IN RE PAYNE/COOPER/SEARCY/GEORGE/WILSON MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MARQUAYLA DESTINY
PAYNE, ADRIA JENISE COOPER, RAY’VEN
SAMONE COOPER, BRANDON JON’TE
DURRELL SEARCY, DENIA LASHAY
GEORGE, and KAYLA NESHELL WILSON,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 10, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277035
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-713589-NA
SHAYLA DENISE GEORGE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ADRIAN JAMES COOPER,
Respondent.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Shayla George (respondent) appeals as of right the family court’s order
terminating her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).1 We affirm.
Although Marquayla turned 18 years old before the filing of the supplemental petition,
the trial court denied respondent’s motions to dismiss Marquayla from the proceedings. We find
1
MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) was cited below as a possible additional ground for termination.
However, we need not determine whether termination would have been proper under
§ 19b(3)(a)(ii) or any other subsection because only one statutory ground is necessary to
terminate parental rights. In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
-1-
no error in this regard. Generally, the family court has jurisdiction over a minor in a neglect and
abuse matter until that minor’s eighteenth birthday. MCL 712A.2(b); MCL 712A.5. However,
the family court’s jurisdiction may be automatically extended for two years pursuant to MCL
712A.2a. While the family court had the discretion to release Marquayla from its jurisdiction by
court order, MCL 712A.2a(1), we find that the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to do
so.
We also conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint a
separate attorney for Marquayla. Under MCL 712A.17d(2), the family court may appoint a
separate attorney if the child’s wishes are inconsistent with the lawyer-guardian ad litem’s
determination of the child’s best interests. See also MCR 3.915(B)(2)(b). Use of the word
“may” in the relevant statutory language indicates that such an appointment is discretionary. See
Warda v City Council of Flushing, 472 Mich 326, 332; 696 NW2d 671 (2005). Although
Marquayla disagreed with the guardian ad litem’s determinations concerning her best interests,
the guardian ad litem adequately informed the court of the existence of and reasons for this
disagreement. Considering the particular facts of this case, the family court did not err by failing
to appoint a separate attorney for Marquayla. MCL 712A.17d(2).
Respondent correctly asserts that the family court abused its discretion when it prohibited
the admission of certain evidence regarding her actions after the date of the supplemental
petition. Because termination did not occur at the time of the initial disposition, but was instead
based on a supplemental petition, the court was free to receive and rely on any relevant and
material evidence. MCR 3.977(G)(2). The supplemental petition contained allegations
concerning respondent’s likely future behavior, and the trier of fact would have benefited from
current information about respondent’s actions, including evidence regarding actions that
occurred after the filing of the petition. The erroneous exclusion of such evidence, however, was
plainly harmless in light of the substantial evidence that respondent had made little or no effort to
address her substance abuse problems or to provide verification of her enrollment in a substance
abuse program.
Given the substantial evidence concerning respondent’s substance abuse, her failure to
rectify her addictions, and her neglect of the children, the family court did not clearly err by
terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). See In
re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 43-44; 549 NW2d 353 (1996); see also In re Shawboose, 175 Mich
App 637, 641; 438 NW2d 272 (1989). Nor did the family court err in ruling that termination was
not clearly contrary to the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 351-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Given the neglect inflicted upon the children, and
respondent’s own admission that she would not be able to presently care for the children, the
court did not clearly err in its best-interests determination.2
2
We note that the family court properly relied on psychological evaluations when making its
best-interests determination. Those evaluations did not contain mere conjecture, but rather
provided important insight into the emotional state of the children and how the children would be
impacted by termination.
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.