MARSHALL SLATER V CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARSHALL SLATER, Personal Representative
for the Estate of DAWN SLATER, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Plaintiff/Appellant-CrossAppellant,
v
No. 269019
Antrim Circuit Court
LC No. 04-008001-NO
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant,
and
CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN SHEAHAN,
Defendant/Appellee-CrossAppellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a judgment entered upon a jury verdict of no cause of action.
Defendant John Sheahan cross-appeals that judgment. We affirm.
Plaintiff and his wife, decedent Dawn Slater, were traveling on West Torch Lake Drive in
Rapid City when they came upon numerous tress branches that had fallen from a tree and were
obstructing the roadway. The weather was rainy and very windy. After clearing the roadway
and while returning to their vehicle, a large limb from the same tree broke off, fell onto a power
line, and then struck Slater in the head. Slater died the following day as a result of her injuries.
Plaintiff filed suit against numerous parties, including a negligence claim against
Consumers Power Company and a premises liability claim against defendant. Plaintiff alleged
-1-
that the tree was in Consumers’ easement and that Consumes breached its duty owed to the
public by failing to remove the dangerous limb from the tree. Plaintiff also alleged that the tree
was on defendant’s property and that defendant breached his duty owed to the public to maintain
his property in a safe condition by failing to remove the dangerous limb from the tree.
Consumers moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that the
undisputed facts showed that Consumers was not responsible for trimming the tree from which
the limb fell. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion, but rather filed a stipulated dismissal in
which the parties agreed to dismiss Consumers without prejudice. Plaintiff admitted at the
hearing on the motion that he lacked any evidence that Consumers was responsible for the tree.
In light of this evidence, the trial court declined to accept the stipulation to dismiss without
prejudice, and granted Consumer’s motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff later moved for relief from that order under MCR 2.612(C)(1). Plaintiff relied
on the affidavit of professional forester Stephen Alguire, who averred that Consumers might
have trimmed the tree fifteen years earlier and that the trimming might have contributed to the
decay of the tree. The trial court denied the motion after plaintiff acknowledged that he had no
direct evidence that Consumers had trimmed the tree.
Before trial commenced with regard to the claim against defendant, defendant informed
plaintiff that it intended to call John Korr, the survey department development manager for
Gosling Czubak Engineering Sciences, Inc., to authenticate a tree location survey that had been
submitted to the court approximately one year earlier. Defendant’s position was that the tree was
not on his property but, rather, within the road right-of-way. Plaintiff moved to strike Korr as a
witness because Korr was not listed on the expert witness list. After the trial court indicated that
it would allow Korr to testify, the court offered an adjournment to allow plaintiff to obtain an
independent survey and depose Korr. Plaintiff declined the offer.
After interviewing Korr on the third day of trial, plaintiff informed the trial court that he
had just learned that Korr did not conduct the measurements or prepare the survey, but rather had
verified the survey. The trial court then allowed Simmerson and Anderson, the individuals who
had taken the measurements and prepared the survey, to testify. Following the trial, the jury
found that the tree was located in the road right of way and, therefore, judgment was entered in
favor of defendant.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to accept the stipulated order to
dismiss Consumers without prejudice. We disagree. The decision whether to accept a stipulated
order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614
NW2d 183 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388;
719 NW2d 809 (2006). Resolution of this issue also involves discussing the trial court’s
decision on the motion for summary disposition, which is reviewed de novo. Collins v Comerica
Bank, 468 Mich 628, 631; 664 NW2d 713 (2003). A motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470
Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). Summary disposition should be granted under MCR
2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Babula v Roberson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995).
-2-
Here, the trial court decided not to accept the stipulated dismissal given the lack of
evidence to support a finding that Consumers could be liable for damages, as well as the need to
resolve the dispute.1 This decision was not outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.2 Additionally, the motion for summary disposition was properly granted in light of
plaintiff’s admission at that time that he had no evidence to suggest that Consumers was
responsible for the accident.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant plaintiff’s motion for
relief from that order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c) on the ground of misrepresentation. Plaintiff
admitted during the motion hearing that he lacked direct evidence to suggest that Consumers had
misrepresented that it had not previously trimmed the tree. Although plaintiff presented an
affidavit in support of his motion, a motion for reconsideration is used to correct “a palpable
error by which the court and the parties have been misled,” and not to present new evidence. See
MCR 2.119(F)(3); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 126 n 9; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Accordingly, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Korr,
Simmerson, and Anderson to testify. We disagree. The decision whether to allow the late
endorsement of an expert witness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Herrera v Levine, 176
Mich App 350, 355; 439 NW2d 378 (1989).
MCR 2.401(I)(2) provides that a trial court “may order that any witness not listed in
accordance with this rule will be prohibited from testifying at trial except upon good cause
shown.”3 Where justice so requires, a trial court should not be reluctant to allow an unlisted
1
Appellant relies on MCR 2.507(G) and interpreting case law to suggest that the stipulated
dismissal was binding on the trial court. See, e.g., Mikonczyk v Detroit Newspapers, Inc, 238
Mich App 347, 349; 605 NW2d 360 (1999) (reasoning that an agreement to settle a dispute is a
binding contract on the parties). MCR 2.507(G) governs agreements or consents between parties
with respect to whether they are binding on a particular party. However, the court rule and
interpreting case law do not require a trial court to accept a stipulated agreement, assuming MCR
2.504(A) does not apply. See also In re Ford Estate, 206 Mich App 705, 708; 522 NW2d 729
(1994) (reasoning that a stipulation of law between the parties was not binding because “the
parties to a civil matter cannot by their mere agreement supersede procedures and conditions set
forth in statutes or court rules”).
2
MCR 2.504(A)(1)(b), which allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without an order of the trial
court, does not apply here because that subrule applies when all the parties in the action agree to
dismiss the action. Here, the parties only agreed to dismiss certain claims against certain
defendants, not to dismiss the entire action against all defendants.
3
Appellant suggests that MCR 2.401(I)(2) limits a trial court’s discretion by requiring the late
endorsing party to provide good cause as to why the potential witness was not disclosed before
the witness can be permitted to testify. To the contrary, in using the term “may,” it is plain that a
trial court retains discretion to prevent an undisclosed witness from testifying unless good cause
is shown. In other words, the court is not mandated to act. See Phinney v Verbrugge, 222 Mich
App 513, 561; 564 NW2d 532 (1997) (reasoning that the term “may” in a statute ordinarily
indicates a permissive provision).
-3-
witness to testify. Pastrick v General Tel Co of Michigan and Sub-Surface Constr Co, 162 Mich
App 243, 245; 412 NW2d 279 (1987). “[J]ustice is best served where an unlisted witness can be
permitted to testify while the interests of the opposing party are adequately protected,” because
neither party is prejudiced and “the jury is afforded a fuller development of the facts surrounding
the case.” Id. at 246. Generally, a trial court should set appropriate conditions to prevent
prejudice and to enable the opposing party to meet the testimony of the new witness. Id.
The trial court acknowledged that plaintiff had not deposed Korr, but noted that whether
the tree was located on plaintiff’s property or in the road right-of-way were critical factual
disputes. The court also noted that the survey was disclosed to plaintiff approximately a year
before trial commenced. The court offered plaintiff an adjournment to obtain an independent
survey and to depose Korr. Plaintiff would have been able to avoid any actual prejudice if he
would have accepted the trial court’s offer. Consequently, no abuse of discretion occurred.4
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
4
In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. In any event, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by denying the motion, because defendant failed to provide admissible evidence to
support the first and second arguments within the motion and because the premises liability
claim regarding argument three is not so clearly unenforceable that subsequent factual
development would not support the claim.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.