PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND EUGENE LLOYD JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262582
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 94-002308-FC
RAYMOND EUGENE LLOYD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case before this Court following a remand to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc
competency hearing. People v Lloyd, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued January 25, 2000 (Docket No. 186131). Defendant was convicted by a jury trial of firstdegree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The convictions arise from an incident in which
defendant shot and killed a coworker following an argument. The trial court found defendant
was competent to stand trial. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant does not directly attack the trial judge’s determination that he was
competent to stand trial. Rather, he asserts that pursuant to MCL 330.2020 et seq. and due
process,1 the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to elicit additional relevant testimony at
the competency hearing. However, defendant did not argue below that he was entitled to present
the witnesses pursuant to MCL 330.2020 et seq. or due process. “An objection based on one
ground is usually considered insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a different
ground.” People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). Accordingly, we review
this issue for plain error affecting substantial rights, i.e., plain outcome determinative error.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is only warranted
under this standard if a plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 763.
1
US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
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It violates an incompetent defendant’s right to due process to subject him to a criminal
trial. Cooper v Oklahoma, 517 US 348, 354; 116 S Ct 1373; 134 L Ed 2d 498 (1996).
Accordingly, our Legislature has established procedures for determining competency. MCL
330.2020 et seq. Under the statutory scheme, a defendant is presumed competent to stand trial,
and
shall be determined incompetent to stand trial only if he is incapable because of
his mental condition of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings
against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner. The court shall
determine the capacity of a defendant to assist in his defense by his ability to
perform the tasks reasonably necessary for him to perform in the preparation of
his defense and during his trial. [MCL 330.2020(1).]
The statute requires that, “a criminal defendant’s mental condition at the time of trial must be
such as to assure that he understands the charges against him and can knowingly assist in his
defense.” People v McSwain, 259 Mich App 654, 692; 676 NW2d 236 (2003).
If a showing is made that a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court must
order the defendant to undergo an evaluation at the Center for Forensic Psychiatry or another
certified facility. MCL 330.2026(1). A written report must be submitted to the court containing
the clinical findings of the facility, the facts on which the findings are based, the opinion of the
facility on the issue of the defendant’s competence to stand trial, and, if the opinion indicates that
the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the opinion of the facility as to whether the defendant
will be able to attain competence within the time limits established by MCL 330.2034. MCL
330.2028. Further, the defendant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his competency to stand
trial. MCL 330.2030. “The written report shall be admissible as competent evidence in the
hearing . . . . The defense, prosecution, and the court on its own motion may present additional
evidence relevant to the issues to be determined at the hearing.” MCL 330.2030(3). However,
“[t]he determination of competency may rest solely on the report of the Center for Forensic
Psychiatry if neither the state nor the defendant chooses to offer testimony.” People v Newton
(After Remand), 179 Mich App 484, 488; 446 NW2d 487 (1989).
On remand, licensed psychologist Jeffrey Davis of the Center for Forensic Psychology
performed a competency evaluation of defendant and wrote a detailed report in which he
concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial at the time of trial. Defendant then
requested that he be permitted to have an independent competency evaluation performed, and the
trial judge agreed. David A. Vore, Ph.D., of Genesee Psychological Resources, P.C., performed
this second independent examination. He too concluded that defendant was competent to stand
trial. Primarily considering these two reports and his own observations of what occurred during
trial, the trial judge concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial.
Defendant asserts on appeal that he had the right pursuant to MCL 330.2030(3) to present
evidence of his incompetence at the competency hearing, and that he was deprived of his right to
due process by the trial court’s failure to consider all of the evidence relevant to the issue of his
competence. After reviewing all of the evidence and defendant’s offers of proof concerning the
testimony of his proffered witnesses, we conclude that any error was not prejudicial and did not
affect defendant’s substantial rights.
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Plaintiff wanted to offer the testimony of several witnesses, we address each in turn.
First, defendant wanted to offer the testimony of Anna Malawka who performed an intake
assessment of defendant for Community Mental Health (CMH) approximately one month before
the murder was committed and eight months before the trial took place. Her assessment
indicates that defendant was composed, but also states that he had “illusions of grandeur.”2 The
assessment also indicates that defendant’s stream of thought was tangential. Under the heading
“TENTATIVE DIAGNOSIS,” the report sets forth the following under Axis I (clinical
syndromes): “R/O Paranoid Schizophrenia[,] R/O Delusional Disorder.”3 The assessment also
sets forth under Axis II (Personality Disorders/Traits, Developmental Disorders) the following
diagnosis: “Intermediate Explosive Disorder 312.34.”
The record also indicates that both Davis and Vore considered defendant’s CMH records
in evaluating defendant’s competence to stand trial, including the report prepared by Malawka.
Moreover, the CMH intake assessment prepared by Malawka was itself admitted as evidence.
Defendant has not made an offer of proof about which Malawka might have testified beyond
what was contained in the report itself. Because this evidence was presented to the court and
considered by both experts who performed defendant’s competency evaluations, we conclude
that Malawka’s testimony would have been cumulative, and, thus, unlikely to affect the trial
court’s competency determination.
Moreover, there was substantial evidence that defendant was competent to stand trial
including: the testimony of clinical psychologist Stephen A. Norris, Ph.D., who conducted a
criminal responsibility examination of defendant before his trial and concluded that defendant
was not delusional, incoherent, or scattered in his thought patterns; defendant’s trial attorney’s
indication to the court that defendant was competent to stand trial; defendant’s evident
participation in determining his own defense strategy; and the reports of the two experts who
concluded defendant was competent to stand trial. Considering the foregoing, we conclude that
there is no reasonable probability that defendant was prejudiced by the trial judge’s refusal to let
Malawka testify.
Defendant also wanted to present CMH jail liaison David Baer as a witness. In an
internal document, Baer referenced the fact that he believed defendant was suffering from
delusional thinking. But, similar to Malawka’s opinions, Baer’s opinions were already contained
in the trial court record and referenced by both experts’ reports concerning defendant’s
competency to stand trial. While Baer might have been questioned about the origin of the
internal communication, we cannot conclude from the evidence contained in the record, that the
trial judge’s exclusion of such evidence constituted plain error affecting substantial rights. Even
if Baer had been able to recount a delusional episode defendant suffered while awaiting trial, the
substantial other evidence described above indicated defendant was competent to stand trial.
Consequently, there is no reasonable probability that defendant was prejudiced by the trial
judge’s refusal to let Baer testify.
2
We assume this is a reference to delusional thought patterns, i.e., delusions of grandeur.
3
Apparently, “R/O” stands for “rule out.”
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Defendant also wanted his mother Paulette Williams and his cousin Roni Lloyd to testify.
According to defendant, they would have testified that defendant’s mental health was declining
before the shooting, and that his thinking became even more illogical following his arrest. There
is no indication that Davis either spoke with these witnesses or knew of their concerns.
However, Vore’s report indicates that he spoke with each of these witnesses for approximately
45 minutes. In fact, Vore recounted his conversations with these witnesses in detail.
According to Vore, Williams told him that while defendant was in jail, he had heard
voices and had seen the man he killed standing beside him. But, the report also states that
Williams told Vore that defendant told her during the trial process that he wanted to testify, even
though his attorney did not want him to do so, and that she believed defendant understood the
charges against him and the possible consequences. According to Vore, Roni told him that
defendant had lived with her for a month shortly before the crime took place. Roni told Vore
that she asked defendant to leave after she became frightened by his “rambling” statements.
Vore also reported that Roni told him she believed defendant understood the potential
consequences of the charges against him, the role of various court personnel, and also reported
defendant did not misbehave during trial.
Defendant has not demonstrated that Williams or Vore would have provided any
additional relevant information to the trial judge beyond what was contained in Vore’s report.
Thus, it appears that any relevant evidence these witnesses could have provided was already
available to the trial judge and was considered by defendant’s own independent examiner who
nevertheless found defendant was competent to stand trial. On these facts, we conclude that the
trial court’s refusal to hear additional testimony from Williams and Roni was not plain error
affecting substantial rights. Indeed, because the evidence these witnesses had to offer was
available to the judge through the admission of Vore’s report, there is no reasonable probability
that their testimony would have affected the outcome of the competency hearing.
Defendant also wanted his appellate attorney to testify concerning his interactions with
defendant approximately seven months after the trial. According to the attorney’s affidavit,
defendant was unable to remain focused on a topic for more than a few minutes and repeatedly
claimed that he was the focus of a conspiracy carried out “by the police, the state and religious
infidels.” Although the expert’s competency evaluations do not reference these observations, the
affidavit was contained in the record and discussed in briefs the trial judge indicated that he had
read. Because defendant has not asserted that his appellate attorney could have provided any
relevant evidence beyond what was contained in his affidavit, we conclude that any error in the
trial court’s failure to hear this testimony did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. As with
the other proffered testimony discussed above, in light of the substantial evidence of defendant’s
competency to stand trial, there is no reasonable probability that the attorney’s testimony would
have affected the outcome of the competency hearing.
Finally, defendant requested that he be permitted to testify concerning his own
competency at the time of the trial. Presuming that a defendant has a due process right to testify
at his own competency hearing, we conclude the judge’s error in refusing to permit defendant to
testify is not plain error affecting his substantial rights. In this instance, the trial judge had the
opportunity to observe defendant during a trial at which he testified and to consider five
psychological reports concerning defendant that were based in large part on interviews of
defendant. Two of the reports, which concerned criminal responsibility but also include
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information relevant to the competency determination, were prepared near the time of the trial.
Further, the two reports specifically addressing defendant’s competency to stand trial were
lengthy and detailed, and both concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. It is not
clear to us what defendant could have testified about that might have altered the outcome of the
competency hearing. According to the experts, defendant understood the charges against him
and was able to knowingly assist in his defense. Vore summarized some of his findings as
follows:
Regardless of the equivocal nature of records pertaining to
psychological/psychiatric diagnosis of Mr. Lloyd, information available to this
Examiner regarding his level of functioning during the course of his trial is not
indicative of the presence of behavioral problems that impaired him in terms of
his ability to participate in the proceeding. Further, information obtained during
the present independent psychological evaluation, in the opinion of this Examiner,
indicates that Mr. Lloyd was aware of the charges against him and of the possible
consequences associated with conviction on those charges at the time of his trial.
Although Mr. Lloyd indicated that he did not feel he was adequately represented
by defense counsel during the trial process, there is no basis to conclude that he
was unable to participate in preparation of his own defense during that time span.
To the contrary, information available to this Examiner indicates that Mr. Lloyd
was able to provide a detailed, specific account of circumstances surrounding the
offense both to his defense attorney and through direct testimony provided during
trial. Information obtained directly from Mr. Lloyd indicated that, at the time of
this trial, he had a basic understanding of the trial process and understood the role
of various court room personnel. Statements made by Mr. Lloyd reflected his
dissatisfaction with the manner in which Attorney West was representing him
throughout the trial process suggesting that he had a clear perspective regarding
the course of the trial process. Mr. Lloyd stated to this Examiner that he
discussed his case with other inmates in the St. Clair County Jail and made
decisions regarding the defense strategy and course of his case based upon
information obtained from these individuals. This resulted in his decision to seek
an independent psychological evaluation regarding mental status at the time of the
offense and to provide direct testimony during the trial. Although the outcome of
these two decisions was not positive regarding resolution of Mr. Lloyd’s case, the
fact that he made these decisions does not equate to lack of competency to stand
trial.
Because the evidence contained in the record illustrates that defendant clearly understood
the charges against him and was able to knowingly assist in his defense, we conclude that any
potential error in the court’s refusal to permit defendant to testify at his competency hearing did
not affect his substantial rights. There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant’s
testimony might have altered the outcome of the competency hearing. McSwain, supra at 692.
We similarly reject defendant’s broader argument that his right to due process was
violated by the trial judge’s failure to hear the testimony of the other witnesses discussed above.
Because it is apparent that the evidence defendant sought to introduce was available to the judge
through affidavits, CMH and jail records, and the psychological examiners reports to the court,
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any error in the exclusion of the witnesses was not plain error affecting substantial rights, and,
therefore, reversal is not warranted on this basis. Carines, supra.
Defendant also makes an unpreserved argument that the trial judge was required to sua
sponte disqualify himself from presiding over the competency hearing pursuant to MCR
2.003(B)(2) because he relied in part in reaching his competency determination on his own
observations of the trial. MCR 2.003(B)(2) provides that a judge is disqualified from presiding if
he “has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”
Knowledge gained during the judicial proceedings is not a basis for disqualification pursuant to
MCR 2.003(B)(2). FMB-First Michigan Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich App 711, 729; 591 NW2d 676
(1998). And, the trial judge did not rely on extraneous evidence in reaching its decision.
Accordingly, defendant’s right to confrontation4 was not violated. People v Simon, 189 Mich
App 565, 568; 473 NW2d 785 (1991).
The trial judge based its conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial, in part,
on defendant’s behavior during the trial itself and the surrounding circumstances. This evidence
was contained in the record, and defendant’s counsel at the competency hearing was free to
argue that this evidence was outweighed by other evidence. In fact, counsel did so argue. The
trial judge simply disagreed. Accordingly, we see no plain error affecting substantial rights.
Because of our resolution of these issues, we need not address the remainder of the issues
defendant raises on appeal.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
4
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
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