PEOPLE OF MI V FELICIA LENETTE HILL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273910
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-000015-FH
FELICIA LENETTE HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
GLEICHER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree that constitutional double jeopardy principles do not bar punishment for
defendant’s convictions of both failure to pay wages, MCL 408.485, and larceny by false
pretenses, MCL 750.218. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination
that defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s restitution order is not ripe for review. In my view,
the trial court improperly ordered defendant to reimburse Raul Parmo-Leon, and this portion of
the court’s sentence should be vacated.
The jury found defendant not guilty of failing to pay wages to Parmo-Leon. At her
sentencing hearing, defendant objected to the probation department’s recommendation that she
pay restitution to Parmo-Leon in the amount of $3,750. The trial court effectively overruled
defendant’s objection by instead referring the issue to a dispute resolution center, stating,
I … think that for the benefit of all the victims in this case that the—what
the Court is going to do is I’m going to refer the issue of restitution to the
Resolution Center with the expectation that a resolution can be made and this
Court will stand by an agreement made with the assistance of the resolution center
with all three complainants; namely Maria Alfaro, Raul Leon and Maria Cruz, and
if a settlement cannot be reached then I’m going to go with the figures as
recommended by both probation departments . . . .
The trial court’s September 18, 2006 order of sentence disposition provides in relevant part as
follows:
Restitution will be $17,255 or figure arrived at by Resolution Center for
all three complainants. Probation will be terminated upon payment of restitution
-1-
of $17,255 or figure agreed to by parties from Resolution Center. (Emphasis
supplied).
In my view, the trial court erred by requiring defendant to either negotiate reimbursement
to Parmo-Leon, or to pay him the full $3750 recommended if negotiations proved unsuccessful.
Because the jury acquitted defendant of failing to pay wages to Parmo-Leon, defendant should
not have to make any restitution to him. In People v Winquest, 115 Mich App 215, 222; 320
NW2d 346 (1982), this Court held “improper” an order of probation requiring the defendant to
make restitution because “a defendant may not be required to make restitution for damages
arising out of a crime for which he was tried and acquitted; under such circumstances the parties
must be left to their civil remedies.”1
I also believe that this issue qualifies as ripe for review because the trial court in its final
order of sentence disposition limited defendant’s options to either paying Parmo-Leon $3,750,
the entire sum recommended by the probation department, or paying him some negotiated
portion of this amount. Both of these choices qualify as unlawful given defendant’s acquittal of
the charge involving Parmo-Leon. Because both options lack legal justification, enforcement of
the order of sentence disposition will cause defendant to suffer a certain, nonspeculative injury.2
Furthermore, because the trial court already has imposed a legally invalid sentence in this regard,
this issue is now justiciable, and further factual development will not sharpen the parties’
positions. Defendant “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury” as a result of the trial court’s order, and defendant’s future financial injury is by no means
“conjectural” or “hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95, 102; 103 S Ct 1660; 75
L Ed 2d 675 (1983) (internal quotation omitted). I would reverse the trial court’s order requiring
defendant to negotiate with or pay Parmo-Leon.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
1
The instant case is readily distinguishable from People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 272; 571
NW2d 503 (1997), because the defendant in Gahan was never acquitted of defrauding any of the
additional victims of his criminal enterprise. In the instant case, a jury decided that Parmo-Leon
was not a victim of defendant’s misconduct, and therefore no factual basis exists for determining
any financial harm that Parmo-Leon sustained.
2
It is fanciful to believe that Parmo-Leon will accept no restitution, given that the trial court has
promised him $3,750 for merely participating in the Resolution Center exercise.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.