine found in the Explorer. There was sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine.
II. Great Weight of the Evidence
Defendant also argues that his conviction was contrary to the great weight of the
evidence. We disagree. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by raising it in a motion
for a new trial, we review the issue for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra
at 763-764; People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).
In evaluating whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, the question is
whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129
(1998). A verdict may be vacated only when it does not find reasonable support in the evidence,
but is more likely to be attributed to causes outside the record such as passion, prejudice,
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sympathy, or some extraneous influence. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 661; 509 NW2d
885 (1993). Conflicting testimony and questions regarding the credibility of witnesses are not
sufficient grounds for granting a new trial. Lemmon, supra at 643. Indeed, “unless it can be said
that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was deprived of all probative
value or that the jury could not believe it,’ or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied
physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination.” Id. at 645-646 (citation
omitted).
Turning back to the present case, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the jury’s verdict that a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were
allowed to stand. Lemmon, supra at 627. We find no plain error in this regard.
III. Motion to Sever Trials
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s refusal to sever
his trial from that of his codefendants. We disagree. The decision to sever or join the trials of
codefendants lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325,
346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994).
In general, a defendant does not have a right to a separate trial. People v Hurst, 396 Mich
1, 6; 238 NW2d 6 (1976). Indeed, a strong policy favors joint trials in the interest of justice,
judicial economy, and administration. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52; 492 NW2d
490 (1992). Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant clearly and
affirmatively demonstrates through an affidavit or offer of proof that his substantial rights will be
prejudiced by a joint trial and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the potential
prejudice. Hana, supra at 346. “‘[I]ncidental spillover prejudice, which is almost inevitable in a
multi-defendant trial, does not suffice.’” Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
The charges against defendant and codefendants Perez-Chica and Moran-Dopico arose
out of a single criminal episode that involved numerous witnesses and substantially identical
evidence. To hold separate trials in these substantially identical cases would have been
unnecessarily duplicative. The interests of justice and judicial economy clearly called for a joint
trial in this case. Further, defendant has not demonstrated that his substantial rights were
prejudiced by the joint trial, and the record does not show any “significant indication” that the
requisite prejudice in fact occurred. Id. at 346-347. All of the defendants claimed to have no
knowledge that the cocaine was in the Explorer. In addition, because each defendant was
charged with conspiracy, the prosecutor would have been entitled to present the same evidence
in separate trials. Id. at 362. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and
the determination of guilt or innocence, and cautioned the jury that each case had to be
considered and decided on the evidence as it applied to each individual defendant. See id. at
351, 356 (observing that the risk of prejudice from a joint trial may be allayed by a proper
cautionary instruction). “It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a separate trial.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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Because defendant failed to raise this issue in a motion for a new trial or request for an
evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Ginther,
390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App
656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69;
536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that it is
“reasonably probable that the results of the proceeding would have been different had it not been
for counsel’s error.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007); see also
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
A. Failure to Argue Motion to Suppress
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue or
request a decision on his outstanding motions to suppress the evidence seized from the Dodge
Durango. The record does not support defendant’s suggestion that defense counsel neglected to
follow through on the motion. At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued there was no
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a stop of the Durango or to arrest defendant,
and questioned whether the actions of the St. Louis police were based solely on a phone call
from a law enforcement officer in Michigan regarding defendant’s possible connection with
Cottleon. The trial court granted defense counsel’s request for an evidentiary hearing to hear
testimony from the two officers directly involved. The two officers were present on the first day
of trial, but the attorneys indicated that they had reached an agreement regarding the “traffic
stop.” Defense counsel stipulated to allow the introduction of only two items recovered from the
vehicle: (1) copies of two airline passenger receipts in Cottleon’s name, and (2) an insurance
card in defendant’s name. Defense counsel reserved the right to renew the motions to suppress if
the prosecutor attempted to introduce other items that were seized.
From the record, it is apparent that after receiving additional information regarding the
circumstances of the stop, defendant’s arrest, and the search of the vehicle, defense counsel
reconsidered the motions and crafted an agreement with the prosecutor to limit what items could
be introduced at trial. Defendant has not presented any evidence or viable argument that trial
counsel’s decision to proceed in this manner was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial.
Decisions about defense tactics, including what arguments to make, are presumed to be matters
of trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). “This Court
will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it
assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” Id. at 76-77.
B. Offense Variable 14
We find no merit to defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to adequately argue that he was not a leader in this multiple-offender situation. At sentencing,
defense counsel challenged the evidence against defendant and argued that defendant was only a
“minor player” in this drug trafficking case. Although defendant asserts that counsel should
have further argued this issue and should have directly addressed specific statements made by the
prosecutor, decisions about how to argue an issue and what specific arguments to make are
matters of trial strategy. Id. at 76. To the extent that defendant relies on the fact that counsel’s
argument was not successful, nothing in the record suggests that counsel’s argument was
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unreasonable or prejudicial. “The fact that defense counsel’s strategy may not have worked does
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App
38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996).
Second, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of offense variable
(OV) 14. MCL 777.44(1)(a) permits the trial court to score ten points for OV 14 if the defendant
was a leader in a multiple offender situation. The entire criminal transaction should be
considered. MCL 777.44(2)(a). Facts relied on in scoring the sentencing guidelines need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Golba, 273 Mich App 603, 614; 729
NW2d 916 (2007). The evidence here showed that although several codefendants were involved
in the drug conspiracy, defendant directed several aspects of the criminal episode. Defendant
followed the Explorer from Arizona to Michigan and maintained contact with Perez-Chica, the
driver of the Explorer. Once in Detroit, defendant called to Perez-Chica to attain the location of
the Explorer. Defendant directed Cottleon to pick up the Explorer and instructed Perez-Chica to
turn the Explorer over to Cottleon. Consequently, there was evidence that supported the trial
court’s finding that defendant had a leadership role in this multiple offender situation. Because
there was no basis for an objection to the scoring of OV 14, defense counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object to the trial court’s ten-point score. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
V. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor knowingly
presented the false testimony of Cottleon to secure his conviction. We disagree. Because
defendant failed to object on the basis he now asserts, we review this claim for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra.
A prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction. People v
Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 276; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). The prosecutor must also correct false
evidence when it is presented. Id. Absent proof that the prosecutor knew that trial testimony
was false, however, reversal is unwarranted. See People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 417418; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
Defendant has failed to show that Cottleon’s trial testimony was actually false. Although
Cottleon made inconsistent statements before trial, the jury was aware of those inconsistencies.
The prosecutor told the jury in opening statement that “at times [Cottleon] has been deceitful.”
“I’m telling you from the get go [Cottleon] isn’t completely truthful with the officers . . . I’m
going to have to pick through what’s a lie and what’s not.” During trial, Cottleon admitted that
he had used several aliases. He further admitted that he had lied previously, including lying in
police interviews on numerous occasions. He claimed that he initially lied because he was
“trying to protect [defendant]” and he “thought Jamie was going to help him with an attorney.”
At one point during the investigation, he “also feared that [his] family would be harmed” because
they were threatened. In addition, Cottleon explained the scope of the sentencing agreement
under which he testified against defendant. The trial court instructed the jury that Cottleon was
charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and that, pursuant
to a sentencing agreement, he was testifying against the other defendants in exchange for a
minimum sentence of seven years. The jury was also instructed to carefully consider Cottleon’s
testimony because he was an accomplice who received leniency in exchange for his testimony.
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Under the circumstances, defendant’s challenge to Cottleon’s testimony involves a matter
of witness credibility, which was for the jury to decide. See Lemmon, supra at 642. The
problems with Cottleon’s credibility were plainly presented to the jury. The record discloses that
defense counsel vigorously attacked Cottleon’s credibility and thoroughly explored his
motivation to lie. Additionally, the trial court’s instructions protected defendant’s rights.2 There
is simply no tangible indication that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and defendant has
failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights in this regard.
VI. Motion to Quash the Information
Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by binding him over for trial.
Again, we disagree. Generally, this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion both a district
court’s decision to bind a defendant over for trial and a trial court’s decision on a motion to
quash the information. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 551-552; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
But “[i]f a defendant is fairly convicted at trial, no appeal lies regarding whether the evidence at
the preliminary examination was sufficient to warrant a bindover.” People v Wilson, 469 Mich
1018; 677 NW2d 29 (2004). Here, defendant’s argument fails because sufficient evidence at
trial supported his convictions, and there is no indication that he was otherwise prejudiced by the
claimed error. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 601-603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). Defendant has
failed to state a cognizable claim on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the evidence at the
preliminary examination.
VII. Defendant’s Supplemental Brief
Defendant raises several additional issues in a supplemental brief filed in propria
persona, none of which has merit.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Because defendant failed to raise these issues in the trial court by way of a motion for a
new trial or an evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.
Sabin, supra at 658-659.
1. Brady violation
Defendant argues that by failing to investigate and challenge “the disappearance” of his
“passport/visa/permit” for nationwide travel, defense counsel allowed a violation of the rule set
forth in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). A criminal
2
To protect a defendant’s rights “when the state grants concessions in exchange for testimony,”
“safeguards include (1) full disclosure of the terms of the agreements struck with such witnesses,
(2) the opportunity for full cross-examination of such witnesses regarding the agreements and
their effect, and (3) instructions cautioning the jury to carefully evaluate the credibility of
witnesses who have been induced by agreements with the prosecution to testify against the
defendant.” People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 405; 600 NW2d 652 (1999).
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defendant has a due process right of access to certain information possessed by the prosecution if
that evidence might lead a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt. People
v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 280; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). In order to establish a Brady
violation, a defendant must prove (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the
defendant, (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it
himself with any reasonable diligence, (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable
evidence, and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability
exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Lester, supra at 281.
There is no indication that the prosecutor either possessed or suppressed defendant’s
travel documents. Furthermore, defendant does not explain how this evidence was favorable to
his defense. A defendant must provide a factual basis to sustain his position. See People v
Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). Because there is no basis for finding a
Brady violation in this case, defendant cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this regard.
2. Mexican Consulate
We also reject defendant’s claim that reversal is required because defense counsel failed
to investigate and challenge the alleged denial of his right to contact the Mexican consulate
under the terms of the Vienna Convention. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that any inaction
by defense counsel prejudiced his defense. That is, defendant does not explain how contacting
the Mexican consulate would have affected the result of the proceedings. His vague assertion
that he may not be able to raise a claim of violation of the Vienna Convention in a federal habeas
proceeding does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different if counsel had pursued this issue.
B. Expert Witness
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a federal DEA
agent to testify as an expert witness. We disagree. Expert testimony is admissible if the expert is
qualified, the evidence gives the trier of fact a better understanding of the evidence or assists in
determining a fact in issue, and the evidence is from a recognized discipline. People v Murray,
234 Mich App 46, 53-54; 593 NW2d 690 (1999). Contrary to defendant’s position, “drugrelated law enforcement is a recognized area of expertise.” People v Williams (After Remand),
198 Mich App 537, 542; 499 NW2d 404 (1993). Additionally, a law enforcement officer may
testify as an expert on drug-related law enforcement by virtue of his training and experience. Id.;
see also People v Ray, 191 Mich App 706, 708; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). Here, the agent’s training
and experience in the area of narcotics trafficking qualified him to testify about the significance
of the quantity of drugs recovered and other aspects of drug trafficking. In addition, the agent’s
knowledge of the drug trade was used to help the jury understand the significance of the amount
of cocaine at issue and the complexity of drug trafficking conspiracies. See Murray, supra at 53.
Therefore, we reject this claim of error.
C. Fair Trial
Defendant has not identified any basis in the record for concluding that any juror was
biased against him because of his status as an illegal alien. On the contrary, the record shows
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that the defense attorneys were permitted to question prospective jurors to test their reaction to
illegal aliens. Defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if anyone “might have a problem”
with the immigration “issue” or “think that it might be an issue that would somehow make them
less impartial or might somehow get into their mind set about this case.” Each prospective juror
responded in the negative. One of the codefendant’s attorneys asked the prospective jurors if
they could “put [codefendant’s] immigration status out of [their] mind and judge him fairly based
on the accusations.” Each prospective juror responded in the affirmative. The trial court asked
each potential juror if he or she could be a fair and impartial juror in this case, to which each
juror responded affirmatively. The purpose of voir dire is to expose potential juror bias so that a
defendant may be tried by a fair and impartial jury. People v Sawyer, 215 Mich App 183, 186;
545 NW2d 6 (1996). There is no evidence of jury bias based on defendant’s status as an illegal
alien in this case. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this ground.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the record shows that the prosecutor disclosed
Cottleon’s “expectation of leniency.” During his testimony, Cottleon testified that he understood
that he would receive a minimum sentence of seven years in exchange for his testimony.
Immediately thereafter, the court advised the jury that Cottleon had been charged with
possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and that, pursuant to an
agreement, he would testify against the other defendants in exchange for a minimum sentence.
In its final instructions, the court reiterated the charges against Cottleon and again explained the
sentencing agreement under which he had agreed to testify. Accordingly, there is no merit to
defendant’s argument that the prosecutor failed to disclose the consideration that Cottleon
received in exchange for his testimony.
E. Cumulative Effect of Errors
Lastly, we reject defendant’s argument that the cumulative effect of several errors
deprived him of a fair trial. Because no cognizable errors warranting relief have been identified,
reversal under a cumulative error theory is unwarranted. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112,
128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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