RONALD KENDALL V PAW PAW TOWNSHIP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD KENDALL and MARY KENDALL,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2006
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 270115
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 05-053481-CZ
PAW PAW TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition in this action brought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL
15.231 et seq. We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Kefgen
v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). Statutory interpretation is a
question of law which is also reviewed de novo. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460
Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
The trial court granted defendant’s motion in part pursuant to MCL 15.233(3), opining
that, based on the sheer number of requests for information submitted to defendant, plaintiffs had
abused their rights under the statute.
The FOIA permits a public body to “make reasonable rules necessary to protect its public
records and to prevent excessive and unreasonable interference with the discharge of its
functions.” MCL 15.233(3). “The express purpose of this rule-making authority is to protect
records and prevent interference with the discharge of the public body’s functions.” Cashel v
Smith, 117 Mich App 405, 411; 324 NW2d 336 (1982) (emphasis in original). It does not
authorize the public body to deny otherwise valid requests simply because it questions the
requester’s motives. Id. at 411-412. Further, the FOIA does not impose a good-faith limitation
on the right to seek access to public records, and a court cannot read into a statute anything “that
is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” In re S R, 229
Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998). The only limitations imposed by the FOIA are that
the requester not be incarcerated, that the document requested be a public record, that the request
be in writing, and that the request describe the record sufficiently to enable the public body to
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find it. MCL 15.231(2); MCL 15.233(1). Thus, the trial court’s belief that plaintiffs had abused
their right to obtain documents under the FOIA was not a proper basis for granting defendant’s
motion.
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion, in part, by finding that the fees charged
were reasonable. Defendant was entitled to charge up to the hourly wage of its lowest paid
employee for the cost of labor involved in fulfilling certain requests. MCL 15.234(3). However,
plaintiffs’ claim was based in part on the allegation that defendant charged a fee in circumstances
not permitted by MCL 15.234 and the policy defendant adopted pursuant to that statute.
Although a public body may, but is not required to charge a fee for searching for and providing
records, if it chooses to do so, it must “comply with the legislative directive on how to charge.”
Tallman v Cheboygan Area Schools, 183 Mich App 123, 130; 454 NW2d 171 (1990). “A public
body is not at liberty to simply ‘choose’ how much it will charge for records.” Id.
Defendant’s policy provided that it would impose fees for finding records and making
them available for viewing, but only “when the failure to charge such a fee would result in an
unreasonably high cost to the township.” An unreasonably high cost was deemed to result from
the work when the estimated time involved exceeded 60 minutes. Defendant granted several
requests, but demanded that plaintiffs pay $11.50 in advance for each.
The submitted evidence did not show that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
defendant charged the fee in compliance with the statute and with its policy. Defendant failed to
show that the work involved in satisfying the requests actually exceeded 60 minutes. If the work
involved did not exceed 60 minutes, responding to the request would not result in an
unreasonably high cost and thus a fee for searching for, examining, and redacting documents
could not be imposed. Therefore, defendant failed to show that it was entitled to judgment with
respect to Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint.
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion in part on the ground that it had properly
withheld salary information on one of its employees under MCL 15.243. “The exemptions in the
FOIA are narrowly construed, and the party asserting the exemption bears the burden of proving
that the exemption’s applicability is consonant with the purpose of the FOIA.” Detroit Free
Press, Inc v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services, 246 Mich App 311, 315; 631 NW2d 769
(2001).
Exempt records include those that contain “[i]nformation of a personal nature if public
disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s
privacy.” MCL 15.243(1)(a). “Information is of a personal nature if it ‘reveals intimate or
embarrassing details of an individual’s private life’ according to the moral standards, customs,
and views of the community.” Detroit Free Press, Inc v City of Southfield, 269 Mich App 275,
282; 713 NW2d 28 (2005), quoting Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed, 455 Mich
285, 293; 565 NW2d 650 (1997). The names and salaries of employees are not exempt from
disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(a). Id. at 282-285; Penokie v Michigan Technological Univ, 93
Mich App 650, 663-664; 287 NW2d 304 (1979). Assuming that sensitive information apart from
salary is exempt, that alone does not warrant nondisclosure. If a public record contains both
exempt and nonexempt material, “the public body shall separate the exempt and nonexempt
material and make the nonexempt material available for examination and copying.” MCL
15.244(1). Thus, the court may order disclosure of a public record that has been redacted to
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conceal the exempt material. Manning v City of East Tawas, 234 Mich App 244, 249-250; 593
NW2d 649 (1999). Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that the requested information was
wholly exempt from disclosure.
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion, in part, on the ground that defendant’s
responses to other requests were appropriate without further explanation. We note that with
respect to plaintiffs’ requests for certain “resolutions,” defendant denied the requests solely
because the actions were taken by motion rather than by resolution, but failed to show that the
record requested was not sufficiently described to enable it to comply with the request. MCL
15.235(4)(b); Cashel, supra at 412. Defendant withheld proof of a contractor’s insurance solely
because it was not a “public document” without showing that the document was not a “public
record” as defined by MCL 15.232(e) or that it was not sufficiently described to enable
defendant to comply with the request. Further, the fact that defendant later provided the
document through discovery may have rendered any request for disclosure moot, but did not
preclude consideration of plaintiffs’ requests for costs, attorney fees, and punitive damages for
defendant’s violation if the violation is proved. Walloon Lake Water Sys, Inc v Melrose Twp,
163 Mich App 726, 733; 415 NW2d 292 (1987). With respect to plaintiffs’ request for a
subscription pursuant to MCL 15.233(1), the record shows that defendant granted the request but
subsequently failed to comply. Assuming without deciding that a request, once granted, need not
be honored if it were granted in error, defendant failed to present any evidence that the request
was granted in error.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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