TIMOTHY LAJOICE V NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TIMOTHY LAJOICE, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of KERIN LAJOICE, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS, INC.,
BRAD E. VAZALES, M.D., GREAT LAKES
CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR
SURGERY, PLLC, DANIEL E. MCDONNELL,
M.D., and DANIEL E. MCDONNELL, M.D.,
P.C.,
No. 277587
Emmet Circuit Court
LC No. 06-009165-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the summary dismissal of this medical malpractice action on
the grounds that the notice of intent to sue and the affidavits of merit did not comply with the
requirements of MCL 600.2912(b)(4) and (d)(1). We affirm.
On April 16, 2002, thirty-nine-year-old Kerin LaJoice was transferred to the emergency
department at Northern Michigan Hospitals from Mackinaw Straits Hospital with a diagnosis of
acute left pneumonitis and possible sepsis. There she was treated by Dr. Daniel McDonnell, a
pulmonologist/internist, and Dr. Brad Vazales, a thoracic surgeon. Various procedures to drain
fluid and pus from Kerin’s lungs were performed during her hospital stay. On May 4, 2002,
Kerin was discharged from the hospital but she was “still experiencing significant chest and back
pain and incessant coughing.” Her request for a home health nurse was denied by Dr.
McDonnell.
On May 7, 2002, Kerin contacted Dr. Vazales’ office to advise that she was coughing up
blood and still experiencing chest and back pain. She was told that “everything was fine” and
that she should simply keep her appointment with the doctor the following week. The next day,
Kerin contacted Dr. Vazales’ office again and was connected to his home by the office’s
answering service. She spoke with Dr. Vazales regarding the facts that she was coughing up
blood and a large blood clot filled her entire ostomy bag—which had been attached prior to her
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discharge from the hospital. Dr. Vazales admonished Kerin for bothering him at home, and
instructed her to call his office in the morning.
As instructed, on May 9, 2002, she called Dr. Vazales’ office. She was given permission
to visit his office at the Mackinaw Straits Hospital. The drainage from her chest was a different
color and smelled bad. She was too weak to stand. After a chest x-ray revealed a “small
pneumothorax and a suspicious cavity,” she was sent home by Dr. Vazales. After being home
for a short time, too weak to move and coughing up blood, an ambulance was called and she was
taken to a hospital where she was diagnosed with “acute progressive hemoptysis” and “R/O
sepsis.” She was then transferred to Northern Michigan Hospitals. Shortly after being admitted,
Kerin suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest. Although able to be resuscitated, she suffered brain
death, and was removed from life support.
On August 1, 2005, plaintiff sent a notice of intent to file claim addressed to all
defendants named in this action. On January 31, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint, an affidavit of
merit signed by a board certified cardiothoracic surgeon, Dr. Peter Sanfelippo, and an affidavit of
merit signed by Dr. John Sherman, who was board certified in internal medicine and
pulmonology.
On March 31, 2006, defendant Northern Michigan Hospitals filed a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the “notice of intent, complaint, and affidavits
of merit all contain vague, non-specific allegations regarding the standard of care and alleged
breaches.” Specifically, it argued, first, the notice of intent “did not provide notice of the
applicable standard of care, or the manner in which such standard of care was alleged to have
been breached” as required by MCL 600.2912b. Second, the affidavits of merit were not
individualized, and were vague as well as indefinite. They failed to set forth as to each
defendant the applicable standard of care and the manner in which each defendant breached that
standard. Defendant argued that:
Plaintiff’s Affidavits of Merit are little more than form documents which do not
suggest what diagnosis should have been made, what treatment was required,
what examinations or tests were required, whether observation and reporting on
the patient’s condition was at issue, what risks were involved in the treatment and
what, if any, consequences or risks were not explained properly to the patient,
what tests or examinations were required, and what conditions should have been
diagnosed or treated. Plaintiff’s affidavits of merit literally allege everything, and
in so doing, allege nothing.
On April 3, 2006, the McDonnell defendants filed a motion for summary disposition.
First, they argued that plaintiff’s notice of intent did not comply with the requirements of MCL
600.2912b because the purported “standard of care” set forth was not differentiated or
particularized as to each individual defendant. Second, plaintiff’s claim as to the manner in
which the standard of care was breached simply referred back to those vague, non-specific
assertions. Third, plaintiff’s affidavits of merit were insufficient under MCL 600.2912d because
they also failed to differentiate between the alleged misconduct of the individual defendants. On
April 7, 2006, defendants Vazales and Great Lakes Cardiothoracic filed a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), which basically repeated the other defendants’ arguments.
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On March 5, 2007, oral arguments were held on the motions for summary dismissal. The
hearing concluded with the trial court granting the motions. Relying on Roberts v Mecosta Co
Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (Roberts II), the court held that
different standards of care apply to each defendant facility and to physicians with different
specialties. Thus a statement particularized as to each defendant must be articulated in the notice
of intent and affidavits of merit. With regard to all defendants in this case, the trial court held
that plaintiff’s notice of intent merely set forth generic or boilerplate allegations with regard to
the standards of care and the purported manner in which those standards were breached. No
particularized allegations as to what actions should have been taken by which doctor or the
hospital to comply with the standard of care were set forth either. The allegations made against
defendants were “vague, general, and conclusory;” “they allege everything and, therefore, allege
nothing.” Accordingly, the court held that the notice of intent did not provide reasonable notice
to defendants as to the nature of the claims against them. With regard to the affidavits of merit,
the trial court concluded that they too suffered from the same fatal defects as the notice of
intent—they lacked particularity. Because the statute of limitations had run on the case, the
court dismissed it with prejudice. A motion for reconsideration was denied and this appeal
followed.
Plaintiff first argues that the notice of intent did, in fact, comply with MCL 600.2912b(4);
thus, summary dismissal was erroneous. After review de novo of the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition, we disagree. See Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572
NW2d 201 (1998).
MCL 600.2912b(4) provides:
The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this
section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of
practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance
with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice
or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant
is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.
In Roberts II, our Supreme Court explained:
Under MCL 600.2912b(4), a medical malpractice claimant is required to provide
potential defendants with notice that includes a “statement” of each of the
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statutorily enumerated categories of information. Although it is reasonable to
expect that some of the particulars of the information supplied by the claimant
will evolve as discovery and litigation proceed, the claimant is required to make
good-faith averments that provide details that are responsive to the information
sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early
notice stage of the proceedings. The information in the notice of intent must be
set forth with that degree of specificity which will put the potential defendants on
notice as to the nature of the claim against them. [Id. at 700-701 (emphasis in
original).]
In that case, the plaintiff failed to identify a specific standard of care that was applicable to each
of the defendants, which included an obstetrician, an emergency room doctor, and a physician’s
assistant. Id. at 701. In addition, the Roberts II Court noted that the plaintiff had simply alleged
that the standards of care were breached, rather than indicating the manner in which they were
breached: “Although the factual recitations in the notices indicate that plaintiff suffered an
adverse medical result, this result is not connected in any meaningful way with the conduct of
any defendant. Accordingly, plaintiff did not fulfill her obligation under § 2912b . . . .” Id. at
701-702.
Here, plaintiff argues that the notice of intent statute only requires that a “statement” of
the six designated factors be made; it does not mandate a full, complete, or detailed statement of
these factors. Plaintiff claims to have set forth an adequate “statement” of the six designated
factors with regard to each defendant. Thus we turn to the notice of intent.
Defendant Northern Michigan Hospitals
With regard to defendant Northern Michigan Hospitals, review of the notice of intent
reveals that plaintiff made various allegations with regard to the standard of care which included,
for example, (a) that the hospital was required to “refrain from permitting physicians to practice .
. . in its hospital when it knew, or in the exercise of due diligence, should have known, that said
physicians were incompetent to do so,” and (b) that the hospital “should forbid its employees
and/or agents . . . from assaulting, battering, verbally abusing, berating and/or badgering its
patients and/or other agents and/or employees.” There are numerous other allegations of the
standard of practice, many of which relate to nurses and physician assistants—although persons
of neither profession are named defendants in this action. Even if we assume without deciding
that these allegations are sufficient to state “[t]he applicable standard of practice or care alleged
by the claimant,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(b), plaintiff has failed to fulfill its obligation under the
statute.
Turning to the statement in the notice of intent that pertains to “[t]he manner in which it
is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the . . . health
facility,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(c), we find only the conclusory statement “[t]he applicable
standard of practice and care was breached as evidenced by the failure to do those things set
forth [in the standard of care section] above.” Similarly, the statement that pertains to “[t]he
alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard or
practice or care,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(d), we find the conclusory statement “[t]he action that
should have been taken to achieve compliance with the standard of care should have been those
things set forth [in the standard of care section] above.” Likewise, the statement that pertains to
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“[t]he manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the
proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(e), we find the
conclusory statement “[a]s a result of defendants’ blatant, gross and negligent errors and
omissions, a Wife and Mother of two young Sons became permanently and cognitively impaired,
and ultimately, she died.”
The “statements” that were purportedly responsive to the requirements of MCL
600.2912b(4)(c) and (4)(d) merely refer to the standard of care section of the notice of intent just
like the “statements” rejected by the Roberts II Court. See id. at 696. These “statements” are
merely indicating that defendant breached the standard of care by breaching the standard of care
and the alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged
standard of care was to provide the standard of care. In other words, these “statements” wholly
fail to provide the requisite notice.
For example, plaintiff contends that the standard of care is that hospitals “should forbid
its employees and/or agents . . . from assaulting, battering, verbally abusing, berating and/or
badgering its patients . . . .” And, according to plaintiff’s “statement,” this “standard was
breached as evidenced by the hospital’s failure to” “forbid its employees and/or agents . . . from
assaulting, battering, verbally abusing, berating and/or badgering its patients.” But merely
restating the purported standard of care does not indicate the manner in which it is claimed to
have been breached, e.g., which employee(s) or agent(s), did what, when, where, how is it
known that the hospital did not forbid such behavior, how is it known that the employee or agent
did not act in violation of a hospital policy, etc. In other words, contrary to plaintiff’s claim—
denoted by the phrase “as evidenced by”—there is no evidence that the hospital failed to forbid
its employees and agents from perpetrating these acts against patients. The same defect exists
with respect to all of plaintiff’s allegations of the standard of care; the manner in which they
were breached was not provided and the actions that could have been taken to comply with such
standards were not set forth. Further, the “statement” that was purportedly responsive to the
requirement of MCL 600.2912b(4)(e) did not indicate “the manner in which it is alleged that the
breach was a proximate cause of the injury.” See Roberts II, supra at 700 n 16.
In summary, these “statements” are not “good-faith averments that provide details that
are responsive to the information sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is
consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings.” Id. at 700-701. The information in the
notice of intent was not set forth with any degree of specificity that would put this defendant on
notice as to the nature of the claim against it. See id. Thus, the trial court properly held that the
notice of intent with regard to defendant Northern Michigan Hospitals was insufficient.
Defendants Dr. Brad E. Vazales & Dr. Daniel E. McDonnell “and their actual and/or
ostensible principals, agents and/or employees”
Plaintiff argues first that the statement of the standard of care as to defendant physicians
was sufficient and the trial court’s ruling that it was required to set forth a separate statement as
to the standard of care applicable to each defendant was “categorically wrong.” Plaintiff
explains that “there is absolutely nothing in the text of §2912b(4)(b) which supports the
conclusion that a notice of intent must include a statement of the standard of care particularized
as to each defendant.” And, nevertheless, plaintiff continues, it is alleged that both of these
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doctors breached the standard of care in the same way—they failed to respond to Kerin’s
increasingly perilous medical condition.
We first address plaintiff’s position that a statement of the standard of care particularized
as to each defendant is not required by the notice of intent statute. In its brief on appeal, plaintiff
opines that the Roberts II majority “judicially engrafted such a requirement onto the statute . . . .”
We disagree. Plaintiff has asserted a claim against each defendant, seeking a recovery from each
defendant, on the ground that each individual defendant committed medical malpractice. See,
e.g., MCL 600.2912. And each named defendant is required to respond to the notice of intent.
MCL 600.2912b(7). As such, each defendant is entitled to notice of the nature of plaintiff’s
claim against him, her or it and, thus, plaintiff is required to articulate statements that are
particularized as to each defendant.
Next, it appears plaintiff is contending either that (1) because Vazales and McDonnell are
both physicians, or (2) because both are specialists in treating lung conditions, the same standard
of care is applicable to both of them and, thus, the statement in this regard is sufficient. Portions
of the statement of the applicable standard of care in plaintiff’s notice of intent are as follows:
Acceptable standards of practice and care require defendants to understand
and recognize that lungs allow oxygen to be carried to the entire body and that
any interference with taking an appropriate amount of oxygen into the body is a
life-threatening situation. Defendants should understand . . . that loculations,
tissue scarring and fibrinogen coagulation and collection within the chest tube
will cause abscesses, which in turn, will interfere with the body’s ability to take in
an appropriate amount of oxygen. . . . Defendants should be vigilant in their
attempts to ensure adequate monitoring, including but not limited to, regularly
assessing quality and quantity of chest tube drainage until the aforementioned
patient’s drainage has stopped. Defendants should ensure that any and all
findings should be related to the pulmonologist and/or the cardiothoracic surgeon,
and if neither chooses to . . . appropriately respond, then defendants are required
to proceed up their respective chain of command in order to protect the patient.
* * *
Acceptable standards of practice and care require defendants to treat each
and every patient with dignity and respect, regardless of the method of
reimbursement for care and treatment.
* * *
Acceptable standards of practice and care require defendants to timely,
adequately and appropriately document clinical findings, care and treatment.
* * *
Acceptable standards of practice and care require defendants to understand
the ramifications of substandard, albeit just plain sloppy and careless, treatment of
a Mother of two very young Sons.
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* * *
Acceptable standards of practice and care require defendants to insert an
appropriately-sized, e.g., 36-40 French, chest tube at the time of the initial
thoracentesis in order to maximize the flow and rate of drainage, prevent
loculations, tissue scarring and fibrinogen coagulation and collection within the
chest tube.
There are numerous other allegations of the standard of practice that, for the sake of brevity, we
need not repeat here. Even if we assume without deciding that these allegations are sufficient to
state “[t]he applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant,” MCL
600.2912b(4)(b), plaintiff has failed to fulfill its obligation under the statute.
When we turn to the statement in the notice of intent that pertains to “[t]he manner in
which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health
professional . . . .” MCL 600.2912b(4)(c), we find only the conclusory statement “[t]he
applicable standard of practice and care was breached as evidenced by the failure to do those
things set forth [in the standard of care section] above.” Plaintiff’s statement that pertains to
“[t]he alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard
or practice or care,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(d), is the conclusory statement “[t]he action that should
have been taken to achieve compliance with the standard of care should have been those things
set forth [in the standard of care section] above.” And the statement that pertains to “[t]he
manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate
cause of the injury claimed in the notice,” MCL 600.2912b(4)(e), is “[a]s a result of defendants’
blatant, gross and negligent errors and omissions, a Wife and Mother of two young Sons became
permanently and cognitively impaired, and ultimately, she died.”
For the same reasons that we held the “statements” pertaining to defendant Northern
Michigan Hospitals were insufficient, we also conclude that these “statements” are insufficient.
Again, even reading the notice of intent as a whole, it wholly fails to provide the requisite notice.
See Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 272 Mich App 621, 628, 630; 728 NW2d 471 (2006) (Boodt I),
rev’d in part on other grounds 481 Mich 558 (2008). The “statements” that were purportedly
responsive to the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4)(c) and (4)(d) merely refer to the standard
of care section of the notice of intent just like the “statements” rejected by the Roberts II Court.
See id. at 696. These “statements” are merely indicating that defendants breached the standard
of care by breaching the standard of care and the alleged action that should have been taken to
achieve compliance with the alleged standard of care was to provide the standard of care. These
“statements” are not responsive to the information sought by the statute.
For example, plaintiff contends that the standard of care required “defendants to
understand and recognize that lungs allow oxygen to be carried to the entire body and that any
interference with taking an appropriate amount of oxygen into the body is a life-threatening
situation.” And plaintiff contends that it “was breached as evidenced by the failure” of
“defendants to understand and recognize that lungs allow oxygen to be carried to the entire body
and that any interference with taking an appropriate amount of oxygen into the body is a lifethreatening situation.” But merely restating the purported applicable standard of care does not
indicate the manner in which plaintiff claims it was breached, e.g., what evidence is there that
these physicians, who specialize in treating lung problems, did not “understand and recognize”
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the oxygen-carrying capacity of lungs—a fact that most elementary school children know. In
other words, contrary to plaintiff’s claim—denoted by the phrase “as evidenced by”—there is no
evidence that these defendants failed to understand and recognize the oxygen-carrying capacity
of lungs. The same defect exists with respect to all of plaintiff’s allegations of the standard of
care; the manner in which they were allegedly breached was not provided and the actions that
purportedly could have been taken to comply with such standards were not set forth. Further, the
“statement” that was purportedly responsive to the requirement of MCL 600.2912b(4)(e) did not
indicate “the manner in which it is alleged that the breach was a proximate cause of the injury.”
See Roberts II, supra at 700 n 16.
In summary, these “statements” are not “good-faith averments that provide details that
are responsive to the information sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is
consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings.” See Roberts II, supra at 700-701. Nor
does the information in the notice of intent set forth with any degree of specificity that would put
these defendants on notice as to the nature of the claims against them. See id. Thus, the trial
court properly held that the notice of intent with regard to these defendants was insufficient.
Plaintiff next argues that, even if the trial court properly concluded that the notice of
intent was insufficient, the court erred in concluding that the appropriate remedy was the
dismissal of the case with prejudice. We disagree. Our Supreme Court in Boodt v Borgess Med
Ctr, 481 Mich 558, 561; 751 NW2d 44 (2008) (Boodt II), recently held that an insufficient notice
of intent does not toll the limitations period. Here, plaintiff argues that the filing of its complaint
and two affidavits of merit tolled the statute. But, because the notice of intent was defective,
plaintiff was not authorized to commence the lawsuit by filing a complaint and affidavits of
merit; thus, no tolling occurred. See id. at 563. Accordingly, the trial court properly held that,
because the statute of limitation had expired, dismissal with prejudice was warranted.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have allowed the notice of intent to be
amended pursuant to MCL 600.2301, which allows the court to permit the amendment of “any
process, pleading or proceeding.” We disagree and note, first, that plaintiff never requested
permission to amend the notice of intent thus this issue is not preserved for review. See Napier v
Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 227; 414 NW2d 862 (1987). Second, the majority of our Supreme Court
in Boodt II, rejected this argument of the dissenting opinion holding that MCL 600.2301 only
applies to pending actions and, because the notice of intent was deficient, no action was pending.
Boodt II, supra at 563 n 4. The Court further rejected the position that a notice of intent
constitutes a “proceeding” within the contemplation of that statute. Id.
In light of our conclusion that the notice of intent was insufficient as to all defendants,
and thus plaintiff was not authorized to file the complaint and affidavits of merit, we need not
consider plaintiff’s arguments pertaining to the trial court’s ruling on the affidavits of merits.
And because summary disposition was proper as to all of these defendants, we need not consider
plaintiff’s argument pertaining to the trial court’s decision on a motion in limine.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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