IN RE STEELE ALEXANDER SCHOWALTER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of STEELE ALEXANDER
SCHOWALTER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 284403
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000331-NA
DANIEL WILLIAM SCHOWALTER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the family court order terminating his parental rights to the
minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm. This appeal has
been decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
To terminate parental rights, the family court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If a statutory
ground for termination is established, the family court must terminate parental rights unless there
exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The family court’s
decision terminating parental rights is reviewed for clear error. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, supra
at 356-357. Regard is to be given to the family court’s special opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
There was clear and convincing evidence to establish the ground for termination
contained in MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). At the time of adjudication, respondent demonstrated poor
parenting skills, was without proper housing, had been using cocaine, and was limiting his work
opportunities in an effort to bolster his application for social security disability benefits. By the
time of a later custody hearing, respondent had failed to participate in parenting classes and had
not made his housing available for the caseworker’s assessment. Respondent had also failed to
seek drug treatment, participate in Narcotics Anonymous, or submit drug screens to demonstrate
that he had stopped using cocaine. Respondent was ultimately denied social security disability
benefits and never provided employment verification to the caseworker. We perceive no clear
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error in the family court’s determination that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) had been established by
clear and convincing evidence.
Nor did the family court clearly err by finding that the statutory ground for termination
contained in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) had been established in this case. There was no evidence that
respondent had suitable housing, employment, or a source of stable income. Respondent’s
psychological evaluation revealed a substantial risk that problems related to neglect would
continue, and confirmed that respondent was currently unable to provide proper care and custody
for the minor child. Further, respondent’s failure to comply with his treatment plan was
evidence of his failure to provide proper care and custody. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661
NW2d 216 (2003). We conclude that the statutory ground for termination contained in MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) was proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Lastly, the family court did not clearly err by determining that the statutory ground for
termination contained in MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) had been sufficiently established. There was no
evidence that the minor child could safely be returned to respondent’s care because the
conditions that led to the initial adjudication continued to exist and would have exposed the child
to a risk of harm. Specifically, respondent never sought treatment or addressed his substance
abuse problems and psychological issues. The statutory ground for termination contained in
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was proven by clear and convincing evidence in this case.1
For these same reasons, we conclude that termination was not clearly contrary to the
minor child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354.
Respondent argues that he misunderstood the court’s expectations of him and did not
realize that he was expected to immediately begin participating in his treatment plan. He delayed
obtaining a psychological assessment for a substantial period of time due to his mistrust of
psychologists, and delayed obtaining a drug assessment for several months as well. However,
rather than relieving respondent of his parental obligations, these delays and alleged
misunderstandings revealed that respondent did not prioritize reunification with his child.
Ultimately, respondent’s actions and inactions revealed his lack of commitment to the minor
child at issue in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
1
Because the family court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), we need not address whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish the statutory ground for termination contained in MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). In re
Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
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