PEOPLE OF MI V LARRY RAY MITCHELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279108
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 05-009636-FH
LARRY RAY MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Kelly and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of animal cruelty (failure to
provide adequate care), second offense, MCL 750.50(2)(a), (4),1 and 11 misdemeanor counts of
animals running at large, MCL 433.12. Defendant stood trial jointly with his wife, Sharon
Mitchell, who was convicted on identical charges. On June 2, 2006, the court ordered defendant
placed on a 12-month delay of sentence, and on May 30, 2007, the court sentenced defendant to
12 months’ probation. Defendant was also fined $300 on the animal cruelty count, and $100 for
each of the 11 misdemeanor counts. We reverse.
I.
Facts
The question in this case revolves around defendant’s ownership of the horses, and not
the treatment (or lack thereof) that they received. Thus, our recitation of the facts adduced at
trial will focus on the ownership issue, and there was some testimony pinpointed on the issue.
For example, defendant’s wife, Sharon, testified that she owned six horses. At trial, defendant
claimed no ownership interest in any of the horses. However, when police interviewed
defendant’s stepson, Scott Stiegemier, about the horses, Stiegemier stated that defendant and
Sharon owned the horses.2 Similarly, when Tuscola County Sheriff’s Department Deputy
1
The Legislature revised MCL 750.50 in 2007, effective 2008. 2007 PA 152.
2
However, Stiegmier subsequently testified that he did not actually know defendant and
Sharon’s finances. He also testified that defendant never wanted anything to do with the horses.
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Michael Mattlin interviewed Sharon, she indicated that she and her husband had six horses. On
direct examination, however, Sharon testified that she owned the three horses, paid for them and
cared for them. Both defendant and Sharon also testified that defendant had made it clear to her
that he wanted nothing to do with the horses. Testimony reflected that defendant had no
involvement in feeding or caring for the horses since 2000, other than one time in 2005 when he
delivered hay bales on a trailer his wife had just purchased. Although defendant is a licensed
farrier (blacksmith) and an equine dentist, he no longer engages in that business and never
performed any work on these horses.
From January through September of 2005, Sharon kept the horses on an 18-acre field that
she rented from Viola Cobb. Defendant was not involved in the negotiations for renting the
field, and his name was not on the rental agreement. During the time the horses were in the field,
two women, Amber Shavrioch and her mother Autumn, helped Sharon care for the horses;
Amber was in the process of buying three of the horses. The three women fed the horses hay,
which they placed on the ground, and grain, which they placed in buckets.
In the early summer of 2005, the women noticed that one of the horses, named Bubbles,
was thin. They consulted a veterinarian, who recommended a supplement called Weight Gain.
They began feeding Bubbles twice a day with Weight Gain and other food supplements, and they
recorded the feedings in a logbook. They also placed Bubbles in a separate pasture from the
other horses. Bubbles gained weight over the summer. Defendant recommended to his wife that
she should have Bubbles’s teeth checked.
The remaining testimony related to how the horses were treated. At the conclusion of the
bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty as noted above. On the issue of defendant
being an owner under the animal cruelty statute, the trial court ruled that defendant was a
“person” under the statute because he and his wife were a “partnership”:
[I]f you’ll read the statutes of the State of Michigan, individuals charged
as persons who are responsible for the care of horses in the definitions of the
statute, a person is a partnership.
It just so happenes [sic] to be in our state if someone joins somebody else
in holy matrimony it becomes a partnership. You can’t say well that’s hers, that’s
mine.
The court later reiterated,
I mean this stuff about he doesn’t own or have a possessory interest, or
takes an interest in the horses, or have title to, or paid for them, care for, carries
no weight because the legislature has in effect, I’m sorry, they’ve taken that
question out of my hands, and it’s strict, it’s strict liability on ownership.
The court concluded,
[t]hey’re defining an owner. The law says it’s a partnership. And using your
example if your wife did come home and she purchased the horse on Monday,
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and if it were inadequately cared for on Thursday, you can be criminally liable for
that neglect under the statute.
II.
Analysis
Defendant first argues that the trial evidence never established any partnership or other
ownership that would make defendant liable for his wife’s treatment of the horses. Therefore,
defendant argues, the trial court erroneously determined that defendant was jointly liable for his
wife’s conduct. Defendant presents the issue as a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which
this Court reviews for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). The issue also presents a question of
statutory construction, which this Court reviews de novo. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245,
250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).
This appeal presents two issues of statutory construction: (1) whether the animal cruelty
statute holds a husband criminally liable for his wife’s treatment of animals, and (2) whether the
animals running at large statute holds a husband criminally liable when his wife’s animals are
running at large.
1.
Animal Cruelty
The animal cruelty statute, MCL 750.50(2) reads in pertinent part as follows:
An owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of an animal
shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail to provide an animal with adequate care.
The statute defines “person” as “an individual, partnership, limited liability company,
corporation, association, governmental entity, or other legal entity.” MCL 750.50(1)(g). The
statute does not define the term “owner.”
The trial court determined that the statute held defendant liable as part of a marriage
partnership regardless of whether defendant ever had charge or custody of the horses.
Accordingly, the trial court did not make any findings as to whether defendant had exercised any
control or ownership over the horses. The fact that he was married to Sharon, who
unquestionably did own the horses, was enough for the trial court to conclude defendant was in a
partnership with Sharon, and thus a “person” under MCL 750.50(1)(g).
In our view, the trial court misconstrued MCL 750.50(2) because it misunderstood the
modifying clause “having the charge or custody of an animal.” The modifying clause directly
follows the word “person.” The verb “have” is defined in part to mean to “posses the
characteristic of.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). “Charge” is defined in
part to mean “[t]o impose a duty, responsibility, or obligation on.” The American Heritage
Dictionary (1996). As such, the modifying clause means that along with owners and possessors
of animals, persons characterized as being responsible for or having the custody of an animal are
also liable if they “[f]ail to provide an animal with adequate care.” Thus, whether defendant had
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“charge or custody” of the horse was relevant, yet the court made no such finding. Instead, the
trial court focused on the term “partnership,” concluding that because defendant and his wife are
marital partners, and because the term “person” includes the category “partnership,” defendant is
responsible for the acts of his wife. This reading effectively ignores the modifying clause, in
essence rendering all individuals involved in a partnership or a corporation liable for conduct by
one member of the partnership or corporation regardless of whom within the corporation has
responsibility for or custody of the animal in issue.
A possible, though not plausible, alternate construction would be that the modifying
clause applies to all three antecedents, such that owners and possessors, as well as persons, are
liable if they have charge or custody of animals. This construction, however, is inconsistent with
the general rule of statutory construction that a modifying clause applies only to the last
antecedent. See People v Pigula, 202 Mich App 87, 90; 507 NW2d 810 (1993) (noting that rule
applies unless subject matter or dominant purpose requires a different interpretation). In the case
at bar, defendant cannot be responsible under either statutory construction without evidence
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that he owned the horses, or that he had custody or
control over them.
The great weight of the evidence indicated that defendant did not own the horses. Both
defendant and his wife definitively testified that defendant did not own the horses. Although
Mattlin testified that Sharon told him she and her husband had six horses, Mattlin did not
elaborate as to whether “having” the horses included any ownership by defendant. Further,
Sharon denied telling Mattlin that she owned the horses with her husband. Even though
defendant’s stepson testified that he vaguely remembered telling an officer that defendant and
Sharon owned the horses, the stepson further testified as follows:
Q. Is it your opinion that in fact [defendant] owns the horses or could others own
the horses?
A.
I really have no need to be in their financial status. But what I seen [sic]
he wants nothing to do with the horses.
Defense counsel asked Tuscola County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Steven Anderson
about defendant’s ownership:
Q. At all such times when you were talking with Mrs. Mitchell and you asked her
if, yes along the line if she had horses, and she owned horses, it was always
her response that it was hers, she never mentioned her husband [defendant] at
all did she?
A. No.
Anderson further testified that he never saw defendant on the horse property.
Veterinarian Luhring testified that defendant “was around” when he worked with the
Mitchells “years ago,” but that defendant was not present when he treated Bubbles. While
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defendant’s name was on the veterinarian’s bill, along with Sharon’s name, Sharon testified that
she paid all of the expenses regarding the horses.
Amber Shavrioch, who was in the process of buying three of Sharon’s horses, testified as
follows:
Q.
And have you ever observed, or have you personally—do you
know if [defendant] has any interest in those horses at all?
A.
He takes no interests that I’m aware of.
Q.
To your personal knowledge has it ever been represented to you
that he owns any of the horses?
A.
They’ve always been Sharon’s horses that I’m aware of.
The Court:
How do you know that, the proof of ownership of those horses?
A.
I consider it the care of the horses.
Shavrioch testified that there was no title or ownership certificate for the horses, but that she
would have a bill of sale when she completed her purchase. Shavrioch’s mother testified that she
saw defendant at the property twice in the fall of 2005: once to drop off or pick up keys, and
once to bring bales of hay.
James Benjamin saw defendant’s wife at the property after the preliminary hearing, but
never saw defendant at the property. Lorenda Jensen could not identify defendant as being one
of the individuals that gathered the horses from her property. Scott Knudsen, the horses’ farrier,
had not seen defendant at the property. The tenant of the house on the property, Darlene
Demroese, saw women on the property daily, but never saw defendant on the property.
Given the lack of proof that defendant owned the horses, coupled with a proper reading
of the statute, we hold that the trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of inadequate care of
animals.
The plain words of the statute also do not impose vicarious or strict liability upon spouses
who are not an owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of an animal. In People
v Johnson, 104 Mich App 629, 633; 305 NW2d 560 (1981), this Court set forth the guiding
principle in reading criminal statutes:
A criminal statute is to be construed according to its language and not beyond it.
Where a statute is drawn to be confined in its operation to certain persons, or
persons having a certain intent or quality, it should be enforced according to those
terms. Here, the phrase “as owner or otherwise” refers to the fact that a person
having charge or custody of an abused animal may be held liable without regard
to ownership. To hold an owner liable without proof that he had charge or
custody would result in vicarious liability for those acts of cruelty committed by
the person with actual charge or custody. [(internal citation omitted).]
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Here, although marriages have been referred to as “partnerships,” Hanaway v Hanaway,
208 Mich App 278, 294; 527 NW2d 792 (2005), it has not been through application of a legal
definition of partnership. The legislative definition of partnership is “an association of 2 or more
persons, which may consist of husband and wife, to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . .
. .” MCL 449.6(1). Byker v Mannes, 465 Mich 637, 644; 641 NW2d 210 (2002). There was no
evidence presented to the trial court that defendant and his wife were carrying on any business
for profit with respect to the horses. The assertion by the people that because the horses were
purchased during the marriage required a finding that defendant also owned them is not only
based upon speculation3, but also transfers a family law concept into a non-analogous criminal
law context. Accordingly, defendant could not be held responsible under the statute as an owner
or person.
2.
Animal running at large
The animals running at large statute is clear with regard to the vicarious liability of
persons other than owners: non-owners are liable only if they willfully and knowingly enabled
an animal to run at large. The statute reads in part as follows:
(2) The owner of an animal shall not permit or enable his animal to run at large in
this state.
(3) A person other than the owner of an animal shall not willfully and knowingly
enable an animal to run at large in this state.
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
433.12.]4
[MCL
The term “owner” is defined for purposes of the statute as “a person who has a right of property
in an animal, a person who keeps or harbors an animal or has it in his care, or a person who
permits an animal to remain on or about the premises occupied by him.” MCL 433.11. Based
upon the statute, defendant cannot not be held responsible under the statute for allowing the
horses to run at large unless defendant is an owner within the meaning of the statute, or
defendant “willfully and knowingly” enabled the horses to run at large.5 As discussed above, the
3
Sharon testified that she paid for the horses. A spouse can own separate property if she utilizes
her own money to purchase property and then solely cares for and manages the property without
commingling it. See Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 494-497; 575 NW2d 1 (1997).
4
The felony information alleges that defendant “did permit or enable and/or willfully and
knowingly enable a horse to run at large.” The Information did not allege that defendant owned
the horses. Defense counsel and the court addressed the allegation without reference to the
statute’s ownership distinction.
5
The trial court specifically found that neither defendant did anything willfully or intentionally
towards or against the horses.
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evidence at trial neither established that defendant owned the horses, nor that defendant
“enabled” the horses to run at large.
Finally, as to MCL 433.12(3), the prosecution neither argued nor presented evidence that
defendant willfully and knowingly enabled the horses to run at large, so defendant could not be
convicted under that subsection of the statute. As the trial court noted when ruling on
defendant’s motion for directed verdict:
If all the charges required the scienter of willfulness, that is a state of mind
of willfulness, that is knowingly and intentionally permitting these specific acts,
this case would be over with. That would be the end of it.
***
There’s not one scintilla of evidence that shows that the owners of these
horses intentionally injured, inflicted pain, or intentionally allowed them to gallop
about.
For these reasons stated, we reverse defendant’s convictions.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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