DF LAND DEVELOPMENT LLC V CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF ANN ARBOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DF LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 275859
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000491-CZ
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF ANN ARBOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Talbot and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case arising out of plaintiff DF Land Development, L.L.C.’s attempt to have a
parcel of property rezoned, plaintiff appeals by leave granted the order granting summary
disposition to defendant Ann Arbor Township on the ground that plaintiff’s claims were not ripe
for review.1 We reverse and remand.
I
This case concerns a 54-acre tract of land (the property) located off US-23 in Ann Arbor
Township (the township) between Ford Road and Earhart Road, adjacent to Domino’s Farm.
The property is 40 to 45 percent wetlands and natural drainage courses, and contains areas of
steep slopes. Ford Road is a narrow, hilly, gravel road, and Earhart Road is very steep. The
property is zoned as general agricultural (A-1). Plaintiff petitioned the Ann Arbor Township
Commission to rezone the property to low density, multiple-family residential (R-7). The
application was accompanied by a “conceptual site plan” of plaintiff’s proposed multiple-family
development. During a series of public hearings regarding plaintiff’s rezoning petition, the
township expressed concern over traffic, site access, utilities, natural features, preserving the
character of the area, and injecting a higher density area between areas of low to moderate
density contrary to the township’s master plan. Township commissioners also noted that,
regardless of the merits of plaintiff’s proposed development, rezoning would allow plaintiff or
any subsequent developer to develop the site in any manner permitted in an R-7 district, up to six
1
In granting summary disposition for defendant, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint
without prejudice.
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residential units an acre, without being bound by plaintiff’s proposal. The commissioners also
noted that plaintiff’s plan would require variances in the height of buildings and the distance
between buildings permitted in the R-7 district. In response to a question posed to it, plaintiff
indicated that it did not apply for a planned unit development (PUD) because such an option
“lacked flexibility.” The township board eventually denied the rezoning application. Plaintiff
thereafter submitted an application for a variance to the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) in which
it sought seven variances. The ZBA denied plaintiff’s application for lack of jurisdiction.
On May 2, 2006, plaintiff filed its complaint, alleging claims of “unreasonable zoning –
substantive due process” (count I), “exclusionary zoning – denial of equal protection and
substantive due process” (count II), and “declaratory relief – ripeness and finality; MCR 2.605”
(count III). The complaint alleges generally that the township’s zoning ordinance “as presently
constituted does not accommodate the objectives of the [master plan] because of its failure to
provide for balanced land uses throughout the Township and for uses compatible with
surrounding development and future use patterns through the exclusion of R-7 and other low and
moderate density, multi-family Zoning Districts and land uses.” In count I, plaintiff alleges that
its proposed rezoning to R-7 would constitute a reasonable use of the property that would serve a
demonstrated need, and that it would be consistent with the goals and objectives stated in the
master plan. Plaintiff alleges that the current zoning of the property is unreasonable and fails to
advance a legitimate governmental interest. Lastly, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s denial of its
rezoning petition was unreasonable, did not promote a legitimate or reasonable government
interest, was arbitrary and capricious, and violated its right to substantive due process.
In count II, plaintiff alleges that the township “by its actions and inactions, and the effect
of the Township’s administration of its Ordinance, has effectively excluded land uses consistent
with” plaintiff’s petition, “(1) on the face of the Zoning Ordinance and Zoning framework; (2) in
the interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance and zoning framework; and (3) through the various
administrative and legislative decisions of the Township.” Plaintiff alleges that R-7 uses are
lawful land uses, that there is a demonstrated need for them, and that rezoning the property to R7 will not have an adverse effect on defendant’s ability to provide services. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant cannot show that there is a “compelling governmental interest” that justifies the
current A-1 zoning of the property, and that defendant’s “actions and position” in denying
plaintiff’s rezoning petition “have had the effect of prohibiting” R-7 uses within the township, in
violation of the Township Rural Zoning Act (“TZA”), MCL 125.297(a), and the Michigan
Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that its rezoning petition is reasonable, and that defendant’s denial
of the petition is unreasonable, does not advance a legitimate or reasonable government interest,
is arbitrary and capricious, and violates plaintiff’s right to substantive due process and equal
protection.
In count III, plaintiff maintains that it has taken all reasonable and necessary steps to
secure a final decision “regarding the requested use of the Property.” Plaintiff alleges that it has
suffered an actual and concrete injury “resulting from Ann Arbor Township’s collective actions,”
and therefore plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims are ripe for judicial review.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, with the township asserting that
plaintiff’s claims are not ripe for judicial review because plaintiff did not pursue alternative
forms of relief such as a PUD or a conditional zoning agreement under MCL 125.3405. At the
hearing on the motion, plaintiff characterized count I as alleging “an as applied constitutional
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deprivation.” Plaintiff also asserted that its count II constituted a ‘facial challenge” to the zoning
ordinance because although R-7 zoning is permitted, no land in the township has ever been
zoned R-7. Plaintiff further asserted that facial challenges and assertions of constitutional
deprivation that are not claims of inverse condemnation or takings are not subject to the rule of
finality. The court asked about defendant’s argument that the matter was not ripe because
plaintiff never pursued a PUD type of rezoning. Plaintiff replied that it was not eligible for a
PUD under the ordinance because the density plaintiff was asking for was inconsistent with the
township’s master plan and because the ordinance states that a PUD cannot be granted where
multi-family housing is proposed. Plaintiff maintained that finality had been achieved because
plaintiff applied for a variance after being denied rezoning.
Defendant denied that the PUD option was unavailable to plaintiff because “if the PUD
process that exists does not satisfy their requests then the Township Board through appropriate
processes can change these PUD requirements.” Defendant contended that plaintiff’s claims
were not ripe because it could have asked for a change to the PUD ordinance. Defendant also
argued that the fact that plaintiff sought a variance is not dispositive because “what they sought
was a variance that would allow the development that had already been denied.” Defendant
argued that plaintiff was bound to seek the minimum variance that would put its property to
productive use.
The trial court relied on Braun v Ann Arbor Twp, 262 Mich App 154; 683 NW2d 755
(2004), in finding that plaintiff was required to seek the minimum variance. The court held that
count I was not ripe because PUD classification was a possibility. The court dismissed count II
because it “is one of exclusionary zoning and as such it is not merely a facial challenge.” The
court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice.
II. “As Applied” Claim
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that its “as applied” claim in count I
was not ripe for judicial review. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by
applying a takings case finality test to its substantive due process claim. Rulings on motions for
summary disposition are reviewed de novo on appeal. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118;
587 NW2d 817 (1999).
A. Ripeness
“A challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance ‘as applied,’ whether analyzed under
42 USC 1983 as a denial of equal protection, as a deprivation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, is subject to the rule of finality.” Paragon Properties Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich
568, 576; 550 NW2d 772 (1996). An “as applied” challenge alleges a present infringement or
denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution.” Id. “[T]he
finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a
definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.” Id. at 577 (citation
omitted). “In other words, where the possibility exists that a municipality may have granted a
variance – or some other form of relief – from the challenged provision of the ordinance, the
extent of the alleged injury is unascertainable unless these alternative forms of potential relief are
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pursued to a final conclusion.” Conlin v Scio Twp, 262 Mich App 379, 382; 686 NW2d 16
(2004).
B. Braun
In Braun, supra at 156, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant’s denial of their rezoning
petition violated substantive due process and equal protection, amounted to exclusionary zoning,
and constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Addressing
the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims on the basis of
ripeness, this Court quoted MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, 477 US 340, 349; 106 S Ct
2561; 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986), a takings only cases, where the Court stated that “[u]ntil a property
owner has obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations to its property, it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any
reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] interests ha[ve] been destroyed.” Braun, supra at
158. The Braun Court also noted that the Supreme Court stated in MacDonald that “[o]ur cases
uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it.” Braun, supra
at 158.
The Braun Court then quoted Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 620-621; 121 S Ct
2448; 150 L Ed 2d 592 (2001), an inverse condemnation action, where the United States
Supreme Court similarly stated:
Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation
which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner's
first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies
to exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the property,
including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. As a
general rule, until these ordinary processes have been followed the extent of the
restriction on property is not known and a regulatory taking has not yet been
established. [Id. at 159 (emphasis added).]
The Braun Court recognized that
[b]oth Palazzolo and MacDonald counsel that a determination of alternative uses
of property as zoned is a condition precedent to a valid takings claim. In other
words, the landowner must show that he sought alternative uses of the property as
zoned and was denied, thus leaving the property owner with land having no
economically productive or reasonably beneficial use. [Id. (emphasis added).]
Based on Palazzolo and MacDonald, the Braun Court found that, because the plaintiffs had not
applied for a variance, or sought review of the board of trustees’ decision before the ZBA, there
was “no way to discern whether the land as zoned has any reasonable beneficial use, or whether
plaintiff’s expectation interests have been destroyed.” Id. The Braun Court concluded that the
trial court had correctly found that the plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim was not ripe for
judicial review. Id. at 160.
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However, the Braun Court then added:
The Supreme Court decision in MacDonald dealt with claims arising
under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. Unlike the case at bar,
MacDonald did not involve any other constitutional claims. In Paragon
Properties . . . our Supreme Court held that a judicial challenge to the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, as applied to a particular parcel of land, is
not ripe for judicial review until the plaintiff has obtained a final, nonjudicial
determination regarding the permitted use of the land. The Court stated
specifically that, “[a] challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance ‘as applied,’
whether analyzed under 42 USC 1983 as a denial of equal protection, as a
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is subject to the rule of
finality.” The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the plaintiff has
suffered an “actual, concrete injury.”
As we stated above, we are not satisfied plaintiffs established that a final
decision was made regarding the permitted uses of the property. For this reason,
in accordance with Paragon, we find that plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional
claims are likewise not ripe for judicial review. Summary disposition of
plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was
appropriate. [Id. at 160-161 (internal quotations and citations omitted).]
The Braun Court correctly recognized that ripeness and finality are required for all “as
applied” claims. As recognized by the Braun Court, Paragon involved only a takings claim.
Paragon, supra at 571-572. The language requiring finality of all constitutional “as applied”
claims should not be taken to imply that the particular ripeness test applied by the Paragon
Court to the takings claim before it is the test that should be applied, generally, to all
constitutional “as applied” claims, regardless of their nature. This is because the holding in
Braun stands for the proposition that in zoning cases where the plaintiffs assert a takings claim as
well as one or more “as applied” constitutional claims, the plaintiffs must establish finality with
regard to the takings claim before the entire matter is ripe for judicial review. In other words, if
finality has not been established with regard to the takings claim, the attendant “as applied”
constitutional challenges cannot be ripe because while resolving the land use claim
administratively, if the plaintiff’s land use claim is resolved, that resolution renders the original
takings claim and attendant constitutional issues moot. Once rendered moot, those constitutional
claims should not be adjudicated. See Eller v Metro Contracting, 261 Mich App 569, 571; 683
NW2d 242 (2004) stating, “[a]n issue is moot and should not be reached if a court can no longer
fashion a remedy.” A failure at the administrative level on the land use claim allows all the
issues to be joined in one proceeding rather than carving out those issues to be remanded for
administrative review, namely, the land use issues, while at the same time proceeding judicially
on the attendant constitutional issues.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution “is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”
Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc, 544 US 528, 536-537; 125 S Ct 2074; 161 L Ed 2d 876 (2005)
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(emphasis in the original). Accordingly, the tests for determining whether there has been a
regulatory taking focus “directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon
private property rights.” Lingle, supra, 544 US at 538-539. In other words, a court must
ascertain the limits of the development that would be permitted on the property, if any, in order
to ascertain the diminution in value (if any) resulting from the alleged taking—such that the
plaintiff may be provided “just compensation.” Id. at 536-540. That is the goal of a ripeness test
in a takings case. See Pearson v City of Grand Blanc, 961 F2d 1211, 1214-1215 (CA 6, 1992)
(“the federal court cannot know what has been taken or what compensation has been afforded
until state remedies have been utilized. Until that time, the federal court cannot determine
whether a taking has occurred, whether compensation is due, or, if it has been afforded, whether
it is just”).
Conversely, issues such as the remaining value of the land or what productive uses might
be allowed by the municipality are not relevant where, as here, the plaintiff does not raise a
takings claim and does not make a demand for damages based on diminution in value or
otherwise. Rather, in the present case, plaintiff simply claims that, as applied, the ordinance does
not substantially advance a legitimate government interest, and is arbitrary and capricious.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the substantially advances test
“prescribes an inquiry in the nature of due process, not a takings test.” Lingle, supra, 544 US at
540-541 (emphasis added). It is a test for ascertaining the validity of the underlying regulation.
Id. at 542-543. If an action is so arbitrary as to violate due process, that is the end of the inquiry,
and “[n]o amount of compensation can authorize such action.” Id. at 543. The Lingle Court
recognized that commingling the two tests is understandable, but concluded that doing so is
invalid, inappropriate, and imprecise. Id. at 541-542, 545, 548.
At least one federal court has warned against applying a takings ripeness test to claims
alleging other constitutional “as applied” violations. See Neuenfeldt v Williams Twp, 356 F Supp
2d 770, 773-776 (ED Mich, 2005). In Neuenfeldt, the plaintiff was denied site plan approval
because he refused to include expensive “stub streets”—intended to allow future connections to
future adjacent subdivisions—as part of his subdivision plan. Id. at 771-772. The plaintiff was
subsequently denied a variance from the stub street requirement. Id. at 772. However, the
plaintiff did not appeal the defendant’s decision, and did not file an inverse condemnation action
in state court. Id. Rather, the plaintiff filed a federal action, alleging violations of equal
protection and substantive due process. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the
constitutional claims were not ripe for review because the plaintiff had not sought just
compensation. Id. at 772-773.
The district court agreed that, if the plaintiff had asserted a takings action, the case would
not be ripe for review. Id. at 773-774. However, the plaintiff alleged that the stub street
requirement had been disparately enforced, to his detriment, thereby alleging equal protection
and substantive due process claims—not a takings claim. Id. at 775-776. Accordingly, given the
defendant’s denial of site plan approval and the denial of a variance application, the plaintiff’s
claims were sufficiently ripe for judicial review. Id.; see also Pearson, supra, 961 F2d at 1214-
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1215 (trial court erred in applying a takings ripeness test to a substantive due process claim);
Nasierowski Bros Inv Co v City of Sterling Hts, 949 F2d 890, 893-894 (CA 6, 1991) (trial court
erred in applying a takings ripeness test to a procedural due process claim).2
The holding in Braun stands for the proposition that in zoning cases where the plaintiffs
assert a takings claim as well as one or more “as applied” constitutional claims, the plaintiffs
must establish finality with regard to the takings claim before the entire matter is ripe for judicial
review. Braun articulates its ripeness test as follows: whether plaintiffs “sought alternative uses
of the property as zoned and was denied,” or applies for the “minimum variance that is necessary
to place the land in productive economic use within the zoning classification.” But Braun only
applies to those claims that combine a takings claim with one or more “as applied” constitutional
challenges. The present case does not involve a takings claim. Thus, the trial court erred by
relying on Braun and concluding that the “as applied” claims were not ripe for judicial review
because plaintiff failed to seek the minimum variance.
In sum, plaintiff filed a rezoning petition and applied for a use variance, and both were
denied. Therefore, plaintiff’s “as applied” claims are ripe for appellate review because plaintiff
has exhausted all administrative remedies available for the particular narrow injury alleged (the
refusal to rezone the property R-7), and defendant has arrived at a definitive position on that
particular issue. The trial court erred by finding that plaintiff’s as applied claim is not ripe for
judicial review.
II. Exclusionary Zoning
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s exclusionary zoning
claims were not ripe for judicial review.
Plaintiff alleged in count II of its complaint that defendant engaged in exclusionary
zoning in violation of former MCL 125.297a3 and the Michigan Constitution.
2
Regrettably, Pearson went on to apply the Nasierowski procedural due process ripeness test to
the substantive due process claim before it. Pearson, supra, 961 F2d at 1215. However, the
Court found that, even if a more stringent test were applied, requiring the plaintiff to file one
meaningful application, and seek a variance, the plaintiff’s claims were ripe for review. Id. (The
Nasierowski test found that, because the plaintiff alleged that the procedures were in themselves
unfair, the claim was immediately cognizable in federal court, without a need to exhaust
administrative remedies. Nasierowski, supra, 949 F2d at 894.)
3
Although repealed by 2006 PA 110, effective July 1, 2006, which enacted the Michigan Zoning
Enabling Act, MCL 125.301 et seq., the TZA still controls this case. MCL 125.3702(2). We
note that the prohibition against exclusionary zoning formerly found in MCL 125.297a was
recodified with nearly identical language in § 207 of the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act. MCL
125.307.
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A. MCL 125.297a
MCL 125.297a provides that:
A zoning ordinance or zoning decision shall not have the effect of totally
prohibiting the establishment of a land use within a township in the presence of a
demonstrated need for that land use within either the township or surrounding
area within the state, unless there is no location within the township where the use
may be appropriately located, or the use is unlawful.
The language of the statute does not address the application of the ordinance to a particular
plaintiff’s individual parcel of land. Rather, to establish an exclusionary zoning claim, the
statute requires a showing that the ordinance has “the effect of totally prohibiting the
establishment of a land use within the township or surrounding area within the state.” In light of
the plain language of the statute, the Braun ripeness test cannot apply to statutory exclusionary
zoning challenges.
When considering the specific language of the statute, in the context of a ripeness
analysis, if finality in the Braun sense were required, it would be an insurmountable requirement
for plaintiffs and the statute would be rendered nugatory for all reasonable intents and purposes.
This is because the holding in Braun requires that plaintiffs must establish finality with regard to
a takings claim before the entire matter is ripe for judicial review by requiring that plaintiffs
“sought alternative uses of the property as zoned and was denied,” or applied for the “the
minimum variance that is necessary to place the land in productive economic use within the
zoning classification.” In exclusionary zoning claims brought under MCL 125.297a, making this
showing would be impossible. Pursuant to MCL 125.297a, the denial of a petition to rezone
one’s singular parcel of property within a township cannot show that the municipality has
reached a final decision on whether to totally prohibit a particular use within an entire township,
but only that parcel of land on which the request has been submitted. In other words, a Brauntype finality test is inappropriate for exclusionary zoning cases because requiring a plaintiff to
petition to rezone someone else’s property or to rezone the entire township to test the outside
limits of the rezoning denial would be inapposite to the plain language of the statute.
Nonetheless, even though the Braun finality test does not apply to claims brought under
MCL 125.297a, a plaintiff remains obligated to first submit a rezoning request or request for a
variance to the appropriate legislative body before seeking relief from the court system. Whether
a municipality will allow a particular requested use in the township must be decided with
reference to what the municipality has authorized and will authorize in its comprehensive zoning
map of the township. While a plaintiff need not satisfy the stringent requirements of the Braun
test, a plaintiff seeking relief under the statute must seek and receive an administrative
determination on a request regarding a particular parcel of land because a use is not necessarily
excluded simply because it does not yet exist in the zoning map. See Landon Holdings, Inc v
Grattan Twp, 257 Mich App 154, 168-169; 667 NW2d 93 (2003).
In Landon, the plaintiffs did not apply for rezoning or for a special land use permit for the
particular use of manufactured housing before filing suit. The Landon Court found that while the
zoning plan allowed for the use, and regardless of the fact that the municipality had not yet
designated land for that use because it had not yet been requested, there could be no exclusionary
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zoning violation. Landon, supra at 157-158, 160. Landon means that exclusionary zoning exists
only after a request has been submitted to the proper administrative body, considered by that
body, and ultimately denied. A plaintiff’s request before the proper administrative body
provides the township the opportunity to revisit its zoning plan and make an administrative
determination on a plaintiff’s particular request. It is in this exercise that the township, in its
legislative function, is provided with public comment, expert analysis, use analysis, community
analysis, needs analysis, and other expert opinions relative to its proper legislative role in zoning
to ensure that it does not violate the prohibition against exclusionary zoning. Thus, failing to
make the initial zoning request before the township administrative body denies a township the
opportunity to consider designating land for the requested land use. Denying the municipality
the opportunity to make the initial determination improperly usurps decision-making authority
from the municipality and inappropriately transforms the judiciary into a kind of “super-zoning”
authority making zoning decisions for particular communities.
In sum, while “finality” in the Braun context is not required to establish ripeness in
exclusionary zoning claims, at a minimum, a plaintiff must submit a zoning request for
consideration before the proper administrative body for a suitability and needs determination in
that particular community for the claim to be ripe and judicial review appropriate. Because
plaintiff submitted its request for rezoning to the township zoning commission, and also sought a
variance before the ZBA, plaintiff’s statutory claim for exclusionary zoning is ripe for judicial
review.
B. Constitutional Exclusionary Zoning Claim
Ordinances are usually presumed to be valid. Smookler v Wheatfield Twp, 394 Mich 574,
581; 232 NW2d 616 (1975). However, “an ordinance which totally excludes from a
municipality a use recognized by the constitution and other laws of this state as legitimate also
carries with it a strong taint of unlawful discrimination and a denial of equal protection of the
law as to the excluded use.” Id., quoting Kropf v City of Sterling Hts, 391 Mich 139, 156; 215
NW2d 179 (1974). Like the statutory exclusionary zoning challenge under MCL 125.297a, a
constitutional exclusionary zoning challenge requires a proponent to establish that the use is
excluded in the municipality. See id. As the Court in Smookler observed, “when confronted
with a regulation invalid on its face, it is not necessary for this Court to examine the
reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to plaintiff’s land.” Smookler, supra at 581
(emphasis added). For this reason, plaintiffs’ constitutional exclusionary zoning claim, whether
labeled as an “as applied” claim or a facial claim, as a matter of law can in substance only be a
facial claim. Id. And “[f]inality is not required for facial challenges because such challenges
attack the very existence or enactment of an ordinance.” Paragon Properties, supra at 577. The
analysis does not stop there, however. While in this facial challenge “it is not necessary for this
Court to examine the reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to plaintiff’s land,” Smookler,
supra at 581, still, the trial court must have some manner available to it to determine whether the
zoning ordinance at issue indeed is “invalid on its face.”
Like statutory exclusionary zoning challenges, in constitutional exclusionary zoning
claims, a plaintiff must submit a zoning request for consideration before the proper
administrative body for a suitability and needs determination for the claim to be ripe for judicial
review. This is because whether a plaintiff’s exclusionary zoning challenge is brought pursuant
to the statute or under the constitution, the zoning map underlying the challenge is part of the
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zoning ordinance. See MCL 125.271; MCL 125.280; see also Paragon, supra at 573-574. And
a use not yet present in the zoning map is not necessarily excluded simply because it does not yet
exist in the zoning map. See Landon, supra at 168-169. Landon also applies in exclusionary
zoning claims brought under the constitution.4 Thus, like statutory exclusionary zoning claims,
while a plaintiff need not satisfy the stringent requirements of the Braun finality test, a plaintiff
seeking constitutional redress must first seek and receive an administrative determination on a
request regarding a particular parcel of land. Because plaintiff here submitted a request for
rezoning to the township zoning commission, as well as a request for a variance before the ZBA,
plaintiff’s constitutional claim for exclusionary zoning is ripe for judicial review. The trial court
erred by finding that plaintiff’s exclusionary zoning claims are not ripe for judicial review.
Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
4
Just because a community has not designated a certain land use within its borders that
exclusionary zoning exists on its face. For example, merely because the administrative body
responsible for zoning in Mackinac Island has not zoned land for industrial purposes does not
mean that exclusionary zoning exists on its face. There must be a request and an appropriate
determination for that community by the administrative body responsible for zoning. In other
words, a community cannot engage in exclusionary zoning if there is no “demonstrated need” for
the zoning requested in that community. See Landon, supra at 168-169.
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