PEOPLE OF MI V SELET DERADO STANLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272836
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-005433-01
SELET DERADO STANLEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecutor appeals as of right from a circuit court order dismissing this case
following the grant of defendant’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii),
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The evidence was found during the execution of a
search warrant at an apartment on Senator Street in Detroit. The apartment was one of four in a
two-story building. The warrant identified the upper left apartment as “7359 Senator upper
apartment” and accurately described the building. As it turned out, each apartment had a
separate street address and the upper left unit was actually 7363 Senator. Defendant challenged
the validity of the warrant because it contained an incorrect address. The trial court agreed that
the warrant was invalid and suppressed the evidence.
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing for clear error
but reviews the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress de novo. People v Marcus Davis, 250
Mich App 357, 362; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). The trial court’s factual findings are clearly
erroneous if, after review of the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). The
application of the exclusionary rule is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v
Custer, 465 Mich 319, 326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).
A search warrant must “designate and describe the house or building or other location or
place to be searched . . . .” MCL 780.654(1).
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The test for determining whether the description in the warrant is
sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement is whether “the description is
such that the officers with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain
and identify the place intended.” The fourth amendment safeguard is designed to
require a description that particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so
as to exclude all others. Thus, the test for determining the sufficiency of the
description of the place to be searched is (1) whether the place to be searched is
described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer to locate
and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and (2) whether there is any
reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched. The
requirement is designed to avoid the risk of the wrong property being searched or
seized. [People v Hampton, 237 Mich App 143, 150-151; 603 NW2d 270 (1999)
(citations omitted).]
Both the description in the affidavit of the property to be searched and the relevant
information known to the officers executing the warrant can be relied upon to validate the
warrant. Id. at 154.
In this case, the warrant identified the right building in which the apartment to be
searched was located and accurately described the structure. The building itself contained four
apartments and was marked with two street numbers, 7359 and 7365. Two mailboxes were hung
on the left side of the entryway, the side marked 7359, and two mailboxes were hung on the right
side of the entryway, the side marked 7365. Although two of the four individual mailboxes bore
address numbers that did not appear on the building, the labels were too small to be read from
the street, and the affiant, Officer Phillip Rodriguez, testified that he did not go up or into the
building before obtaining the warrant to avoid revealing his interest in it. Rodriguez further
testified that the upper left apartment was the target of the investigation. The inhabitant was
known only as Rod, so there was no way to verify the address via the occupant’s name. In light
of the numbers above the door, Rodriguez believed that the two apartments on the left
corresponded to the 7359 address. He thus identified the upper left apartment as the upper unit
of 7359 Senator. Rodriguez, who knew which apartment was to be searched, participated in the
execution of the warrant, making it unlikely that the wrong apartment would be searched, and the
officers did in fact enter the targeted apartment. Taking the warrant description together with
Rodriguez’s knowledge regarding the premises, the location was described sufficiently to enable
the officers to locate the premises to be searched and thus the mistake with regard to the actual
address did not render the search warrant invalid. People v Westra, 445 Mich 284, 286; 517
NW2d 734 (1994); Hampton, supra. Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the charges. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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