PEOPLE OF MI V ALONZO LEO STURTEVANT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 278572
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-013920-01
ALONZO LEO STURTEVANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of attempted larceny in a building, MCL 750.92 and 750.360,
and was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to one to fifteen years’
imprisonment. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
On November 14, 2006, three Wayne State University custodians were working together
at the Old Main building on WSU’s campus. At approximately 5 a.m., they heard a noise in an
adjacent classroom. When they investigated, they observed defendant climbing out the basement
window carrying a DVD or VCR player. After chasing defendant for a short distance, the
custodians notified the WSU police of the situation. Within five to twenty minutes, the police
apprehended defendant and brought him back to the Old Main building where the custodians
definitively identified him as the person they saw stealing the electronics.
Defendant first argues on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
when defense counsel failed to move to suppress the in-court identification of him as having no
independent basis because the circumstances surrounding his on-the-scene identification were
unduly suggestive.
Whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246
(2002). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and review its constitutional
determination de novo. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the entire
record, a definite and firm conviction is left that a mistake has been made. People v Akins, 259
Mich App 545, 564; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). Under de novo review, this Court gives no
deference to the trial court. People v Howard, 233 Mich App 52, 54; 595 NW2d 497 (1998).
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Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326-327; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). To overcome this
presumption, the defendant must meet a two-pronged test. The defendant must first show that
counsel’s performance was deficient as measured against an objective standard of reasonableness
under the circumstances and according to prevailing professional norms. Strickland, supra at
687-688; Pickens, supra at 302-303. Second, the defendant must show that the deficiency was
so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial such that there is a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the trial outcome would have been different. Strickland,
supra at 687-688; Pickens, supra at 309.
A prompt on-the-scene identification allows the police to immediately decide whether a
“suspect [is] connected with the crime . . . or merely an unfortunate victim of circumstances.”
People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 363; 650 NW2d 407 (2002) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, on-the-scene identifications are sometimes indispensable in order to
determine whether a subject should be released from police custody. Id. at 361-362. They also
allow victims to make identifications when their memories are fresh. Id. at 362. However, an
identification procedure violates a defendant’s right to due process of law when, in light of the
total circumstances, it is so impermissibly suggestive that it gives rise to a substantial likelihood
of misidentification. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998); People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). The following factors are relevant to
determine the likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity for the witness to view the
suspect at the time the crime occurred; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of
any prior descriptions by the witness; (4) the witness’s level of certainty during the
identification; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. People v
Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304-305; 591 NW2d 692 (1998).
The on-the-scene identification procedure used in this case occurred in a suggestive
atmosphere because defendant, when presented to the custodians, was handcuffed and was the
only person in the back of the police car. However, under the totality of the circumstances,
defendant failed to show there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Colon, supra at
305. There was clear and convincing evidence that the custodians’ identification was not based
on any suggestiveness surrounding the on-the-scene identification, but had a sufficiently
independent basis. Id. All three custodians testified that they had a good look at defendant in a
well-lit classroom and that less than 20 minutes elapsed between the time they first saw him in
the classroom and then saw him again in the back of the police car. Further, the custodians were
fully focused on defendant during the incident, positively identified him was the person they saw
in the classroom, and gave similar descriptions of him, which did not contradict the photo of him
taken that same morning.
The performance of defendant’s trial attorney did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Indeed, an attorney is not required to raise futile objections. People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Because the on-the-scene
identifications were not impermissibly suggestive, a motion to suppress would have been futile.
Defendant next argues on appeal that the trial court violated his due process rights when
it coerced him to waive a jury trial in exchange for a prompt bench trial. Defendant submits that
People v Williams, 275 Mich App 194, 196-197; 737 NW2d 797 (2007), wherein this Court
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ruled that offering the defendant a speedier bench trial in exchange for a jury waiver did not
make the waiver involuntary or deprive the defendant of due process, was wrongly decided. The
Williams panel reviewed the record and found no evidence of any pressure or coercion, id. at
197, nor do we find any here on facts very comparable to those that transpired in Williams. We
decline to revisit the ruling in Williams, which is precedentially binding. MCR 7.215(C)(2) and
(J)(1). We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court should have, under a local court
rule, sought reassignment of the case to another judge for a jury trial. This argument lacks
record development and requires unacceptable speculation.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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