PEOPLE OF MI V LORI JEAN KOSMALSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278133
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000134-FH
LORI JEAN KOSMALSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury conviction of manslaughter with a vehicle, MCL
750.321, for which she was sentenced to 6 to 15 years in prison. We affirm.
On December 2, 2005, Daryl Price was driving his vehicle southbound through an
intersection on a green light when his vehicle was violently struck by an eastbound vehicle that
ran a red light. Price was killed. Defendant was driving the vehicle that ran the red light. She
was driving at a high rate of speed—well above the 35 mile per hour limit—when she struck
Price’s vehicle. Just before the collision defendant was seen driving at a high rate of speed,
running another red light, and driving erratically, including changing lanes numerous times
without using her turn signal. After the collision, defendant’s blood was tested and found to
contain three different prescription medications—Xanax, Methadone, and Citalopram—all of
which effect one’s ability to drive, particularly when combined. Defendant had a long history of
abusing prescription medications. She also had a history of driving erratically and had been
ticketed twice—in February and July of the same year—for reckless driving. And then Price was
killed. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter with a vehicle. This appeal followed.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her postverdict motion for a Ginther1 hearing to expand the record in support of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. We disagree. A trial court’s decision on whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Mischley, 164 Mich App 478, 481-482;
417 NW2d 537 (1987).
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Where the issue is counsel’s performance, a defendant
must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, if not for counsel’s
errors, the result would have been different and the result that did occur was fundamentally
unfair or unreliable. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d
674 (1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309, 312-313; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
In her request for a Ginther hearing, defendant alleged that her trial counsel failed to meet
with expert witnesses who could have testified that defendant lost control of her car because of a
seizure condition. Further, defendant claimed, her civil attorney—Shelia McCoy—was
unexpectedly required to argue two important pre-trial motions in the criminal matter involving
the admission of evidence related to (1) her previous reckless driving, and (2) the THC found in
the victim’s blood. Defendant also asserted that her first criminal attorney promised a favorable
plea deal with a reduced sentence that ultimately proved spurious, resulting in defendant firing
him and hiring a new attorney when there was little time left for trial preparation.
The request for a Ginther hearing was denied. First, the trial court concluded that there
was no “information, whatsoever, from any doctor that is in any valid form that would say that
she actually did have seizures.” Second, the court concluded that defendant’s counsel, McCoy,
appropriately argued the issues related to the evidence of defendant’s previous reckless driving
and the THC issue. Third, the trial court noted that, before trial, defendant’s attorneys indicated
that they were diligently searching for witnesses and that two witnesses had actually been found.
At the hearing, defendant also argued that her new criminal counsel was disadvantaged by the
lack of pretrial preparation by her former attorneys, including their failure to have an accident
reconstructionist examine the vehicles. The trial court refused to consider that issue because it
had not been set forth in the filed motion. The court concluded that defendant had received
“very effective representation” and that “there was nothing in the claims that [were] . . .
presented in” the motion “that was not on the record that entitles Defendant to a Ginther
hearing.”
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it made a ruling based
on the existing record when the problem was that the existing record was insufficient. We
disagree. The trial court addressed all of the allegations raised in the motion and found that,
even if the allegations were true, they either would not have changed the outcome of the trial or
did not demonstrate a representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
This conclusion was not erroneous. Although the trial court did not consider defendant’s
argument that her attorney should have arranged for an accident reconstructionist to examine the
vehicles, defendant fails to show how this circumstance renders the result unfair or unreliable.
Defendant’s expert did get the opportunity to testify. In light of all of the evidence, including
eyewitness testimony pertaining to the collision, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied defendant’s request for a Ginther hearing.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request
for an adjournment after she obtained a new criminal attorney just two weeks before trial. A trial
court’s ruling on a motion to adjourn is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Coy, 258
Mich App 1, 17; 669 NW2d 831 (2003).
[T]o invoke the trial court’s discretion to grant a continuance or adjournment, a
defendant must show both good cause and diligence. “Good cause” factors
include “whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate
reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested
previous adjournments.” Even with good cause and due diligence, the trial
court’s denial of a request for an adjournment or continuance is not grounds for
reversal unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice as a result of the abuse of
discretion. [Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).]
Defendant requested an adjournment to allow her new attorney more time to prepare for trial.
Defendant argued that this was necessary because her other attorney, McCoy, was not a criminal
specialist. While this was not framed as a constitutional issue with the court below, an
adjournment request related to new counsel does implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel. See People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 575-576; 194 NW2d 337 (1972).
Requiring more time for a new attorney to prepare when a trial is imminent is, on its face,
a legitimate reason to ask for an adjournment. That defendant had two attorneys does not
automatically mean that either one would be sufficient to protect her right to counsel if the other
had to be removed or replaced. See MRPC 1.1(a). Nonetheless, the trial court held, in part, that
it would not adjourn the trial because there had been no prior indication that McCoy’s
representation was something less than joint. Given McCoy’s involvement in the case from the
beginning—which included being at the site of the collision—as well as the extent of that
involvement, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
defendant’s request for an adjournment.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed testimony
regarding her two prior arrests for reckless driving. A trial court’s decision whether to admit
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999). A preliminary question of law regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed
de novo. Id.
MRE 404(b)(1) sets forth the standards for the admission of other acts evidence. It
provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
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For evidence to be admissible under MRE 404(b), it must be offered for a proper purpose, it
must be relevant, and the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the potential
for unfair prejudice. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). Evidence is
considered unfairly prejudicial if admitting it would create a danger that marginally probative
evidence would be given undue weight by the jury. People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 306; 642
NW2d 417 (2001).
Here, evidence was admitted that defendant was twice previously arrested for reckless
driving. The evidence was admitted for the purpose of showing that defendant knew that her
drug use would adversely affect her ability to drive. The first incident happened on February 13,
2005. Defendant was pulled over after she had a minor accident with another vehicle for which
she received a citation. About an hour later she was observed driving in an erratic manner,
eventually ending up in a ditch. Although she was “soiled” and “disheveled,” a Breathalyzer test
was negative for alcohol. At that time, defendant was arrested for reckless driving. When the
police officer asked her if she had taken any drugs, she admitted she had taken some the day
before. However, defendant said that she was driving erratically because of loose dogs in her
car, an excuse that the police officer found plausible.
The second incident happened on July 16, 2005. The vehicle that defendant was driving
was seen swerving all over the road and she was pulled over. The police officer testified that
defendant was drooling and her speech was slow and slurred. He thought she was drunk.
Although defendant failed several field sobriety tests, a Breathalyzer test was negative for
alcohol. Defendant admitted that she was taking medications and the officer discovered a bottle
of medication in the vehicle. Defendant was again arrested for reckless driving.
It is clear that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b), i.e., to
show that defendant knew that her drug use would adversely affect her ability to drive. And the
evidence regarding the July 16, 2005, reckless driving incident was relevant to that purpose
because defendant failed field sobriety tests and admitted to taking medications. The probative
value of that evidence was also not substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence related to the July
16, 2005, incident.
The relevance of the February 13, 2005, incident is not quite so clear. Although
defendant admitted to taking a medication the day before, field sobriety tests were not conducted
and she offered an explanation for her erratic driving, i.e., the loose dogs in her vehicle.
However, her driving behavior—two vehicle incidents within about an hour—and her personal
appearance—soiled and disheveled—indicated otherwise. Evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. The
trial court concluded that the evidence was relevant, as well as probative. We agree but, even if
this was a close evidentiary question, there was no abuse of discretion, i.e., it was not outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See People v Young, 276 Mich App 446, 448; 740
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NW2d 347 (2007); People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 637; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). And,
further, an evidentiary error does not merit reversal unless, if after considering the entire cause, it
appears more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v Smith, 243
Mich App 657, 680; 625 NW2d 46 (2000). To the extent that this evidence was erroneously
admitted, it was certainly not outcome determinative.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the
results of the victim’s toxicology report which showed THC (tetrahydrocannabinol)2 in his
system at the time of the crash. We disagree. As noted above, a trial court’s decision whether to
admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while a preliminary question of law
regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed de novo. Lukity, supra at 488.
Defendant argues that the toxicology report was relevant and should have been admitted
into evidence. According to defendant, “[b]ecause the jury in this case was asked to decide
whether [defendant] was grossly negligent or whether her conduct merely amounted to ordinary
negligence, the conduct of both parties is relevant information that should have been presented to
the jury before it could properly render a decision regarding [defendant’s] guilt or innocence.”
While we agree that Price’s conduct before his death as pertains to the circumstances of the
collision is relevant, defendant has failed to establish the relevancy of the toxicology report.
As discussed above, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Defendant seems to claim that the evidence
is relevant to the issue of whether she was grossly negligent when she ran a red light, at a high
rate of speed, and crashed her vehicle into Price’s vehicle. We disagree.
The elements to prove gross negligence are:
(1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence
to avert injury to another.
(2) Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of
the means at hand.
(3) The omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger
when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove
disastrous to another. [People v McCoy, 223 Mich App 500, 503; 566 NW2d 667
(1997).]
It is unclear to us as to which element defendant is claiming the toxicology report is relevant.
Because in her brief on appeal she states that it was up to the jury to determine “whether the
victim in any way contributed to the accident,” we assume she is referring to the second element.
However, there is no evidence to support her theory that Price in any way caused or contributed
to this collision. To the contrary, the evidence indisputably showed that he was traveling
2
THC is “the proactive ingredient of marijuana.” People v Derror, 475 Mich 316, 319; 715
NW2d 822 (2006).
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through the intersection on a green light. Defendant, who had been driving very aggressively
and erratically, ran the red light at that same intersection, at a high rate of speed, and collided
with Price’s vehicle, causing his fatal injuries. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to admit the report on the ground that it was irrelevant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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