PEOPLE OF MI V BILLY EMMET BRANDOW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269628
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 05-052046-FC
BILLY EMMET BRANDOW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (person under the age of 13), and two counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (person under the age of
13). The trial court sentenced defendant, as an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.12, to
32 to 57 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-I conviction, and to concurrent terms of 15 to 35
years’ imprisonment for each of his CSC-II convictions. Defendant now appeals his convictions
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions stemmed from allegations that he engaged in sexual contact with
his girlfriend’s ten-year-old daughter, and that he engaged in sexual contact and digital vaginal
penetration with his cousin’s eight-year-old daughter. The evidence reveals that the criminal
sexual conduct occurred at the home of defendant’s cousin and that defendant was intoxicated at
the time. Defendant’s aunt testified at trial that defendant admitted to her that he engaged in
criminal sexual conduct with the victims. During a police interrogation, defendant stated several
times that it was “very possible” that he committed the offenses, and that it was “unlikely” that
anyone else committed the offenses. He said that he was remorseful “[b]ecause all this
happened, you know, it’s my fault.” He stated that “[i]f it happened, it’s a one time thing.” He
admitted, however, that he had a problem with alcohol, that he may have a sexual problem, and
that he may need “[h]elp with the little girls.”
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.
Defendant preserved this issue by moving for a mistrial below, after a witness made a reference
to defendant’s prior incarceration at trial. People v Alter, 255 Mich App 194, 205; 659 NW2d
667 (2003). We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 194; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). “A trial court
should grant a mistrial ‘only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant
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and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.’ ” Id. at 195, quoting People v Ortiz-Kehoe, 237 Mich
App 508, 514; 603 NW2d 802 (1999).
References to a defendant’s prior incarceration are generally inadmissible. People v Hatt,
384 Mich 302, 307; 181 NW2d 912 (1970); People v Fleish, 321 Mich 443, 461; 32 NW2d 700
(1948). “It is well settled that evidence of a prior conviction may be prejudicial to the accused,
the danger being that the jury ‘will misuse prior conviction evidence by focusing on the
defendant’s general bad character . . . .’” People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176
(1999), quoting People v Allen, 429 Mich 558, 569; 420 NW2d 499 (1988). “However, not
every instance of mention before a jury of some inappropriate subject matter warrants a
mistrial.” Griffin, supra. “[A]n unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not
grounds for the granting of a mistrial.” People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d
497 (1995).
At trial, defendant’s cousin testified that defendant and his girlfriend consumed alcohol at
her house on the night that the criminal sexual conduct occurred. She testified that they “had
wanted to go to the bar but [she] didn’t want them to leave because they had already been
drinking and [she] didn’t want him to go back to prison.” Defendant moved for a mistrial,
arguing that, even if the reference to his prior incarceration was inadvertent, it impermissibly
suggested that his character was reprehensible and, thus, it “contaminated the jury.” The trial
court denied defendant’s motion and instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, witnesses sometimes say things which are not
admissible as evidence. Any prior record is not admissible in these proceedings
because it is not relevant to the proceedings. For this reason I’m striking the last
answer and ordering you not to consider it as evidence. Can you all promise me
that you’ll do that? All right. Very well.
The improper comment by the witness was not grounds for a mistrial. Defendant
conceded at trial that the mention of defendant’s prior incarceration was inadvertent and was not
elicited by the prosecutor’s questioning. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor
“clearly anticipated or hoped for” the answer, or that the answer was “calculated to prejudice the
minds of the jurors against the defendant.” Cf. People v Greenway, 365 Mich 547, 551; 114
NW2d 188 (1962). The record reflects that the reference to defendant’s prior incarceration was
volunteered by the witness in response to a proper question. Moreover, the witness did not
know, and was not in a position to know, that her testimony was improper. Haywood, supra at
228.
Furthermore, defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the witness’s
improper comment. After the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the witness’s reference
to defendant’s prior incarceration, the prosecutor did not pursue the matter further. Moreover,
the trial court directed the jury, in its final instructions, not to consider any excluded evidence or
stricken testimony, and to decide the case based only on the properly admitted evidence. “Jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”
Bauder, supra at 195 (citations omitted).
“[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
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‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
‘devastating’ to the defendant.” [People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 581; 628
NW2d 502 (2001), quoting Greer v Miller, 483 US 756; 107 S Ct 3102; 97 L Ed
2d 618 (1987).]
In this case, defendant failed to establish that there was an overwhelming probability that the jury
would be unable to follow the trial court’s instructions, or that there was a strong likelihood that
the evidence would have a devastating effect on defendant. And, on the record before us, we do
not find that defendant was prejudiced by the brief, incidental comment such that a mistrial was
warranted. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a
mistrial.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
We disagree.
Defendant did not raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct below. Thus, this issue is
unpreserved. We review unpreserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting
the defendant’s substantial rights. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 630; 709 NW2d 595
(2005). “Reversal is warranted only when the error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or when the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v Leshaj, 249 Mich App 417, 419; 641 NW2d 872
(2002). “Thus, where a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect we will
not find error requiring reversal.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 449; 669 NW2d 818
(2003).
At trial, defendant’s girlfriend testified that, initially, she was unsure whether her
daughter’s allegations against defendant were true because she “didn’t think he was like that.”
The prosecutor asked her, “At some point in time did you kind of think that perhaps what [your
daughter] told you was true?” She responded, “Yes.” Defense counsel objected on relevance
grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. Defendant now argues that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct when he elicited the testimony because it is impermissible for a witness
to testify concerning the credibility of another witness. This issue is as much an evidentiary
issue as it is a prosecutorial misconduct issue; therefore, we focus our review on whether the
prosecutor elicited the testimony in good faith. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 70-71; 732
NW2d 546 (2007). A prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit evidence does not constitute
misconduct. Id. at 70.
We agree that, arguably, the prosecutor’s question was improper. “It is generally
improper for a witness to comment or provide an opinion on the credibility of another witness
because credibility matters are to be determined by the jury.” Id. at 71. See also People v
Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 17; 378 NW2d 432 (1985). However, we do not agree that the error
resulted in unfair prejudice to defendant. In light of the other evidence introduced at trial,
particularly defendant’s own statements, neither the question posed by the prosecutor, nor the
witness’s response to the question, were “of a character likely to have prejudiced defendant’s
rights, or to have influenced the jury improperly.” People v Morehouse, 328 Mich 689, 693; 44
NW2d 830 (1950). Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were to decide
which witnesses to believe, and that they were free to believe all, none or part of any person’s
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testimony. “It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v
Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). And, we find that the trial court’s
instruction was sufficient to eliminate any prejudice that might have resulted from the
prosecutor’s question. See Buckey, supra at 17-18. Reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct
is not warranted. Ackerman, supra at 449.
Defendant next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel below.
“Because no Ginther hearing was held, People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443; 212 NW2d
922 (1973), review is limited to errors apparent on the record.” People v Jordan, 275 Mich App
____; ____ NW2d ____ (Docket No. 267152, issued April 19, 2007), slip op at 5.
“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must also overcome
the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2 315 (1991),
citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984). [People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).]
“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed” and “[t]he defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of
the implications of rejecting his plea offer and proceeding to trial. However, defense counsel
assured the trial court that he had so advised defendant, and that defendant still wanted to
proceed to trial. Nothing in the record suggests that trial counsel failed to properly explain to
defendant the possible consequences of either accepting the offer or going to trial. Because the
record does not support defendant’s allegation, defendant failed to establish that defense counsel
was ineffective. See People v McCrady, 213 Mich App 474, 479-480; 540 NW2d 718 (1995).
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an opening
statement at trial. The decision to waive an opening statement is a matter of trial strategy,
People v Calhoun, 178 Mich App 517, 524; 444 NW2d 232 (1989), and “can rarely, if ever, be
the basis for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” People v Pawelczak, 125
Mich App 231, 242; 336 NW2d 453 (1983). Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that
counsel’s decision not to present an opening statement constituted sound trial strategy. Rockey,
supra.
Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he was unprepared
for trial and because he failed to investigate or interview any witnesses. A defendant has the
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burden of establishing the factual predicate for her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Defendant has failed to present any facts
to support this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, he has failed to establish
any prejudice resulting from the alleged lack of preparation. “When making a claim of defense
counsel’s unpreparedness, a defendant is required to show prejudice resulting from this alleged
lack of preparation.” People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636, 640; 459 NW2d 80 (1990).
Defendant additionally claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
defendant’s cousin, Alan Brandow, to testify at trial. Alan was present when defendant was
confronted by the victims’ parents regarding the allegations of sexual abuse. The record reflects
that defense counsel did not subpoena Alan before trial because he was named on the
prosecutor’s witness list. At trial, the prosecutor indicated that a detective attempted to interview
Alan but that Alan was mentally challenged and “he didn’t offer really anything.” The trial court
ordered that Alan be produced before the end of the trial so defense counsel could make an
independent judgment whether to call Alan as a witness at trial. The record is silent regarding
any conversation that may have occurred between defense counsel and Alan; however, nothing
indicates that defense counsel was deprived of the opportunity to speak with Alan. The simple
fact that defense counsel did not call Alan to testify at trial is insufficient to establish that defense
counsel was ineffective. It is well established that “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to
present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and
this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy.”
People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). Moreover, other than the
defendant’s statements in his brief on appeal, nothing before this Court suggests that Alan’s
testimony would have benefited defendant had he been called to testify at trial. There is no error
apparent on the record with respect to defense counsel’s decision not to call Alan as a witness at
trial. See People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 426-427, 430; 656 NW2d 866 (2002).
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert
witness to testify that the eight-year-old victim experienced redness and irritation in her vaginal
area because of a bedwetting problem. However, the decision not to present expert testimony at
trial “is presumed to be a permissible exercise of trial strategy.” People v Cooper, 236 Mich
App 643, 658; 601 NW2d 409 (1999). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687
NW2d 342 (2004). On the record before us, there is no evidence to support that the decision not
to call an expert was anything but sound trial strategy. We note that, on appeal, defendant offers
no proof that an expert witness would have testified favorably if called by the defense.
Accordingly, defendant has not established the factual predicate for his claim, Hoag, supra.
Moreover, he has failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error,
the result of the proceedings would have been different. Ackerman, supra at 455-456.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
testimony concerning statements that defendant made when he was confronted with the victims’
allegations of sexual abuse. Defendant has failed to cite any authority to support his conclusion
that the challenged testimony was inadmissible, and thus, necessarily subject to a valid objection.
“This Court will not search for authority to support a party’s position.” People v Smielewski, 214
Mich App 55, 64 n 10; 542 NW2d 293 (1995). Further, defendant carries the burden to
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. Knapp,
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supra. It is well established that defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile
objection. McGhee, supra at 627. Defendant has not established that any proposed objection to
the challenged testimony would have been valid. Thus, he has not met his burden of
demonstrating that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress the statements that he made to police detectives concerning the allegations of sexual
abuse. He also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the detectives’
testimony at trial concerning the statements that defendant made during the interrogation.
Statements of an accused made during a custodial interrogation are admissible if the prosecution
can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements were made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 707; 703 NW2d 204 (2005),
citing Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Several
factors are to be considered when evaluating a statement for voluntariness. See People v
Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988); People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 564;
675 NW2d 863 (2003). Nothing in the record supports a finding that defendant’s statements to
police in this case were involuntary or otherwise subject to suppression. The record revealed that
defendant was provided with his Miranda rights, and nothing supports that he did not fully
understand those rights and freely choose to waive them. On the record before us, the statements
were therefore properly admitted at trial. Because a motion to suppress would have been futile,
defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue such a motion. People v Snider, 239
Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). “Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be
predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion.” People v Riley (After
Remand), 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury
instruction “which pertained to the reasonable doubt of the [victims’] credibility [sic], as to their
allegations [sic].” However, the trial court instructed the jury both with regard to reasonable
doubt and with regard to the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, throughout defense counsel’s
closing argument, he questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and argued that
there was reasonable doubt regarding defendant’s guilt. Defendant cannot overcome the
presumption that defense counsel’s decision not to request an additional instruction was sound
trial strategy. See People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444-445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999) (Defendant did not overcome the presumption that the failure to request a certain
instruction was not trial strategy and thus, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel). Further, defendant failed to show the existence of a reasonable probability that, had
counsel requested the instruction, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Knapp,
supra.
Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
defendant’s appearance at trial in jail clothing. A defendant has a due process right to be dressed
in civilian clothing at trial. People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 151-152; 505 NW2d 889
(1993). Where a defendant makes a timely request to wear civilian clothing, the trial court must
grant the request. Id. at 151. Before the jury was impaneled in this case, defendant advised the
court that he was expecting his uncle to bring a shirt for him to wear during the trial and that the
clothing was “on the way.” The record indicates that defendant’s property at the jail consisted of
one pair of shorts and that no other clothing was available to defendant when the trial began.
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The trial court noted that efforts were made “to get him dressed out today” and that the sheriff
did not decline to allow defendant to wear civilian clothes. Defense counsel’s reason not to
pursue defendant’s right to be tried in civilian clothing is unclear from the record. Even if
counsel should have pursued this issue, defendant has failed to show a reasonable probability
that the result of trial would have been different if defense counsel pursued this issue and secured
civilian clothes. Knapp, supra. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
must fail. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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