IN RE AMBER BLOCKER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AMBER BLOCKER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 17, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 279581
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-452810-NA
JACK JAY BLOCKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
This case involves the termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii) and §19b(3)(b)(i). The single issue addressed on this appeal is
whether the trial court erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights on the basis of a plea and
an abuse report which the trial court stated would be used specifically for the purpose of the trial
court obtaining jurisdiction. Because we conclude that the record does not clearly show that
respondent stipulated to the admission of the abuse report and plea to establish the statutory
grounds for termination, and the statutory grounds were not otherwise established by legally
admissible evidence, we are forced to reverse this matter and remand it to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In child protective proceedings, the court must first obtain jurisdiction over the children
which generally requires a determination whether the children have been neglected as defined in
MCL 712A.2(b)(1), or are without a fit home as defined in MCL 712A.2(b)(2). In re AMB, 248
Mich App 144, 167; 640 NW2d 262 (2001). Generally, the determination whether the
allegations in the petition are true, thus allowing the court to exercise jurisdiction, is made from
the respondent’s admissions to the allegations in the petition or from other evidence if the
respondent pleads no contest, or from evidence introduced at a trial if the respondent contests
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jurisdiction. In re PAP, 247 Mich App 148, 152-153; 640 NW2d 880 (2001); MCR 3.971; MCR
3.972; MCR 3.973(A).
Once jurisdiction is obtained, the case proceeds to disposition to determine what is to be
done with the child. MCR 3.973; MCL 712A.18. The court may make the child a temporary
ward and have the parents participate in services to facilitate reunification or it may make the
child a permanent ward by terminating parental rights. MCR 3.973(F); MCR 3.977(E).
The court may order termination of parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing if
(1) the original, or amended, petition contains a request for termination;
(2) at the trial or plea proceedings, the trier of fact finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the grounds for assumption of
jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b) have been established;
(3) at the initial disposition hearing, the court finds on the basis of clear
and convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the trial or
plea proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or
more facts alleged in the petition:
(a) are true, and
(b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), or (n);
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, in accordance with the
rules of evidence as provided in subrule (G)(2), that termination of parental rights
is not in the best interests of the child. [MCR 3.977(E).]
Petitioner argued, and the trial court found, that there was a statutory basis for
termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). Those grounds are:
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer
from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent.
(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse
included 1 or more of the following:
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***
(ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration,
or assault with intent to penetrate.
The petition contained a request for termination. The court determined on the basis of
respondent’s plea that it had jurisdiction over the child. It utilized the investigative report to
determine that it had jurisdiction on the basis of overall neglect1 and utilized the abuse report to
determine that it had jurisdiction on the basis of child abuse. The court ultimately ordered
termination because it found, again from the abuse report received into evidence at the plea
proceeding, that respondent had sexually abused Amber’s siblings. However, the abuse report
contained multiple layers of hearsay: it was an out-of-court assertion relating what the foster
father had told a case worker about what the boys had told him, all of which was considered by
the trial court for the truth of the matters asserted in contravention of MRE 801.
Petitioner does not dispute that the abuse report contained inadmissible hearsay, but
argues that respondent cannot challenge the court’s consideration of that evidence, having
stipulated to its admission at the plea proceeding. This would be true if the plea had been offered
for the purposes of establishing a statutory basis for termination, respondent could not now claim
error on the basis of evidence received pursuant to his own attorney’s stipulation. People v
Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001), lv den 465 Mich 934 (2001); People v
McCray, 210 Mich App 9, 14; 533 NW2d 359 (1995), lv den 451 Mich 902 (1996). However, it
is not clear from the record that the plea was taken for the purpose of establishing a statutory
basis for termination.
While not specifically authorized under the court rules, it is not unusual for a respondent
to enter a plea to a petition for termination, admitting to facts that establish a statutory basis for
termination and requesting a dispositional hearing for the purpose of showing that termination is
contrary to the child’s best interests. Petitioner is of the view that this is what transpired here.
The plea itself is tacit evidence that it was taken for purposes other than jurisdiction
because the court already had jurisdiction over all the children by virtue of the mother’s plea and,
therefore, it was unnecessary to hold a separate adjudicatory hearing with respect to respondent.
In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 205; 646 NW2d 506 (2002).
Certain remarks by respondent’s counsel also suggest that respondent was offering his
plea to the statutory grounds for termination. Before respondent offered his plea, his attorney
stated:
[M]y client, for judicial economy, is willing to enter a no contest plea.
But still vehemently denies the allegations as they pertain to criminal sexual
1
Assuming without deciding that the CPS investigative report established an alternate basis for
termination under § 19b(3)(j), that is irrelevant because the court ordered termination solely on
the basis of the sexual abuse of Amber’s siblings; it did not find that Amber was likely to be
harmed because respondent was unable to function as a proper parent.
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conduct. In order to avoid any type of embarrassment to, or subjecting to [sic]
children be it him taking the stand, or any type of testimony of that nature
providing criminal sexual conduct. He is willing to avoid that.
And in the mean time, if the Court accepts his no contest plea to both
environmental, and physical abuse that as it pertains to the various children, the
two boys, that he will be requesting a polygraph test . . . in regards to the criminal
sexual conduct aspect to vindicate him from any and all allegations of that nature.
I know usually it’s the other way around, but in order to expedite this
matter, in order to put it into motion we’ve agreed to proceed in that direction.
In addition, after the plea, respondent’s counsel noted that respondent wanted to take a
polygraph examination “for use regarding best interest.” These statements suggest that
respondent was entering a plea to the termination aspect of the petition and agreeing that the
court could use the otherwise inadmissible hearsay in the abuse report to establish one or more
grounds for termination with the understanding that he would attempt to persuade the court at the
dispositional hearing that the abuse did not in fact occur.
When taking the plea, however, the trial court advised respondent that “[t]he only thing
before me right at this moment is the jurisdictional question” and further advised that respondent
was giving up the right to have petitioner prove “jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
He would still have to in the future either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
temporary custody is necessary. Or by clear and convincing evidence that there’s grounds for
termination of parental rights[.]” (Emphasis added). Even at the dispositional hearing, the court
noted that it had only taken jurisdiction with respect to respondent at the plea proceeding. We
are thus bound by the explicit language used by the trial court in asserting that the plea
proceeding was only used for purpose of taking jurisdiction. Given the statements of the trial
court together with the fact that the parties did not expressly state the purpose of the plea on the
record, we conclude that respondent did not stipulate to admission of the abuse report for the
purpose of establishing a statutory basis for termination.
In light of our decision, it is unnecessary to consider respondent’s remaining issues.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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