PEOPLE OF MI V LAWRENCE FRANK COBB
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 28, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269880
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-203780-FH
LAWRENCE FRANK COBB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and White and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of attempting, preparing, or conspiring to
arrange for child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2), and using the Internet to
communicate with another to commit or attempt to commit child sexually abusive activity, MCL
750.145d(1)(a) and (2)(f). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of two to twenty years
for each count. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
I
Defendant’s convictions arise from his communication with James May, a special agent
for the Michigan Attorney General’s Office, in an Internet adult chat room, while Agent May
was conducting an undercover investigation of Internet crimes. The chat room enables a person
to engage in an instant messaging conversation with another user of the chat room. A user can
also send offline messages, which operate similar to Internet e-mail by allowing a person to send
a message to another that is accessible at a later time.
Agent May created a fictitious female profile for use in the chat room, which included
such information as hobbies and interests, and then waited for someone to contact him. On June
21, 2005, Agent May was contacted by someone using “python40mich” as a screen name. Agent
May viewed python40mich’s profile, which indicated that python40mich was a 40-year-old male
whose hobby was finding naughty girls to play with. Although Agent May’s fictitious profile
did not contain an age, he indicated in the chat that he was a 14-year-old girl. Python40mich was
sexually explicit in the chat, making various lewd statements to arrange a meeting with Agent
May’s fictitious persona to engage in sexual acts. Python40mich also inquired whether he was
chatting with a police officer and requested an opportunity for a phone conversation before
meeting at a shopping mall.
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Michigan State Police Detective Rebecca MacArthur posed as Agent May’s fictitious
persona for purposes of calling the phone number provided by python40mich. Detective
MacArthur did not disguise her voice, but tried to sound immature when discussing the planned
meeting for the next day. Agent May received an offline message from python40mich on the
next day in which python40mich indicated that he could not wait for the meeting. Later that day,
Agent May went to the shopping mall where the meeting was scheduled. He recognized
defendant from his picture in the chat room profile. After watching defendant in the parking lot,
Agent May and other agents arrested defendant.
At trial, defendant presented an abandonment defense to the charge that he attempted to
arrange for child sexual abusive activity. Further, defendant testified that he thought that he was
meeting an adult at the shopping mall, who had pretended to be a younger girl in the June 21,
2005, chat. He believed that terminology used in the chat was beyond the understanding or
expected conversation of a 14-year-old girl, and viewed their chat as a total fantasy. Further, he
concluded, based on his brief phone conversation to confirm the meeting, that he was speaking
with an adult female. He intended that they would have lunch together when they met.
II
Defendant first claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by
defense counsel’s stipulation to the admission of a transcript of his chat room conversation with
Agent May. Defendant asserts that most of the transcript should have been redacted to exclude
irrelevant and prejudicial statements. Additionally, he asserts that the court erred in permitting
Agent May and the female detective to play the roles of defendant and the alleged minor and
read the transcript to the jury.
A defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
action constituted sound trial strategy under the circumstances. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281,
302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Further, defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different and the attendant
proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Rodgers, supra at 714 (emphasis in
original).
Defendant has failed to establish either the deficient performance or the prejudice
necessary to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although defendant claims
that most statements in the chat transcript should have been excluded, his failure to identify the
portions that should have been excluded under MRE 401 or MRE 403 alone could preclude
relief. An appellant may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject
his or her position. People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260; 457 NW2d 136 (1990). In any
event, all evidence offered by the parties is prejudicial to some extent. Waknin v Chamberlain,
467 Mich 329, 334; 653 NW2d 176 (2002). Evidence is excludable under MRE 403 if the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.
Under the rule of completeness, the entire transcript of defendant’s Internet chat with Agent May
had probative value based on the basic premise that “a thought or act cannot be accurately
understood without considering the entire context and content in which the thought was
expressed.” People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 215; 462 NW2d 1 (1990). Indeed, defense
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counsel’s apparent trial strategy, as evidenced by his request in closing argument that the jury
consider the “totality of the chat,” was for the jury to receive the entire transcript so that it could
evaluate defendant’s claim that he believed that he was having a chat with an adult.
Limiting our review to the record, defendant has not overcome the presumption that
defense counsel’s stipulation to admit the entire transcript was sound trial strategy under the
circumstances. A failed strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Turning to defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to overrule defense
counsel’s objection to having the transcript read to the jury, we agree with the prosecutor’s
argument that this claim does not fall within the ambit of defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In general, an issue is not properly preserved for appeal unless it is set
forth in the statement of the question presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Brown, 239 Mich
App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). Nonetheless, because this Court is empowered to
overlook defendant’s failure to properly present this issue for appellate consideration, Health
Care Ass’n Worker’s Compensation v Dir of Bureau of Worker’s Compensation, 265 Mich App
236, 243; 694 NW2d 761 (2005), we shall consider defendant’s claim that the manner in which
the chat was published to the jury created a danger of unfair prejudice.
In general, we review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Before opening statements at trial,
defense counsel objected to the chat being read to the jury on the ground that it was not meant to
be spoken out loud and having it read to the jury would severely prejudice defendant’s position.
The trial court ruled that it could be read through a witness. Later, after introducing a transcript
of the chat during Agent May’s testimony, the prosecutor proposed that Agent May read the part
attributed to his fictitious persona and that Detective MacArthur read the part attributable to
defendant’s screen name, python40mich. Defense counsel replied that he had no objection, but
requested that the jury be advised that Detective MacArthur would be testifying as the speaker in
the phone conversation with defendant. While Agent May and Detective MacArthur were
reading the chat, defense counsel did not raise any objection, other than to object when Agent
May briefly interrupted the reading of the chat to explain the meaning of an “ASL” term that he
used in the chat. The trial court overruled the objection because Agent May was testifying as a
witness.
In general, a party must timely object, stating the specific ground for objection. MRE
103(a)(1). The purpose of an objection is to give the trial court an opportunity to cure the error.
People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). A proper MRE 403 determination
can best be “left to a contemporaneous assessment of the presentation, credibility, and effect of
testimony.” People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 71; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). We agree
with defendant’s claim on appeal that the inflection of a witness’s voice can affect the meaning
of written words. See United States v McMillan, 508 F2d 101, 106 (CA 8, 1974) (discussing the
admissibility of a transcript of tape recordings). Further, the court could have admitted the
transcript as an exhibit and permitted the jury to read it. Nevertheless, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s decision to overrule the specific objection made at trial to having
the transcript of the chat read to the jury. If defendant believed that Agent May and Detective
MacArthur were reading the chat with prejudicial inflection, defendant should have timely and
specifically objected on this ground. Because defendant did not do so, we conclude that he failed
to preserve this issue for appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); see Canales v State, 98 SW3d 690, 699 (Tex
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App, 2003) (the court found nothing to review where the trial court had overruled a defendant’s
objection, before a letter was read to the jury, and the defendant did not further object to any
unfairly prejudicial inflection when the letter was read). Further, limiting our review to the
record, we find no plain error. Therefore, reversal on this ground is not warranted. MRE 103(d);
Jones, supra at 355.
III
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his request to have the jury
instructed on accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child less than 16 years of age, MCL 750.145a,
as a necessarily included lesser offense to the principal charge under MCL 750.145c(2). The
trial court denied the request on the ground that defendant’s defense was that he never believed
that Agent May’s fictitious persona was under 16 years old. The trial court concluded that there
was no evidence to support an instruction on MCL 750.145a. The trial court later added that the
requested instruction was improper because the two offenses contain different elements and
MCL 750.145a was not necessarily a lesser included offense of MCL 750.145c(2), even if there
was evidence to support the instruction.
A lesser offense instruction is only appropriate if the lesser offense is necessarily
included in the greater offense. MCL 768.32; People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 626; 685 NW2d
657 (2004); People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). All elements of the
lesser offense must be included in the greater offense, and a rational view of the evidence must
support the instruction. Nickens, supra at 626. Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a
necessarily included instruction is de novo. People Walls, 265 Mich App 642, 644; 697 NW2d
535 (2005).
Both MCL 750.145a and MCL 750.145c(2) can be committed in different ways. As
amended by 2002 PA 45, MCL 750.145a provides:
A person who accosts, entices, or solicits a child less than 16 years of age,
regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or knows the
actual age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a child less
than 16 years of age with the intent to induce or force that child or individual to
commit an immoral act, to submit to an act of sexual intercourse or an act of gross
indecency, or to any other act of depravity or delinquency, or who encourages a
child less than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows the
individual is a child or knows the actual age of the child, or an individual whom
he or she believes is a child less than 16 years of age to engage in any of those
acts is guilty of a felony . . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Although defendant defended against the charge in MCL 750.145c(2) on the ground that
he believed that Agent May’s fictitious persona was an adult, and offered his own testimony in
support of his claim, a rational view of the chat room conversation supports an inference that
defendant believed that Agent May’s fictitious persona was less than 16 years of age.
Defendant’s only indicated concern in the chat was that he might be conversing with a police
officer. Nonetheless, defendant provided his phone number in the chat and, on the next day,
went to the prearranged meeting place at the mall.
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In fact, defendant’s belief that Agent May’s fictitious persona was 14 years old was
essential to the prosecutor’s claim that defendant violated the provision in MCL 750.145c(2) that
a person who attempts or prepares or conspires to arrange for . . . any child
sexually abusive activity . . . is guilty of a felony. . . if the person knows, has
reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know that the child is a child
....
Subject to an affirmative defense for persons emancipated by operation of law, the term
“child” means “a person who is less than 18 years of age.” MCL 750.145c(1)(b). But the
preparation means of committing MCL 750.145c(2) does not require an actual child. If a
defendant prepares to arrange for child abusive activity by chatting with and enticing someone
who he believes is a child, he may be convicted under the statute. People v Thousand, 241 Mich
App 102, 115-116; 614 NW2d 674 (2000), rev’d in part on other grounds 465 Mich 149; 631
NW2d 694 (2001).
Upon de novo review, we conclude that a rational view of the evidence supported
defendant’s requested instruction under MCL 750.145a because, similar to MCL 750.145c(2),
the offense does not require that there actually be a minor child victim and, despite defendant’s
testimony to the contrary, the evidence supported a reasonable inference that defendant believed
that Agent May’s fictitious persona was 14 years old. Indeed, the prosecutor essentially
concedes this point on appeal by arguing that it could have charged defendant under MCL
750.145a based on the facts of this case. The fact that defendant offered a different explanation
for his conduct at trial does not support a different result.
The controlling question is whether MCL 750.145a is a necessarily included lesser
offense of the charge against defendant under MCL 750.145c(2). To constitute a necessarily
included lesser offense, the elements of the lesser offense must be completely subsumed in the
greater offense. Walls, supra at 645. The greater offense must require the jury to find a disputed
factual element that is not part of the lesser offense. Cornell, supra at 357.
We reject defendant’s claim that the charge against him under MCL 750.145c(2) required
proof of a knowledge element not found in MCL 750.145a. The disputed factual element was
whether defendant believed that he chatted with a 14-year-old child. This same element would
have been required to sustain a charge under MCL 750.145a.
IV
Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial, without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, based on defendant’s claim that a juror was tricked or coerced
by other jurors into voting for a guilty verdict. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003).
A trial court may grant a new trial on any ground that would support appellate reversal of a
conviction or because it believed that the verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCR
6.431(B); People v Crear, 242 Mich App 158, 167; 618 NW2d 91 (2000).
The offer of proof made by defendant in support of his motion consisted of his counsel’s
representations at the motion hearing. Although defendant’s former counsel filed a statement of
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the juror labeled “affidavit of witness,” the document was not a proper affidavit because it was
not confirmed under oath or affirmed before a person having authority to administer such oath or
affirmation. Detroit Leasing Co v Detroit, 269 Mich App 233, 236; 713 NW2d 269 (2005).
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the fact that the jury
was polled before being discharged to deny the motion without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. The purpose of polling the jury in open court is to determine if each juror consented to
the verdict announced by the foreperson. See Routhier v Detroit, 338 Mich 449; 61 NW2d 593
(1953). Even if we were to treat defense counsel’s representation at the motion hearing and the
juror’s statement as a proper offer of proof, it was insufficient to demonstrate the type of
extrinsic influence or clerical error that would warrant setting aside the jury verdict placed on the
record at trial. People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 91; 566 NW2d 229 (1997).
V
Defendant next argues that MCL 750.145c(2), as applied in this case, is too vague and
overly broad to pass constitutional muster. We review de novo the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to quash the information or reduce the charges on the ground that MCL
750.145(2) is unconstitutionally vague. People v Hill, 269 Mich App 505, 514; 715 NW2d 301
(2006).
In general, a defendant may not defend on the basis of a claim that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague if his conduct is fairly within the scope of the statute. Hill, supra at
525. “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and are so construed unless their
unconstitutionality is clearly and readily apparent.” Id. A statute may be challenged for
vagueness on the grounds that it (1) is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment rights, (2)
does not provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct, and (3) is so indefinite that it confers
unstructured and unlimited discretion on the fact-finder to determine whether the law was
violated. Id. at 524.
Here, defendant’s argument is directed at the requirement of fair notice. Specifically,
defendant claims that he might have solicited another individual to engage in private sexual
activity, but that nothing was presented at trial that could lead a person of common intelligence
to believe that he was violating the statute.
To afford proper notice, a statute must provide a person with ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Hill, supra at 525. The statutory meaning
must be fairly ascertainable from judicial interpretations, the common law, dictionaries, treaties,
or the commonly accepted meaning of the words. Id. It is plain from the language in MCL
750.145c(2) that it criminalizes a person’s attempt or preparation to arrange for child sexually
abusive activity. See People v Adkins, 272 Mich App 37, 48; 724 NW2d 710 (2006). The
statute defines “sexually abusive activity” as “a child engaging in a listed sexual act,” and further
defines “listed sexual act” to be mean “sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, sadomasochistic
abuse, masturbation, passive sexual involvement, sexual excitement, or erotic nudity.” MCL
750.145c(1)(h) and (l). Specific definitions of each act are also provided in MCL 750.145c(1),
and this Court’s interpretation of MCL 750.145c(2) in Thousand, supra at 115-116, makes it
clear that criminal responsibility does not require an actual child victim. A person of ordinary
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intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited under the statute.
Therefore, as applied to the circumstances of this case, the statute is not void for vagueness.
Finally, while defendant suggests that the statute is overly broad and impinges on First
Amendment freedoms, defendant has not substantiated his position. In any event, the charge
against defendant was predicated on his attempt or preparation to arrange for child sexually
abusive activity. The First Amendment does not provide a defendant with the right to attempt to
persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts. People v Cervi, 270 Mich App 603, 622; 717
NW2d 356 (2006).
VI
Defendant next challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash the information
or reduce the charges on the ground that insufficient evidence was presented at the preliminary
examination to establish a violation of MCL 750.145c(2). We find it unnecessary to address this
claim because any error at the preliminary examination is subject to a harmless error analysis.
People v Hall, 435 Mich 599; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). “If a defendant is fairly convicted at trial,
no appeal lies regarding whether the evidence at the preliminary examination was sufficient to
warrant a bindover.” People v Wilson, 469 Mich 1018; 677 NW2d 29 (2004).
VII
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion for an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of entrapment. Defendant seeks a remand to the trial court for
consideration of his claim.
Because the determination whether a defendant was entrapped is a factual one, a trial
court must generally conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue. People v D’Angelo,
401 Mich 167, 178; 257 NW2d 655 (1977). Both the prosecutor and defendant are free to
present evidence, which likely will include the defendant’s own testimony, to establish a claim of
entrapment. Id. The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish entrapment by a
preponderance of the evidence. People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).
We review the trial court’s findings for clear error. Id. A defendant is considered entrapped if
“(1) the police engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to
commit a crime in similar circumstances or (2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible
that it cannot be tolerated.” Id. Where a law enforcement official does nothing more than
present an opportunity to commit a crime, entrapment does not exist. Id.
The remedy ordered in D’Angelo, supra at 183-184, where the entrapment issue was
improperly submitted to a jury, was to remand to the trial court to determine the entrapment issue
based on the evidence adduced at trial. Id. at 184. In ordering the remand, our Supreme Court
considered the trial court’s superior opportunity to observe and hear the entrapment witnesses at
the trial. Id. But a remand is unnecessary when the entrapment issue could be decided as a
matter of law based on uncontroverted evidence or by accepting a defendant’s trial testimony on
the entrapment issue as true. People v Ramon, 86 Mich App 113, 117; 272 NW2d 124 (1978).
Here, the record indicates that defendant relied on a transcript of his chat room
conversation with Agent May’s fictitious persona to support his claim of entrapment. The trial
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court found no need for an evidentiary hearing because it could determine from the existing
record that defendant was not entrapped. Because defendant did not show any need for a
testimonial record to develop his claim of entrapment, the trial court did not err in resolving the
entrapment issue without affording the parties an opportunity to present witnesses at an
evidentiary hearing.
Further, defendant had an opportunity to testify at trial and, even accepting the testimony
as true, it does not aid defendant in establishing that he was entrapped. The record indicates
nothing more than that defendant was presented with an opportunity to commit a crime.
Johnson, supra at 498. Because defendant has not established any area where further factual
development could advance his claim that he was entrapped, remand for an evidentiary hearing
is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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