GREGORY STEWART V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREGORY STEWART, BFC MANAGEMENT,
and SESI MOUSAD,
UNPUBLISHED
March 4, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V
CITY OF DETROIT, DETROIT DEPARTMENT
OF BUILDINGS AND SAFETY
ENGINEERING, DETROIT BOARD OF
ZONING APPEALS, and CITY HEAT
CABARET,
No. 276720
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-635434-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Jansen and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the circuit court’s order dismissing this case for want of
standing and denying a request for a preliminary injunction. We affirm. This case is being
decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant City Heat Cabaret is a business providing alcoholic beverages and topless
dancing. Plaintiff Stewart resides within 300 feet of that facility, and plaintiffs Mousad and BFC
Management operate a rival business nearby. According to plaintiffs, the owners of City Heat
obtained a permit from defendant Department of Buildings and Safety Engineering for extensive
renovations, and then substantially demolished the existing structure under a plan to rebuild with
considerably greater ground-level floor space. City Heat maintained that because it would also
be deleting its basement floor space from the plan, the renovations would actually result in an
overall reduction in commercial floor space.
Maintaining that the City Heat project threatened to intensify a nonconforming use,
plaintiffs attempted to persuade the municipal authorities to revoke the permit. Plaintiff Stewart
applied to the Board of Safety Engineering to submit the matter for review to defendant Board of
Zoning Appeals, but the Board of Safety Engineering refused accept the application on the
ground that the permit for renovations was not subject to review because no zoning ordinances
were implicated.
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Plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel revocation
of the permit or submission of the matter to the Board of Zoning Appeals, and seeking a
temporary restraining order enjoining further construction. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory and
additional injunctive relief. The circuit court dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs
lacked standing to maintain it.
“Whether a party has standing to bring an action involves a question of law that is
reviewed de novo.” In re KH, 469 Mich 621, 627-628; 677 NW2d 800 (2004). For a plaintiff to
have standing to press a civil claim, that plaintiff must have suffered an actual or imminent,
concrete and particularized, invasion of a legally protected interest. Lee v Macomb Co Bd of
Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 739-740; 629 NW2d 900 (2001); see also Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).
MCL 125.3607(1) provides, “Any party aggrieved by any order, determination, or
decision of any officer, agency, board, commission, zoning board of appeals, or legislative body
of any local unit of government” made in connection with a zoning matter “may obtain a review
in the circuit court . . . .” This Court has defined “aggrieved party” as a person “whose legal
right is invaded by an action, or whose pecuniary interest is directly or adversely affected by a
judgment or order.” Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 319; 686 NW2d 241 (2004) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In the zoning context, however, to be an aggrieved party
one must “allege and prove that he has suffered some special damages not common to other
property owners similarly situated.” Unger v Forest Home Twp, 65 Mich App 614, 617; 237
NW2d 582 (1975).
Plaintiffs assert that Stewart has standing simply because he owns a residence within 300
feet of the subject property. But plaintiffs support this assertion only by showing that Stewart,
because of his proximity to the project, was entitled by city ordinance to written notice of
hearings in connection with that property. Entitlement to notice of existing proceedings is not
the same as standing to initiate litigation.
Plaintiffs additionally argue that, “increased numbers of patrons to a rebuilt, refurbished
and/or expanded adult cabaret club, along with all activity related thereto, will damage Mr.
Stewart and his property in a manner disparate from the public at large.” However, general
concerns relating to increases in traffic, or reductions in property values, do not bring standing.
Unger, supra at 618. Further, plaintiffs’ comparison of Stewart’s interests to those of the public
at large is inapt; the proper comparison is between Stewart and “other property owners similarly
situated.”
Id. at 617.
Plaintiffs protest, without elaboration, that “reestablishment,
reconstruction, expansion and/or intensification will have a detrimental effect on the adjacent
residential neighborhood in which Mr. Stewart resides.” But plaintiffs merely present Stewart as
one member of an affected community—not as a person suffering special damages unshared by
his similarly situated neighbors. Id.
Concerning the remaining plaintiffs’ competing business, plaintiffs assert that the City
Heat project is “only blocks away” and that it will “directly affect” their business interests.
However, a person’s financial interest in the development of neighboring properties “is not the
kind of legally protectable property right or privilege, the threatened interference with which
grants standing to seek review.” Western Michigan Univ Bd of Trustees v Brink, 81 Mich App
99, 105; 265 NW2d 56 (1978).
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Because plaintiffs have failed to show that any of them is facing a concrete and
particularized invasion of a legally protected interest, or that any of them will suffer special
damages not common to similarly situated neighbors, the circuit court properly dismissed this
case on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.
Because plaintiffs have failed to show that that have standing, we need not separately
consider whether the circuit court erred in refusing to grant their request for a preliminary
injunction.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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