PEOPLE OF MI V LOUIS ANTHONY WILBON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263153
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-004423-FH
LOUIS ANTHONY WILBON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of larceny by false pretenses over
$20,000. MCL 750.218(5)(a). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to a prison term of 5 to 25 years, to be served consecutively after a federal prison
sentence he was already serving. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was on parole for a federal crime when he was charged with the instant
offense. He first argues that dismissal was required under the interstate agreement on detainers
(IAD), MCL 780.601, et seq., because he was not brought to trial within 120 days after his
transfer into state custody. We disagree. A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for
violation of the IAD is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Stone, 269 Mich App 240,
242; 712 NW2d 165 (2005). The relevant provision, Article IV, subsection (c) of MCL 780.601,
states that “trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the
prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.” Here, the trial court twice adjourned trial at the prosecutor’s behest,
once to allow the officer in charge to attend his daughter’s wedding, and a second time to allow
another key witness to recover from open-heart surgery.
Although the original hearings on these motions were held off the record in chambers,
defendant specifically waives review of any procedural irregularities on appeal, and only argues
that there was no “good cause” supporting the delays. However, the unavailability of material
witnesses is ordinarily good cause for an adjournment, MCR 2.503(C), so defendant fails to
persuade us, on the record presented, that the motions for adjournment were unreasonable.
Moreover, defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice that would have rendered the delays
unreasonable, especially considering that defendant himself had already requested a two-month
delay of the preliminary examination. Instead, defendant merely relies on speculation for his
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allegations of prejudice and the unreasonableness of the delays. To preserve these issues of
unreasonableness and lack of “good cause” for our review, it was incumbent on defendant to
create a record that thoroughly explored the reasons for delay and, to refute reasonableness, the
anticipated harm to defendant. Defendant may not waive procedural irregularities and then rely
on the resultant deficient record to speculate about the impropriety of the court’s actions. See
People v Washington, 461 Mich 294, 300; 602 NW2d 824 (1999). Under the circumstances,
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to dismiss.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a prospective juror
for cause. A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). A potential juror may be
challenged for cause if he or she “is biased for or against a party or attorney, . . . shows a state of
mind that will prevent the person from rendering a just verdict, or has formed a positive opinion
on the facts of the case or on what the outcome should be, . . . [or] has opinions or conscientious
scruples that would improperly influence the person’s verdict . . . .” MCR 2.511(D)(2), (3), and
(4); see also MCR 6.412(D)(1). Here, the challenged juror never made any unequivocal remark
that he believed defendant was guilty or that he could not be fair. He agreed that he could base
his decision on the evidence and the law. Defendant did not ask the juror any further questions
to show a basis for disqualification. Giving deference to the trial court’s superior ability to
assess the juror’s demeanor regarding whether he could be impartial, Williams, supra, the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly departed from the sentencing
guidelines range of 5 to 46 months for reasons that were already considered in the scoring of the
guidelines. We disagree. A trial court may depart from a minimum sentence within the
sentencing guidelines range “if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that
departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3). A trial court may
not base a departure on a characteristic already taken into account in the guidelines, unless it
finds that “the characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.” MCL
769.34(3)(b).
In this case, the trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines range because of
defendant’s extensive prior criminal record, the similarity of his repeated crimes, and the length
of time between his supervised release and the onset of his renewed criminal conduct. Each of
these reasons were objective and verifiable. Further, these factors were not adequately reflected
in the scoring of the guidelines. Defendant’s 13 prior felony convictions well exceeded the four
necessary to receive the maximum score of 30 points for prior record variable (PRV) 2, MCL
777.52(1)(a). Defendant also received ten points for PRV 6 because he was on parole when he
committed this offense, but as the trial court observed, the scoring of this variable did not reflect
that defendant engaged in “virtually identical criminal conduct” or that defendant had been on
parole “just a few days when this whole episode began.” Under the circumstances, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were substantial and compelling reasons to
depart from the guidelines range, and the extent of the departure, 14 months, is proportionate to
the seriousness of defendant’s criminal conduct and his extensive criminal history. People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264-265; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
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Defendant argues, in propria persona, that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction of false pretenses over $20,000. We disagree. “[W]hen determining whether
sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Under
this deferential standard, “a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and
make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400;
614 NW2d 78 (2000). “The elements of the crime of false pretenses are: (1) a false
representation as to an existing fact, (2) knowledge by defendant of the falsity of the
representation, (3) use of the false representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental
reliance on the false representation by the victim.” People v Wogaman, 133 Mich App 823, 826;
350 NW2d 816 (1984).
Here, defendant deposited an altered check for $60,000.33 and then withdrew money in
amounts exceeding $20,000 that were not covered by the unsubstantiated account. Although
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to link him to the altered check because the
teller who accepted the check for deposit could not identify him in court, the teller testified that
she checked the driver’s license of the person who deposited the check and it conformed with
defendant’s name on the check and with the appearance of the customer. She also testified that
she wrote defendant’s account number on the check. A teller at another branch identified
defendant as the person to whom she issued a $40,000 cashier’s check in reliance on the $60,000
deposit. Although defendant denied depositing a $40,000 cashier’s check at another branch and
asserted that he deposited cash, a teller there identified a copy of the cashier’s check and testified
that she wrote defendant’s account number and her teller number on the check when she
deposited it. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues, in propria persona, that he was denied a fair trial because the only
African-American juror on his jury was dismissed before the jury began deliberations. We
disagree. Although intentionally excluding a juror on the basis of race has constitutional
implications, see e.g. Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), the
record does not support any allegation that the juror was dismissed on the basis of race. The
record discloses that 14 jurors were selected to serve on defendant’s jury. The court informed
the 14-member jury that only 12 jurors would deliberate and the remaining two would serve as
alternates. At the conclusion of the trial, two of the jurors were dismissed, including the lone
African-American juror on defendant’s jury. Although defendant contends that the AfricanAmerican juror was intentionally singled out for removal, the record does not support this claim.
Rather, the record indicates that before the jurors were removed, the trial court repeatedly stated
that the identity of the two alternate jurors would be established “purely at random.” When the
matter was raised after the African-American juror was excused, the court again stated that the
two alternate jurors were excused “purely by lot.” Defendant has not provided any support for
his contention that the dismissal of the two alternate jurors was other than by random selection.
Defendant also asserts that African-Americans were underrepresented in the original jury
array. Because defendant did not raise any challenge to the composition of the jury array before
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a jury was selected and sworn, this issue is not preserved. People v McKinney, 258 Mich App
157, 161; 670 NW2d 254 (2003). Therefore, we review this issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). “To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant
must show that a distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury pool, and that the
underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection
process.” People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203; 615 NW2d 1 (2000). In this case, defendant has
not provided prima facie support for his claim that African-Americans were underrepresented in
his venire. After the lone African-American juror was dismissed as an alternate juror, the trial
court commented that, “in the original panel, we had 35 jurors, four of whom were AfricanAmericans, which means we had a little bit more than 11 percent minority representation on the
pool, which is darn close to the actual minority population of this entire county. At least four.
There might have been a fifth one, I wasn’t sure. But, I know there were four for sure.” Under
the circumstances, defendant has failed to substantiate his claim.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly denied his request to call two new
witnesses and improperly allowed evidence of a “federal document.” We review the trial court’s
evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12
(2003). Neither of the two witnesses defendant desired to call was identified on defendant’s
witness list, and defendant had not made any arrangements to secure the presence of one of them.
Although defendant maintains that the witnesses would have rebutted evidence of defendant’s
involvement in other criminal activities, defendant had already admitted the behavior in his
testimony. Defendant testified that, in the past, he had engaged in fraudulent activity to support
his gambling addiction and had worked as a courier for organized crime doing money laundering
and narcotics dealing. Defendant’s purpose in calling one of the witnesses was to support his
theory that the officer in charge was a member of an organized crime ring. According to
defendant’s offer of proof, however, the witness would merely have testified that defendant
previously refused to reveal the identify of a man who allegedly was involved in the drug trade.
The proposed testimony would not have established the detective’s identity as this unnamed
person. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s request to call the two unnamed witnesses. MRE 403.
Finally, the record does not support defendant’s claim that the prosecution was allowed to
introduce a highly prejudicial federal document. In his testimony, defendant claimed that the
officer in charge was a member of a crime organization known as “The Group.” The only
reference to the alleged federal document occurred when the detective testified in rebuttal that he
was familiar with an organization known as “The Group” from reviewing a federal document
about defendant’s criminal history. This reference was hardly prejudicial given defendant’s
extensive direct testimony that he was a member of “The Group” under the detective’s
supervision. MRE 103(a). The detective stated that he did not read his own name on the
document, and could not recollect seeing the names of others accused by defendant either. No
further reference to the document was made. The detective denied being part of “The Group,”
contrary to defendant’s testimony. The trial court specifically precluded the prosecutor from
delving into the substance of the federal document, so the facts do not support defendant’s claim
of error.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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