PEOPLE OF MI V TERRANCE LAMAR RAWLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 27, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271472
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 05-017302-FC
TERRANCE LAMAR RAWLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Hoekstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of kidnapping, MCL 750.349,
armed robbery, MCL 750.529, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, possession of a firearm by a person
convicted of a felony, MCL 750.224f, and two counts each of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (sexual penetration in circumstances involving commission of
another felony) and MCL 750.520b(1)(e) (sexual penetration by an actor armed with a weapon).
Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 25
to 50 years’ imprisonment for the kidnapping, armed robbery, and criminal sexual conduct
convictions, and five to ten years’ imprisonment for the carrying a concealed weapon and felon
in possession convictions, each to be served consecutively to a term of two years’ imprisonment
for the felony-firearm conviction. Because double jeopardy protections preclude defendant’s
conviction and sentence on four separate counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under the
facts of this case, we vacate two of his convictions and sentences for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct and remand this matter to the trial court for modification of the judgment of sentence. In
all other respects, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against an
African-American juror on the basis of race in violation of Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S
Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). We disagree and conclude that the trial court properly found that
the prosecutor dismissed the juror for credible, race-neutral reasons.
A peremptory challenge may not be used to strike a juror on the basis of race because it is
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 282; 702 NW2d 128
(2005), citing Batson, supra at 89, 96-98. A three-step process is involved in determining
whether a party improperly exercised a peremptory challenge. Bell, supra.
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First, there must be a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race. To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, the opponent of the
challenge must show that: (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial
group; (2) peremptory challenges are being exercised to exclude members of a
certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) the circumstances raise an
inference that the exclusion was based on race. The Batson Court directed trial
courts to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether a prima facie
showing has been made. [Id. at 282-283. (citations omitted).]
“Second, if the trial court determines that a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts
to the proponent of the peremptory challenge to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the
strike.” People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 337; 701 NW2d 715 (2005), citing Batson, supra at 97.
The proponent need not make “‘an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.’” Knight,
supra, quoting Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995).
“Rather, the issue is whether the proponent’s explanation is facially valid as a matter of law.”
Knight, supra, citing Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 360; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395
(1991) (plurality opinion). “Finally, if the proponent provides a race-neutral explanation as a
matter of law, the trial court must then determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a
pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination.”
Knight, supra at 337-338, citing Batson, supra at 98.
In the present case, the trial court initially concluded that defendant made a prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination and that the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral
explanation for the strike. On appeal, neither party challenges these findings by the trial court.
Rather, defendant’s contention on appeal is focused on the third step of Batson, i.e., the trial
court’s determinations whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the
opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination. This Court reviews a trial
court’s determinations in these regards for clear error. Knight, supra at 344-345.
The lower court record reveals that the prosecutor articulated three race-neutral reasons
for dismissing the challenged juror. First, the prosecutor noted that the challenged juror was
relatively young and, in a case involving a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, a
younger person might have difficulty handling the details of the case and interacting with her
fellow veniremembers in a mature fashion. Second, the prosecutor noted that the challenged
juror gave distinct and “tightlipped” answers to her questions, giving the prosecutor the
impression that the challenged juror would not open up to the other jurors and “could possibly be
a bit of a lone wolf.” Third, the prosecutor indicated that she watched the challenged juror enter
the courtroom and noted that the challenged juror failed to make eye contact or engage her when
she asked questions during voir dire.
Following the prosecutor’s argument relating to her race-neutral reasons for striking the
challenged juror, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s reasons were insufficient.
Defense counsel noted that other young female jurors, who were white, were still present on the
jury. The trial court subsequently found that the prosecutor’s challenge of the challenged juror
was not a pretext and that defendant had failed to show purposeful discrimination. The trial
court partially based its decision on a comparison of the reasons the prosecutor dismissed two
other African-American jurors, noting that a lack of nonverbal communication and a subjective
feeling about a particular juror were sufficient race-neutral explanations for striking a juror.
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We conclude that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. “The United
States Supreme Court has observed that [d]eference to trial court findings on the issue of
discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because . . . the finding largely will
turn on evaluation of credibility.” Knight, supra at 344 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The prosecutor’s proffered reasons for dismissing the challenged juror were sufficient
and race-neutral. Further, there is little evidence in the lower court record to suggest to this
Court that the prosecutor’s reasons were a pretext. “[T]he best evidence” regarding the reasons
for dismissing a juror “often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.
As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on
demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Id. at 345 n 13.
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that the trial court committed clear error.
Next, defendant argues that his convictions and sentences for four counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct violate principles of double jeopardy. We agree. The United States and
Michigan Constitutions protect against multiple punishments for the same offense. People v
Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574-575; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). Here, evidence of only two instances of
sexual penetration, both of which occurred during the commission of the kidnapping and while
defendant was armed, were introduced by the prosecution at trial. The prosecution rightly
concedes that because a single act of penetration accompanied by multiple aggravating
circumstances cannot result in multiple convictions and sentences under MCL 750.520b,
defendant could properly be convicted of only two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. See People v Johnson, 406 Mich 320, 331; 279 NW2d 534 (1979). Accordingly, we
vacate two of defendant’s convictions and sentences for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and
remand this case for amendment of the judgment of sentence to specify that defendant stands
convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, each supported by two
alternative theories, MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (sexual penetration in circumstances involving
commission of another felony) and MCL 750.520b(1)(e) (sexual penetration by an actor armed
with a weapon).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for correction of the judgment of
sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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