PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY DEMETRIS HOLDEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272633
LC No. 04-024329-FH
TIMOTHY DEMETRIS HOLDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Talbot and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right following his convictions for burning of real property,
MCL 750.73; arson of insured property, MCL 750.75; use of false pretenses with intent to
defraud, MCL 750.218(4)(a); failure to file a tax return or filing a fraudulent tax return, MCL
205.27(1)(a); and committing a fraudulent insurance act, MCL 500.4511(1). Defendant was
sentenced to concurrent terms of 23 months to ten years for the two arson convictions, 13 months
to 5 years for the false pretenses and tax-related convictions, and 13 months to four years for the
insurance fraud conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
arson, burning of real property, insurance fraud, and false pretenses. We disagree.
We review a claim of insufficient evidence de novo to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would justify a rational trier of fact
in finding that all the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Lange, 251 Mich App 247, 250; 650 NW2d 691 (2002) (citations omitted). “Circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom may be sufficient to prove all the elements of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d
534 (2007).
In order to convict the defendant of the crime of burning real property, the prosecution
was required to establish: (1) that defendant burned a building, or the contents thereof; (2) that
the building was not a dwelling; and, (3) that defendant intended to burn the building or its
contents, or intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning the building
or contents, knew of the risk, and disregarded the same. MCL 750.73; see, e.g., People v
Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 404-410; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (distinguishing between common law
arson and statutory arson); CJI2d 31.3. The elements of the crime of burning insured property
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are; (1) the burning of any building or personal property, (2) that was insured against loss or
damage caused by fire, (3) with the defendant having knowledge that the property was insured,
(4) where the defendant intended to set the fire without just cause or excuse, knowing that this
would cause damage to property, and (5) where the defendant acted with an intent to defraud or
cheat the insurer. MCL 750.75; CJI2d 31.5; People v Ayers, 213 Mich App 708, 721; 540 NW2d
791 (1995).
“It is the nature of the offense of arson that it is usually committed surreptitiously. Rare
is the occasion when eyewitnesses will be available. By necessity, proofs will normally be
circumstantial.” People v Horowitz, 37 Mich App 151, 154; 194 NW2d 375 (1971). Taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, the jury could have found sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict defendant of the arson charges. Testimony at trial indicated
that defendant purchased the home for $1,000 plus the outstanding back taxes (approximately
$3,000-4,000) in the late fall of 2000. Within days, defendant purchased a $40,000 insurance
policy on the home, indicating to the insurance company that there either was a tenant in the
house or there would be within 30 days. Defendant, however, was unable to provide any contact
information for the tenant and the home had no working utilities or water service. Defendant
signed insurance paperwork containing other statements that could be construed as false, such as
that he had owned the property for more than three years (which rendered it unnecessary to
disclose that he had paid far less than the price for which he insured it) and that he was not
behind on property taxes in the past two years even though the taxes were delinquent. The house
was burned within weeks after the deed for the home was signed.
Although defendant explains the allegedly false statements as unintentional, the
prosecution is not required to rule out every arguable theory of innocence, but is only required to
prove its theory beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d
78 (2000). Defendant’s explanations depend entirely on his credibility, as do his claim that he
had a prospective renter when he applied for insurance and his claim that he would have had the
home ready to rent within 30 days. Considerations of credibility and the weighing of evidence
are matters that are properly left to the jury. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679
NW2d 127 (2004). Taking the above into consideration, this Court is satisfied that there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict defendant of arson and burning of real property.
There is similarly sufficient evidence to convict defendant of obtaining money by false
pretenses and insurance fraud. The insurance agent testified that he would not have insured the
property if defendant did not intend to rent it within 30 days and that the insurance company
might not have insured it for $40,000 if defendant had disclosed the purchase price as required
on the insurance application. Again, statements made by defendant concerning the insurance
application could therefore be viewed as false and defendant’s explanation for his false
statements depended on his credibility. The jury, taking into account the above as well as the
evidence of arson and defendant’s filing an insurance claim for the burned home, could conclude
that defendant intended to defraud the insurer and obtain money by false pretenses.
Defendant next argues that the tax fraud charge should have been severed from the other
charges. We disagree. Whether defendant’s charges are related is a question of law which is
reviewed de novo, and “[t]he court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to sever is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” People v Girard, 269 Mich App 15, 17; 709 NW2d 229 (2005).
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In this matter, defendant brought an oral motion to sever the charges on the first day
scheduled for trial. Notably, MCR 6.120(B)(2) authorizes the trial court to consider the
timeliness of a motion for joinder or severance in determining whether the same would be
appropriate. On the basis of timeliness alone, it could be said that the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion for severance.
Moreover, the charges were related. Under MCR 6.120(C), the court must sever
unrelated offenses for trial. Offenses are related for purposes of this rule only if they are based
on the same conduct or transaction, a series of connected acts, or a series of acts constituting
parts of a single scheme or plan. MCR 6.120(B)(1). The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant
intentionally burned the home as part of his plan to make money off the property by various
fraudulent methods, including making false statements to the insurance company to obtain
coverage worth more than the value of the home, and reporting, for tax purposes, over $30,000 in
expenses for the property in the short time that he owned it. The tax return information
concerning expenses for the property, when viewed together with other affirmative statements by
defendant concerning the property (i.e. reporting to the insurance company that a tenant did or
would live in the home within 30 days despite the fact that there were no working utilities at the
home and defendant had no contact information for the potential tenant; reporting to the
insurance company that there were no delinquent taxes on the property) can be viewed as a series
of acts constituting a single plan to obtain money from ownership of the property that far
exceeded the actual value of the property. That the tax fraud charge was related to the other
charges further supports our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion to sever.
Defendant next argues that his conviction should be reversed because his home was
illegally searched and that items improperly seized should have been suppressed as “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” We disagree.
Defendant, having cited no portion of the record demonstrating that he raised this
argument before the trial court, has not preserved this issue for appeal. See, People v Milstead,
250 Mich App 391, 404 n 8; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). An appellate court will not reverse a
conviction based on an unpreserved issue except for plain error that affected a defendant’s
substantial rights by resulting in the conviction of an actually innocent person or seriously
affecting the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761, 764-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures and provides that no warrants shall issue without probable cause. U.S. Const., Am.
IV. The Michigan constitutional provision is substantially the same. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11.
“Essentially, in order to search a dwelling for evidence of a crime, the police must have probable
cause to search, and must also have a warrant based on that probable cause. . . thus, in order to
show that a search was legal, the police must show either that they had a warrant, or that their
conduct fell under one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v
Davis, 442 Mich 1, 9-10; 497 NW2d 910 (1993). Examples of exceptions to the warrant
requirement are: (1) searches incident to arrest, (2) automobile searches and seizures, (3) plain
view seizure, (4) consent, (5) stop and frisk, and (6) exigent circumstances. Id. Additionally, the
inevitable discovery rule provides that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search may
“still be admitted at trial if the prosecution establishe[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that
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the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” People v
Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 435; 622 NW2d 528 (2000); see also Nix v Williams, 467 US
431, 444; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984). “If the evidence would have been inevitably
obtained, then there is no rational basis for excluding the evidence from the jury.” Brzezinski,
supra at 435-436.
In this instance, defendant apparently sustained damage to his residence (unrelated to the
arson charge at issue) and submitted a claim to his insurance company for the damages. An
insurance investigator went to defendant’s home and, with defendant’s permission, entered the
home to evaluate the damage. While in the home, the investigator noticed several lit candles set
on top of scraps of paper in a crawlspace of the home. The investigator called the police, who
went to the residence and seized the scraps of paper. The scraps of paper, which were not
admitted into evidence, contained alleged “prayer requests” written by defendant and made
reference to his insurance company and police officers. The papers led to further investigation
into defendant’s insurance claim concerning the property currently at issue and, ultimately, his
arrest in the instant matter.
Defendant’s argument that the improper search of his home and the ultimate seizure of
the papers requires reversal fails for two reasons. First, the seized documents were not
discovered by the police and were not admitted into evidence. Second, the burning of ten
unattended candles atop slips of paper in the crawl space of a home behind a water heater
presented an obvious fire hazard and a danger to anyone in or near the home. Accordingly, the
officer responding to the scene was justified in looking inside the crawl space. Once he
determined that there were lit candles behind a water heater, he was justified in entering the
crawl space and seizing the items which could have started a fire.
Defendant’s next argument on appeal is that he is entitled to resentencing because offense
variables were erroneously scored. A sentencing court’s decision in scoring OV points will not
be reversed on appeal unless the decision was clearly erroneous. People v Witherspoon, 257
Mich App 329, 335; 670 NW2d 434 (2003). Scoring decisions under the sentencing guidelines
are not clearly erroneous if “there is any evidence in support of the decision.” Id.
MCL 777.39(1)(b) authorizes the scoring of ten points for OV 9 when, “There were 2 to
9 victims who were placed in danger of physical injury or death, or 4 to 19 victims who were
placed in danger of property loss.” A photograph admitted at trial showed that the fire had
melted siding on the home next door and there was evidence that three people resided in that
home at the time of the fire. Even assuming that those neighbors were not home at the time of
the fire, the damage to the home represents potential property loss and, it can reasonably be
inferred that the neighbors had property inside the home. These neighbors were certainly placed
in danger of some property loss, and the insurance company suffered actual loss in the form of
paying monies for defendant’s burned home. Accordingly, because at least four victims faced
the danger of property loss, the trial court did not clearly err in scoring ten points for OV 9.
Defendant next argues that OV 13, addressing a continuing pattern of behavior, should
have been scored at zero instead of ten points because he had no prior convictions. We disagree.
MCL 777.43(1)(c) provides for scoring ten points if “[t]he offense was part of a pattern
of felonious criminal activity involving a combination of 3 or more crimes against a person or
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property.” Here, the arson was part of a pattern of criminal activity involving three or more
crimes against property because defendant was also convicted of false pretenses, burning of
insured property, and insurance fraud all arising from the arson. As a result, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in scoring this variable at ten points.
Defendant next contends that OV 16 should have been scored at five points instead of ten
because the value of the property was less than $20,000. We agree, but find this error to be
harmless.
MCL 777.46 provides as follows:
(1) Offense variable 16 is property obtained, damaged, lost, or destroyed.
Score offense variable 16 by determining which of the following apply and by
assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number
of points:
*
*
*
(b) The property had a value of more than $20,000.00 or had significant
historical, social, or sentimental value .............. 10 points
(c) the property had a value of $1,000.00 or more but not more than
$20,000.00................................................... 5 points
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 16:
(a) In multiple offender or victim cases, the appropriate points may be
determined by adding together the aggregate value of the property involved,
including property involved in uncharged offenses or charges dismissed under a
plea agreement.
(b) In cases in which the property was . . . destroyed, use the value of the
property in scoring this variable. If the property was damaged, use the monetary
amount appropriate to restore the property to pre-offense condition in scoring this
variable.
Here, the insurance company settled defendant’s claim for $15,000 and $3,669 in
demolition costs, and the prosecutor charged defendant with false pretenses for an amount less
than $20,000. Additionally, defendant purchased the home for $1,000 plus back taxes less than
$5,000. Although the prosecutor argued that the court should consider either the $40,000
amount the propery was insured for or the restitution amount of $29,000, in scoring OV 16, there
is no evidence that either figure constitutes the actual value of the property or the replacement
cost of the property.
Had OV 16 been properly scored, defendant’s overall OV score would have been twentyfive points rather than the thirty he received. However, for this class D offense, OV level III
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applies to offenses having twenty-five to thirty-four OV points. MCL 777.65. The scoring error
therefore did not alter defendant’s guidelines range and remand for resentencing is unnecessary.
See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 92, n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).1
Defendant also argues that the amount of restitution, $29,996 is excessive because it
includes attorney fees and investigation costs, which are not contemplated by MCL 769.1a or
780.766. We disagree.
We generally review for an abuse of discretion an order of restitution. People v
Gubachy, 272 Mich App 706, 708; 728 NW2d 891 (2006). However, “[w]hen the question of
restitution involves a matter of statutory interpretation, review de novo applies.” Id.
The attorney fees challenged by defendant are not the cost of prosecuting defendant but
represent the various costs, totalling $4,176.75, incurred by the insurance company for, among
other things, investigating the validity of the claim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding restitution because MCL 780.767(1) provides, “In determining the amount of
restitution to order . . . , the court shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as
a result of the offense.” All of the amounts listed were incurred by the insurance company as a
result of the offense. See, Id. at 709-714.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
disagree.
We
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
professional reasonableness, and that it is reasonably probable that but for counsel’s ineffective
assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich
App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). “Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that
counsel's performance was sound trial strategy.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396; 688
NW2d 308 (2004).
The basis for defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that counsel failed to
question the insurance company’s investigating attorney regarding a letter the attorney had
written recommending payment of defendant’s claim and which defendant claims was thus
exculpatory. Declining to cross-examine the investigating attorney regarding the allegedly
exculpatory letter was a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant filed a motion for remand in
connection with this issue, which this Court granted on May 4, 2007. At a hearing held on
remand, the investigating attorney, Mr. Meter, testified that he recommended payment of
defendant’s insurance claim in 2001, and that, based on the information he had at the time, he did
not feel there was enough evidence to connect defendant with the fire at the home. Mr. Meter
1
The judgment of sentence states that defendant was convicted and sentenced for burning of a
dwelling house under MCL 750.72, but he was actually convicted of the alternate count of
burning of real property other than a dwelling, MCL 750.73. If this typographical error has not
yet been corrected, the judgment of sentence should be amended to reflect that defendant was
convicted of burning of real property other than a dwelling.
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also testified, however, that he later became aware of other information concerning the fire and
that had he had such information available to him at the time of his initial recommendation, his
opinion would have been different.
At the same hearing, defendant’s trial attorney testified that he declined to question the
attorney regarding his opinion in the letter because the letter did not reflect his later opinion as to
whether defendant started the fire and he did not want to open the door to unfavorable testimony.
Defendant’s trial attorney additionally testified that he spoke to Mr. Meter about the letter before
trial and that Mr. Meter had advised the attorney that defendant had filed insurance claims other
than the one at issue. Mr. Meter also advised that the opinion expressed he expressed in the
letter had since changed. Assuming, without deciding, that the letter would have been
admissible, defendant has not shown that his trial counsel’s declining to introduce or pursue the
letter was unreasonable as a matter of trial strategy, since questioning the attorney about his
earlier opinion would have opened the door to testimony that his opinion had changed.
Defendant next argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because documents such as
the complaint, warrant, and register of actions were not filed with the trial court. We disagree.
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v Harris,
224 Mich App 597, 599; 569 NW2d 525 (1997).
Defendant brought a motion to vacate his sentence below based on substantially this
same theory, and although the trial court acknowledged that the complaint filed in the record was
not properly stamped with the date when filed as required by MCR 8.119(C), such error was
harmless because the register of actions showed that the complaint and warrant were the first
documents filed in the case on April 7, 2003. Also of note, the original felony complaint and
warrant appear in the file and contain signatures of the assistant prosecutor, complaining witness,
and the district judge and are dated April 7, 2003. While defendant alleges that these documents
were missing from the file when he requested them, defendant has provided no support for his
assertion. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief based on this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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