GLORIA WILLIAMS V FRANKENMUTH BAVARIAN INN INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GLORIA WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 283898
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-060077-NO
FRANKENMUTH BAVARIAN INN, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Borrello and Davis, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
In this premises liability action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court decision
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. While we disagree that the condition was
open and obvious as a matter of law, we nevertheless affirm the trial court’s ruling based on lack
of notice to defendant of the allegedly dangerous condition. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Pertinent Facts
On the evening of February 20, 2005, plaintiff went to the defendant establishment to
drop off her husband, who was employed there, and to pass the time while her husband was
working. Plaintiff was accompanied by her daughter, her cousin, and her cousin’s daughter. It
had been snowing hard that day, and plaintiff described it as the first day of a winter storm. The
outdoor walkway leading to the entrance was equipped with a heating system that operates to
heat and dry the surface, and there was no snow on the walkway. Immediately inside the lobby
was a rubber or rubber-like floor mat, extending inward approximately three to four feet,
recessed into the ground and level with the floor, and designed to permit liquids to drain down
rather than remain on the surface. The bulk of the lobby floor was covered with approximately
one-foot square, dense, short-nap carpet tiles.
Plaintiff entered the lobby and proceeded down a hallway that was covered with reddishbrown tile. Approximately 40 to 50 feet down the hallway from the entrance, plaintiff was
walking while looking down at her feet. Ahead of her and out of her view, plaintiff’s cousin
slipped on the floor but regained her balance and avoided falling. As plaintiff’s cousin turned to
warn her that the floor was slippery, plaintiff fell, severely injuring her ankle. Plaintiff did not
see the water on the floor before she fell, and first felt the water when it soaked her clothes at the
-1-
time of the fall. Plaintiff contends that the color of the tile and the lighting conditions in the
hallway prevented the water from being visible.
Defendant moved the trial court for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
arguing that the condition that caused plaintiff to slip was open and obvious and not
unreasonably dangerous, and, alternatively, that plaintiff had not shown that defendant had the
requisite notice, either actual or constructive, of any dangerous condition. The trial court agreed
and granted the motion.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). Summary disposition is
proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue regarding
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Veenstra v
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 164; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the wet floor was not open and obvious, or if it was open and
obvious, a question of fact exists as to whether an unreasonably dangerous condition existed.
Plaintiff also argues that a question of fact exists as to whether defendant had constructive
knowledge of the wet floor when it knew from past experience that when it snowed, patrons
would track water into the establishment.
Defendant contends that the condition was open and obvious, that no special conditions
existed giving rise to potential liability, and that plaintiff’s claims are barred for lack of the
requisite notice to defendant of the allegedly dangerous condition sufficiently in advance to
provide defendant with a reasonable opportunity to alleviate it.
A premises possessor owes a duty “to undertake reasonable efforts to make its premises
reasonably safe for its invitees.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 526; 629 NW2d 384
(2001). As such, a premises possessor “owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to
protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the
land.” Id. at 516, citing Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
A premises possessor is generally not required to protect an invitee from open and
obvious dangers. The open and obvious danger doctrine “attacks the duty element that a plaintiff
must establish in a prima facie negligence case.” Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440
Mich 85, 95-96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). The logic behind the open and obvious doctrine is that
“an obvious danger is no danger to a reasonably careful person.” Novotney v Burger King Corp
(On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 474; 499 NW2d 379 (1993). Accordingly, when the
potentially dangerous condition “is wholly revealed by casual observation, the duty to warn
serves no purpose.” Id. If this purpose is frustrated by the application of the doctrine to a
particular set of facts because the condition is for all practical purposes invisible and
indiscernible, then the application of the open and obvious doctrine would not be appropriate.
-2-
“If special aspects of a condition make even an open and obvious risk unreasonably
dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable precautions to protect
invitees from that risk.” Lugo, supra at 517. The special aspects that cause even open and
obvious conditions to be actionable are where such a condition is “effectively unavoidable,” or
where the condition “impose[s] an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.” Id. at 518.
The standard for determining if a condition is open and obvious is whether “an average
user with ordinary intelligence [would] have been able to discover the danger and the risk
presented upon casual inspection.” Novotney, supra at 475. The test is objective, and the inquiry
is whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have foreseen the danger, not
whether the particular plaintiff knew or should have known that the condition was hazardous.
Corey v Davenport College (On Remand), 251 Mich App 1, 5; 649 NW2d 392 (2002).
In this case, it must first be determined if there is a genuine, material dispute whether the
water in the hallway could have been discovered by an average person of ordinary intelligence
upon casual inspection. See Veenstra, supra at 164; Novotney, supra at 475. Plaintiff asserts
that the water could not be discerned upon a reasonable inspection because the tile was dark and
the lighting in the hallway poor. To support this assertion, plaintiff testified that her cousin
slipped in the same hallway only moments before she herself fell, and that, even though she was
looking down at her feet while walking through the hallway, she could not see the water. Given
the safety precautions taken by defendant at its entryway with respect to deterring the tracking in
of snow, it is reasonable to conclude that an average person would not necessarily expect a
significant amount of water accumulation 40 to 50 feet down the hallway. Viewing the parties’
descriptions of the premises in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it is not clear that the condition
could have been wholly revealed by casual observation. Consequently, we hold that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether an average person of ordinary intelligence could
discover the danger upon casual inspection. Given our finding in this regard, we need not
address plaintiff’s alternative argument regarding whether the condition was unreasonably
dangerous.
The trial court also granted summary disposition, however, on the ground that plaintiff
provided no evidence that defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the presence of a
hazard. We agree.
“To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached the duty, (3) the defendant’s breach [of
duty] caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages.” Kosmalski ex rel
Kosmalski v St John’s Lutheran Church, 261 Mich App 56, 60; 680 NW2d 50 (2004). As
previously stated, a premises possessor has a duty to exercise reasonable care “to protect an
invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.” Lugo,
supra at 516. However, the premises possessor is liable for injury resulting from a dangerous
condition only if the condition is caused by active negligence by the possessor or its employees,
or the condition is of such a character or duration that the possessor should have had knowledge
of it. Serinto v Borman Food Stores, 380 Mich 637, 640-641; 158 NW2d 485 (1968).
In Serinto, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a broken mayonnaise jar that was on the floor
of the defendant grocery store next to one of the shelves. Id. at 641. With regard to the
defendant’s adequate notice of the condition, the plaintiff testified that she had had been in the
-3-
store for about 45 to 50 minutes prior to the accident and during this time she did not hear
anything resembling the sound of a jar breaking. Id. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s
failure to hear a jar breaking was not sufficient evidence to justify submitting to the jury the
question of the defendant’s notice of the existence of the broken mayonnaise jar on the floor of
the defendant store. Id. at 643-644.
In this case, plaintiff does not allege that defendant was actively negligent with respect to
the presence of water on its floor. While arguing that more could have been done to reduce the
risk or warn of the danger, plaintiff acknowledges the precautions defendant had taken. Plaintiff
confirmed in her deposition that when she approached the lobby entrance from the parking lot,
there was no snow on the tiling or sidewalk. Plaintiff further admits that defendant placed a rug
over the floor to protect against slippery conditions, even while stating that the rug did not
completely cover the tiles. In combination, these steps demonstrate that defendant exercised
reasonable care in minimizing the risks its invitees would face from snow or water being tracked
into the premises. See Lugo, supra at 516.
Additionally, plaintiff did not show that defendant failed to discover a hazardous
condition within a reasonable amount of time. See Serinto, supra at 640-641. Plaintiff testified
that she did not know how long any unusual amount of water had been on the floor in the
hallway. Nothing in the record suggests that any of defendant’s other invitees had complained
about the hallway’s condition. Further, there is no evidence that defendant, or defendant’s
employees, knew that water existed on the hallway floor, or acted negligently in failing to
remedy a dangerous condition. Instead, the evidence suggests that defendant was reasonable in
believing that the measures taken to protect invitees would adequately guard against the hazard
that plaintiff alleges was present.
Plaintiff argues that because it had been snowing all day, and because defendant had been
open all day to invitees, defendant had constructive notice that people had been tracking water
into the building on their wet shoes. This reasoning is not persuasive, and does not show that
defendant breached its duty to plaintiff. In Altairi v Alhaj, 235 Mich App 626, 640; 599 NW2d
537 (1999), this Court stated, “[i]nsofar as plaintiff seeks to use general knowledge of local
weather conditions to show that defendant should have known that ice lay under the snow on his
steps, the same knowledge can be imputed to plaintiff.” Similarly, any knowledge plaintiff
wishes to charge defendant with regarding water being tracked inside the building can also be
reasonably assigned to plaintiff.
Thus, similar to Serinto, supra, plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could infer that defendant had the requisite notice, either actual or constructive,
of a dangerous amount of water on the hallway floor, and negligently allowed the condition to
exist for an unreasonable amount of time. As such, plaintiff has failed to show that defendant
breached its duty of care to her.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.