IN RE HARVEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ZACHARY POUL HARVEY and
ALEXANDER MICHAEL HARVEY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 285179
Antrim Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-004211-NA
MICHAEL HARVEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Michael Harvey appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating
his parental rights to the minor children.1 We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Harvey, a deputy with the Antrim County Sheriff’s Department, and his wife Tricia
Harvey had two children, Zachary Harvey and Alexander Harvey. Around March 2005, Harvey
began having an affair. In September 2005, Tricia Harvey confronted him about the affair, and
Harvey became violent. Afterward, whenever Tricia Harvey confronted him about his
whereabouts and his affair, he became violent and abusive. For instance, on several occasions
Harvey held a gun to Tricia Harvey’s head and said, “I should just f[___]ing kill you,” he
grabbed her by her throat and “slammed” her head against the couch, he “punched” holes in her
bedroom walls and bathroom doors, and, on one occasion, he broke a bedside lamp causing glass
to shatter all over Alexander Harvey, who was asleep in her bed. According to Tricia Harvey,
Harvey pointed a gun at her in the presence of the children. During this time, Zachary Harvey,
then age 13, did not like to be at home and spent a lot of time with his maternal grandmother.
1
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (h) (the children would be
deprived of a normal home for a period exceeding two years due to the parent’s imprisonment),
and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the children returned to the parent’s home).
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In April 2006, Harvey and Tricia Harvey had a disagreement about his affair. Harvey
was angry, and as Tricia Harvey left the home, she heard a shot fired outside the back door. In
May 2006, after Harvey discovered that Tricia Harvey had talked to an attorney about a divorce,
Harvey held a gun “pointblank” to Tricia Harvey’s forehead and said “I should just f[___]ing kill
you now” while she was in the driveway. At this time, the children were inside the home, and as
Harvey pointed the gun at Tricia Harvey, Alexander Harvey said, “Daddy, don’t shoot my
mommy.” Following this incident, Tricia Harvey filed a criminal complaint against Harvey, and
Harvey was arrested. Following his arrest, the children had no contact with Harvey during the
remainder of these proceedings. At some point, a personal protection order was issued
preventing Harvey from having contact with Tricia Harvey or the children.
In August 2006, Harvey pleaded guilty to one count of felonious assault, stemming from
his assault of Tricia Harvey.2 In September 2006, a trial court sentenced Harvey to two to four
years’ imprisonment.
In February 2007, approximately nine months following the incident, petitioner filed a
petition requesting termination of Harvey’s parental rights at the initial disposition. The petition
alleged that (1) in May 2006, Harvey got into an argument with Tricia Harvey, during which he
pushed and hit her, pointed a gun at her and threatened to kill her, and also threatened to kill her
mother and the children; (2) the children overheard or witnessed the argument; (3) Harvey was
arrested, convicted, and sentenced to two to four years’ imprisonment for felonious assault
stemming from the incident; (4) at the time of his arrest, the police recovered approximately 22
guns in Harvey’s truck and home, some of which were loaded; (5) Zachary Harvey reported that
he was afraid of and angry with his father and did not want further contact with him; (6) Tricia
Harvey reported a history of Harvey’s domestic abuse; (7) Harvey physically and verbally
assaulted his girlfriend, including pushing her down, choking her, and destroying her property;
and (8) a woman with whom Harvey had another child reported that he was physically abusive
toward her, including grabbing her by the hair, slamming her head into furniture, pushing her
into walls, and threatening to kill her and their child. In September 2007, Harvey entered a nocontest plea, and the trial court assumed jurisdiction over the children. The children were placed
in Tricia Harvey’s care, with whom they have been residing since.
In late-September 2007, Harvey underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation with
Dr. Timothy Strauss. The evaluation revealed that Harvey suffered from a personality disorder.
Specifically, the “primary concerns were narcissistic personality disorder with histrionic traits”
and “intermittent explosive disorder.” According to Dr. Strauss, persons with narcissistic
personality disorder “tend to view most relationships as extremely self-centered,” “have a lot of
difficulty developing genuine compassion and genuine empathy for other people,” “tend to
blame their problems on others,” “tend to view themselves as more the victim,” “tend not to see
their part in the relationship [as] a problem,” “have difficulty in intimate relationships [and]
family relationships,” “have a lot of difficulty understanding how they impact other people . . .
negatively,” “tend to have inflated self-esteem,” and “tend to see others as rather inferior to
2
Harvey also pleaded guilty to one count of domestic violence, stemming from an incident with
his girlfriend.
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them.” Dr. Strauss opined that Harvey would not have the “empathy, compassion or care to
ensure safety and understand the impact he has on others,” he would “not be aware of what his
children [were] experiencing,” “clearly [felt] that he ha[d] little repair work . . . to do,” and
“present[ed] a high risk for physical and verbal abuse primarily towards his romantic partners,”
which the children would likely witness.
According to Dr. Strauss, persons diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder have a
“temper problem,” which can be “pretty severe,” involving verbal and physical abuse, and
aggressive and “out of control” behavior. The “explosive episodes” associated with the disorder
are intermittent and unpredictable. According to Dr. Strauss, Harvey’s dual diagnosis of
narcissistic personality disorder and intermittent explosive disorder caused added concern.
According to Dr. Strauss, Harvey’s personality disorder was generally “very difficult to
treat” and “tends to be refractory, which means [a person] can make progress and then tend to
step backwards.” According to Dr. Strauss, although Harvey reported gaining some anger
management tools through his participation in a therapy program while in prison, he “clearly”
displayed the “Narcissistic Personality traits” and would require intensive therapy. Specifically,
Dr. Strauss opined that, for Harvey to possibly benefit from treatment, it would require two or
three means of consistent and intensive therapy for two to three years with a psychologist with
specialized training in treating personality disorders. However, the prognosis for change for
persons with Harvey’s diagnosis was “very poor” because the disorder was “very difficult to
treat” with the “failure rate” of treatment being approximately 70 to 90 percent. Considering the
poor prognosis for change associated with Harvey’s personality disorder, Dr. Strauss believed
that he had a poor likelihood of improvement, less than 10 percent. Accordingly, Dr. Strauss
expected Harvey’s behavior to remain the same. Dr. Strauss also felt that Harvey had only
“limited” insight regarding how his behaviors impacted his children.
Dr. Strauss also evaluated Zachary Harvey and Alexander Harvey, who were then 13
years old and almost four years old, respectively. According to Dr. Strauss, Zachary Harvey
expressed some positive things about Harvey, such as when he took him fishing and did other
activities with him. On the other hand, Zachary Harvey indicated that Harvey was “relatively
uninvolved in his life,” he had “significant” or “overwhelming” fear that Harvey would harm
him or harm or kill Tricia Harvey, he did not trust that Harvey could control his temper, he did
not want to be around Harvey or see him, and he was afraid Harvey would become violent or
threatening again. Zachary Harvey also indicated that he heard Tricia Harvey and Harvey
arguing and heard Harvey make threats to kill her, he was afraid the threats included him, he was
exposed to a lot of fighting and aggressiveness, and he experienced trauma from the experience.
Dr. Strauss felt that Zachary Harvey viewed his father as “emotionally absent” from his life both
presently and in the past and had only a “weak attachment” to him, at best. In fact, according to
Dr. Strauss, Zachary Harvey viewed his father as “gone.” Zachary Harvey also expressed
concern for the next woman Harvey became involved with and indicated that he would “feel
sorry” for her. Further, although Zachary Harvey received and made progress in counseling, he
presented as “hyper sensitive and hyper aroused, and very cautious about discussing the family
past,” which “may make him fearful of new situations that would remind him of that situation.”
Zachary Harvey also had feelings that he was responsible for his parents’ domestic disputes and
divorce.
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Dr. Strauss testified that his testing of Alexander Harvey did not demonstrate positive
feelings toward Harvey. Instead, testing indicated that Alexander Harvey felt that Harvey was
“pretty distant” and that he viewed his father as being absent. In fact, Alexander Harvey viewed
Harvey as “gone from his life,” did “not envision him returning to his life in any meaningful
way,” and did not have a sense of missing him or of him coming back, which, according to Dr.
Strauss, most likely indicated that Alexander Harvey viewed his father as “permanently gone”
from his life. During the evaluation, Alexander Harvey indicated that fantasized that he “got it
[the gun] and shot him up and killed him.” According to Dr. Strauss, while fantasizing at
Alexander Harvey’s age was not unusual, it was “very rare” for a child to have such an
“aggressive daydream” of shooting his father, which indicated he was “relatively frightened” of
him. Alexander Harvey also indicated a need to protect himself and Tricia Harvey from Harvey.
The children’s counseling records also indicated a disconnection from Harvey, a fearfulness of
him, a hesitancy to be around him, and a “lack of identification” with him.
Dr. Strauss concluded that it would not be in either Zachary Harvey or Alexander
Harvey’s best interests to attempt reunification with Harvey due to his “very poor” prognosis for
change because of his personality disorder, the children’s lack of a strong attachment to him, the
children’s lack of “faith” that Harvey would protect them, the children’s fears for their own
safety, the children’s testing indicating that they were “moving on” with their lives, and the
lengthy time that Harvey would need to treat his personality disorder. According to Dr. Strauss,
even in the best of situations, if Harvey made improvement, reunification would “re-traumatize”
the children and could cause them to suffer posttraumatic stress disorder, their “feelings of fear
would start up,” and they would experience “a lot of difficulty and . . . a lot of anxiety.”
According to Dr. Strauss, “the likelihood that [the children would] respond favorably to
[reunification] and tolerate that much pain and discomfort and anxiety would be very low, so you
would see regression in their behavior.” Specifically, if reunification were attempted with
Zachary Harvey, Dr. Strauss would expect his grades to decline, depression that could be
significant, and withdrawal from friends and activities. If reunification were attempted with
Alexander Harvey, Dr. Strauss would expect developmental and intellectual regression, acting
out, and aggressive behavior. Further, after the children were re-traumatized and if the
reunification was not successful, the children would need to go through counseling again to “get
them back to feeling safe” and would likely start to distrust other adult caregivers, such as Tricia
Harvey. Dr. Strauss did not believe re-traumatizing the children would be in their best interests
especially given the low prognosis that Harvey would successfully address his personality
disorder.
In early-December 2007, at Harvey’s request, he underwent a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation with Dr. David McDermid. During the evaluation, Dr. McDermid found Harvey to be
“very cautious and distrustful” and not “very reliable.” Dr. McDermid agreed with Dr. Strauss’s
evaluation concerning Harvey and the children and also diagnosed him with intermittent
explosive disorder and personality disorder “with narcissistic passive-aggressive, antisocial and
some paranoid trends.” Dr. McDermid felt that Harvey’s personality disorder was “quite
marked.” On a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most severe, Dr. McDermid categorized
Harvey as an “eight.” Given the difficulty in treating his disorder, Dr. McDermid was
“pessimistic about there being any significant change.” Dr. McDermid also opined that Harvey’s
disorder placed him at “high risk” “for verbal and physical abuse towards his romantic partners,
which would result in the children continuing to witness them.” Further, Dr. McDermid did not
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note any significant change in Harvey’s insight into his behavior from the date of his arrest and
observed that he continued to place responsibility for his issues and problems on other persons.
Dr. McDermid also did not believe that Harvey had made progress with the treatment program
he attended while in prison, despite Harvey’s opinion to the contrary. Accordingly, Dr.
McDermid believed that returning the children to Harvey’s care would put them in danger. In
fact, Dr. McDermid found it “hard to imagine” the children “coming back into contact” with
Harvey, believed that contact with him would be “incredibly stressful” for the children, and
believed that the children were highly likely to re-experience the same kind of physical abuse if
returned to his custody.
As mentioned, Harvey participated in an “Assaultive Offender Psychotherapy” program
while in prison during the proceedings. In late-December 2007, he completed the program,
attending all 44 sessions, completing his homework, regularly participating in group discussion,
and displaying “excellent” attitude and effort. The program’s therapist, Mark Fox, indicated in
his termination report that Harvey showed a willingness to learn and made “a great deal of
progress” toward achieving a better understanding and more effective management of his
criminal behaviors and his feelings connected with criminal behavior. Specifically, Harvey was
able to identify his risk factors, including his need to be in control all the time, feeling that he
was always right, letting his feelings build up to the point where he became very upset, impulsive
thinking and acting, having angry thoughts, getting involved in bad relationships, and job-related
stress. He was also able to identify new thinking and coping skills designed to deal with his risk
factors and increase his self-control and discipline. Overall, Fox felt that Harvey had a “very
good plan” that should be effective in keeping him out of prison, if he followed through.
In January 2008, the time of the termination trial, Zachary Harvey, age 14, and Alexander
Harvey, age four, had received counseling and had “done well enough” to end treatment. They
continued to reside with Tricia Harvey. According to Tricia Harvey, Alexander Harvey no
longer had a recollection of Harvey and Zachary Harvey occasionally discussed Harvey in the
context of not wanting to see him. Neither child asked to see Harvey. In fact, Zachary Harvey
expressed relief that Harvey was no longer around, in that he indicated he liked being home now
and stated, “I’m a lot happier and a lot better to be around.” According to Dr. Strauss, Alexander
Harvey appeared to be developing well, and his peer and family relationships appeared to be
healthy.
By the time of the termination trial, Harvey remained in prison. Harvey’s earliest release
date was in May 2008, and his maximum discharge date was May 2010. Upon his release,
Harvey planned to attend an anger management group and to reside with his brother.
After conducting a termination trial, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence
to support grounds for termination of Harvey’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h),
and (j). Pertinent to the trial court’s decision were the opinions of the evaluating experts, whom
the court found to be “credible and believable.” Specifically, the trial court found that
(1) Harvey had a “very poor” prognosis for change given his personality disorder and would not
likely benefit from treatment to be able to provide proper care and custody for the children
within a reasonable time; (2) attempting reunification with Harvey would re-traumatize and be
extremely harmful to the children and not in their best interests; (3) due to Harvey’s
imprisonment, the children would be deprived of a normal home exceeding two years; and
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(4) termination was clearly in the best interests of the children. The trial court then ordered
termination of Harvey’s parental rights.
II. Motion To Disqualify
A. Preservation Of Issue
“[T]o preserve for appellate review the issue of a denial of a motion for disqualification
of a trial court judge, a party must request referral to the chief judge of the trial court after the
trial court judge’s denial of the party’s motion.”3 Although Harvey filed a motion to disqualify
the trial judge, which the judge denied, there is no indication that he sought review of the judge’s
denial of the motion to disqualify.4 The trial judge in this case was the only judge and chief
judge of the Antrim County Probate Court. MCR 2.003(C)(3)(b), provides, “in a single-judge
court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge
shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall
decide the motion de novo.” Accordingly, Harvey failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review.5 Additionally, as discussed below, Harvey’s claim cannot succeed as he failed to
demonstrate that the presiding judge was actually biased or prejudiced, and he did not overcome
the heavy presumption of impartiality.6
B. Standard Of Review
We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s factual findings on a motion for
disqualification, but we review de novo the application of the facts to the law.7
C. Analysis
During the motion hearing in the instant case, Harvey identified no conduct by the trial
judge that demonstrated actual prejudice or bias, arguing only that the children’s maternal
grandmother was a court employee and a limited guardian for the children for health insurance
purposes. Furthermore, the instant case was not so “extreme” such that due process necessitated
judicial disqualification absent proof of actual bias or prejudice.8 To the contrary, there was no
3
Welch v District Court, 215 Mich App 253, 258; 545 NW2d 15 (1996), citing MCR
2.003(C)(3)(a).
4
MCR 2.003(C)(3)(a) and (b).
5
Welch, supra at 258.
6
MCR 2.003(B)(1); Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 495-497; 548 NW2d 210
(1996); VanBuren Charter Township v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598; 673 NW2d 111
(2003).
7
VanBuren Charter Township v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598; 673 NW2d 111
(2003), citing Cain, supra at 503 n 38; Armstrong v Ypsilanti Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573,
596; 640 NW2d 321 (2001).
8
VanBuren, supra at 599.
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indication that the presiding judge had a financial interest in the outcome of the case; had been
the subject of personal abuse or criticism from Harvey; might have prejudged the case because of
having previously acted as an accuser, fact-finder, or initial decision maker; or was “enmeshed in
other matters involving” Harvey.9 Although the trial judge indicated that he and Harvey had
coached their sons’ baseball teams in the same league and that the trial judge had extended an
offer to Harvey’s son, a child at issue, to join his team, those comments clearly did not display
any “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism such that the exercise of fair judgment is
impossible.”10 Likewise, the mere fact that the children’s grandmother and limited guardian for
health insurance purposes was a court employee did not establish that the trial judge was biased,
or even probably biased, against Harvey. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of Harvey’s motion for disqualification.11 Harvey failed to
overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality to warrant disqualification of the
presiding judge.12
III. Termination Of Parental Rights
A. Standard Of Review
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that the petitioner has proven at
least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.13 We review
for clear error a trial court’s decision terminating parental rights.14 A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.15 Regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.16
Once a petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights, unless the trial
court finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
interests.17 There is no specific burden on either party to present evidence of the children’s best
9
Id. at 599-600.
10
People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 391-392; 605 NW2d 374 (1999).
11
VanBuren, supra at 598.
12
Id.
13
MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); In re
Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993), citing In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47,
50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
14
MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 355-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); Sours,
supra at 633.
15
In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
16
MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989).
17
MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 350, 354. We note that MCL 712A.19b(5) was recently
amended such that the trial court must now find that termination of parental rights is in the
(continued…)
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interests; rather, the trial court should weigh all evidence available.18 We review the trial court’s
decision regarding the child’s best interests for clear error.19
B. Statutory Grounds For Termination
1. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
Harvey’s conduct traumatized and emotionally harmed the children. He physically and
verbally abused and threatened to kill Tricia Harvey in their presence. Thereafter, he was absent
from the children’s lives due to his imprisonment for the felonious assault of Tricia Harvey.
Harvey does not contest that his past acts were violent in nature. Instead, he argues that his
favorable progress in an “Assaultive Offender Psychotherapy” program completed while in
prison showed that he had learned appropriate ways to manage his anger and that the children
would no longer be subjected to a risk of harm if returned to his care. We disagree. Although
Harvey’s prison therapy termination report was positive, the expert opinions clearly contradicted
that report and overwhelmingly indicated that the children would likely be subjected to serious
emotional harm if returned to his home. It was clear from the trial court’s opinion that the court
found the expert opinions to be “extremely credible and believable.” And we give deference to
the special opportunity of the trial court as fact-finder to judge the credibility of the witnesses
who appeared before it.20 The evidence clearly and convincingly established a reasonable
likelihood, based on Harvey’s conduct or capacity, that the children would be emotionally
harmed if returned to his home. Thus, termination was proper under § (3)(j).
2. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)
By the time of the termination trial, Harvey remained unable to provide proper care and
custody for the children, as he was still imprisoned. Even under the best case scenario, if Harvey
were released from prison on his earliest release date, three months from the time of the
termination hearing, he would not be able to provide proper care and custody for the children for,
at least, an additional two to three years while he attempted to address his personality disorder.
Unfortunately, even with intensive treatment, his prognosis for improvement is extremely poor,
and he might not ever be able to successfully address his issues to ensure that his children would
be safe and properly cared for while in his care. Under these circumstances, there was no
reasonable expectation that Harvey would be able to provide proper care and custody for the
children within a reasonable time, if ever, considering their ages. Thus, termination was proper
under § (3)(g).
Further, we reject Harvey’s argument that termination was improper under §(3)(g)
because the children were in the care and custody of Tricia Harvey, a presumably fit parent,
(…continued)
child’s best interests. 2008 PA 199, effective July 11, 2008. However, here, we use the prior
standard under which the trial court made its original disposition.
18
Trejo, supra at 354.
19
Id. at 356-357.
20
Miller, supra at 337.
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during his imprisonment. “[T]he Legislature envisioned and intended that the probate court
could terminate the parental rights of just one parent,” and the court need not rely on traditional
custody and visitation proceedings to protect a child.21
3. MCL 712A.19b(3)(h)
With regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(h), it was not certain at the termination trial that
Harvey’s imprisonment would deprive the children of a normal home for at least two years
because his release date was uncertain. Given the close proximity of his earliest release date to
the time of the termination hearing, we cannot find that his inability to provide a “normal home”
for the children within two years of the termination hearing would be due to his imprisonment.
Instead, as stated above, he would not be able to provide an appropriate home for the children
because of his need for long-term mental health treatment to address his personality disorder.
Regardless, any error in terminating Harvey’s parental rights under section (3)(h) was harmless
because the trial court needed clear and convincing evidence of only one statutory ground to
support termination.22
C. Best Interests Determination
Considering the children’s negative feelings toward Harvey, their lack of a strong
attachment to him, Harvey’s poor prognosis that he could successfully address his personality
disorder even with intensive treatment, and the expert opinions that any attempt at reunification
with Harvey would be traumatic and harmful to the children, we conclude that the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.23
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
21
In re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 561, 566-568; 499 NW2d 400 (1993).
22
In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
23
In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 677-678; 692 NW2d 708 (2005) (stating that a trial court’s
finding that termination is in a child’s best interests is not required by the court rule, but is
permissible if the evidence justifies it).
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