IN RE MCDUEL MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAMIYKAL McDUEL, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 30, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277364
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-050182-NA
BRYAN LEE COLEMAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
STEPHANIE MONIQUE McDUEL and
EMMANUEL SORIANO,
Respondents.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights to his minor child, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence established to support
termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights pursuant to § § (3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). MCR
3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). At the time Jamiykal
came into care, respondent-appellant did not have adequate housing, he was unemployed, and he
was on parole. During the 14 months the minor child was in care, respondent-appellant made no
effort to comply with the treatment plan. He went to one parenting class and then completely
abandoned the program. He was requested to do nine urine screens but completed none. He did
not submit to the psychological or substance abuse evaluations. Although there was a period
where he claimed to have employment, respondent-appellant never provided the requested
verification. Six months after Jamiykal came into care, respondent-appellant was arrested and
jailed on two criminal offenses. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent-appellant was
still incarcerated and had a cocaine possession charge pending. Considering this drug-related
offense in conjunction with his refusal to participate in services, it is clear that respondent had
not adequately addressed his substance abuse issues. Finally, respondent-appellant did not have
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employment or suitable housing. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent-appellant
was not in a position to care for his son.
Further, there was no evidence that conditions would be rectified within a reasonable
time. No evidence of respondent-appellant’s release date was offered at the termination hearing,
although counsel represented it was relatively soon. Even assuming that respondent-appellant
was going to be released imminently, there was nothing to support a finding that he would be in
a position to parent his child within a reasonable time. All indicators suggested that respondentappellant was not motivated to change. For the six months that he was not incarcerated, he made
no effort. He then committed additional crimes, not only while he was already on parole for
earlier offenses but also while he was being strictly scrutinized by the system to ascertain his
suitability to care for his son. He did not make any real effort, other than one letter, to maintain
contact with his son and petitioner. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err
when it found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
Respondent-appellant also contends that the statutory grounds for termination were not
established because petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to assist him toward
reunification. We disagree. Generally, when a child is removed from a parent's custody,
petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child's
removal by adopting a service plan. MCL 712A.18(f)(1), (2), and (4). Respondent-appellant
specifically notes the trial court’s admonishment of the foster mother for missing parenting time
and argues that this illustrates his position. We note that the foster mother’s transportation issue
was addressed promptly by the court and petitioner, that petitioner provided make-up visits but
respondent-appellant was incarcerated at the time, and, in any event, respondent-appellant was
not held responsible for visits that were missed due to no fault of his own. Under these
circumstances, this one temporary lapse in services was not so egregious as to erase the efforts
made on respondent-appellant’s behalf. For approximately six months before his incarceration,
respondent-appellant was provided multiple services in an effort toward reunification.
Respondent-appellant failed to participate and/or complete any of the services provided. While
respondent-appellant was jailed, he sent one letter to his caseworker expressing his desire to plan
for his child, and a caseworker met with him at the jail to explain the terms of the parent-agency
agreement. Respondent-appellant made no further attempts to contact the caseworker. Based
upon this record, it cannot be said that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to assist
respondent-appellant toward reunification.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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