GLENN WILLIAMS V CHELSEA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GLENN WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
No. 261946
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 01-001416-NH
v
CHELSEA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL and
WILLIAM R. LEE, M.D.,
Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees,
and
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MEDICAL GROUP
and PATRICK MUNSON, M.D.,
Defendants.
Before: White, P.J., and Zahra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this medical malpractice case, defendants Chelsea Community Hospital and William
R. Lee, M.D. appeal as of right a judgment in favor of plaintiff Glenn Williams. Plaintiff crossappeals asserting that the trial court erred in failing to add prejudgment interest to the case
evaluation sanctions. We affirm, but remand for calculation of prejudgment interest on the case
evaluation sanctions and for amendment of the judgment to add that amount.
I. Facts
In August 1999, plaintiff, a 39-year-old journeyman electrician, fell and twisted his ankle.
He presented to defendant hospital where Patrick Munson, M.D. ordered ankle x-rays and
diagnosed an ankle fracture. Joanne Barbour-Walker, M.D., a radiologist, also read the x-rays.
Dr. Munson referred plaintiff to Dr. Lee who reviewed the x-rays and also diagnosed an ankle
fracture. Dr. Lee applied a fiberglass cast to plaintiff’s lower leg. A few days later, plaintiff
presented to the emergency department of defendant hospital with complaints of pain and
swelling in his foot. Dr. Lee removed the cast. Plaintiff continued, over the next two weeks, to
complain of unusual sensations in his toes and foot. Dr. Lee assured plaintiff that this was
normal. In August 1999, Dr. Lee and radiologist Michael Sarosia, M.D. interpreted additional x-1-
rays to show no change. It was not until September 15, 1999, that x-rays of plaintiff’s foot were
taken and showed a fracture in plaintiff’s calcaneous (heel bone). As instructed by Dr. Lee,
plaintiff underwent rigorous physical therapy. It was not until October 1999, that Dr. Lee
referred plaintiff for a CT scan, which showed that plaintiff had sustained a severely comminuted
calcaneal fracture. In May 2000, plaintiff underwent a right subtalar fusion with right lateral
wall decompression and right distal fibula resection.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant hospital was liable for the negligence of
Dr. Lee, Dr. Barbour-Walker, and Dr. Sarosia in failing to timely diagnose his calcaneal fracture.
He also alleged that the hospital was liable for Dr. Lee’s negligence in failing to timely and
properly treat the fracture. There was no claim against the hospital other than for its vicarious
liability for the negligence of these doctors. Plaintiff named Dr. Lee separately and alleged that
he was liable for his own negligence.
The case proceeded to trial. After both sides rested, the jury returned a verdict in
plaintiff’s favor. Defendants appeal the judgment entered against them. Plaintiff cross-appeals
the trial court’s decision not to add prejudgment interest on the case evaluation sanctions.
II. Analysis
A. JNOV
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). We disagree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for JNOV is reviewed de novo. Sniecinski v BCBSM,
469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). In reviewing the decision, this Court must view the
evidence and all legitimate inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
id. to determine whether a question of fact existed, Zantel Marketing Agency v Whitesell Corp,
265 Mich App 559, 568; 696 NW2d 735 (2005). Only if the evidence failed to establish a claim
as a matter of law is JNOV appropriate. Sniecinski, supra at 131.
To prevail in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (a) the applicable
standard of care, (b) that the defendant breached the standard, (c) an injury, and (d) that the
breach proximately caused the injury. Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488,
492; 668 NW2d 402 (2003). "To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must prove the
existence of both cause in fact and legal cause." Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 647; 563
NW2d 647 (1997). Expert testimony is essential to establish a causal link between the alleged
negligence and the alleged injury. Dykes v William Beaumont Hosp, 246 Mich App 471, 476482; 633 NW2d 440 (2001); Thomas v McPherson Community Health Ctr, 155 Mich App 700,
705; 400 NW2d 629 (1996). "To recover for the loss of an opportunity to survive or an
opportunity to achieve a better result, a plaintiff must show that had the defendant not been
negligent, there was a greater than fifty percent chance of survival or of a better result." Dykes,
supra at 477. MCL 600.2912a provides:
(2) In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In an action
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alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an
opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the
opportunity was greater than 50%.
In Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70, 83; 655 NW2d 569 (2002), this Court
held that "MCL 600.2912a(2) requires a plaintiff to show that the loss of the opportunity to
survive or achieve a better result exceeds fifty percent."
1. Causation
Defendants first argue that the trial court should have granted JNOV because plaintiff’s
expert testimony did not satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2912a(2) with respect to plaintiff’s
loss of an opportunity to avoid fusion, arthritis, and a work-ending injury. We disagree.
The evidence demonstrates that plaintiff underwent a fusion, suffers from arthritis, and is
unable to work in his former capacity as an electrician. George Holmes, M.D. testified that if
plaintiff’s injury had been timely and properly treated with a reduction, he more likely than not
would have avoided fusion and suffered only mild arthritis. Dr. Holmes testified,
My opinion is that, if this had been reduced in a timely manner, he would have
had a much better – more likely than not, a much better prognosis in terms of
healing and not needing a brace or any other devices for ambulation.
He further testified:
Q.
. . . More likely than not, would Mr. Williams have not needed a fusion or
not had the subtalar arthritis had this fracture been timely diagnosed and treated?
A.
Yes.
With regard to arthritis, Dr. Holmes testified that if the fracture had been fixed, plaintiff would
have had a seventy to eighty percent chance of “doing well,” meaning functioning with mild
arthritis.
Roy Sanders, M.D. testified to a reasonably degree of medical certainty with regard to the
possibility of plaintiff sustaining a work-ending injury. He testified:
Q.
Now, with regard to his calcaneal fracture, I think we – you’ve – you’ve
testified on direct examination about the – the type of result he could have had if
he was timely diagnosed and treated with – with an open reduction.
Do you have an opinion more probably than not if this had been timely
diagnosed and treated, that it would not have been a work-related – work-ending
injury for him?
[Defense objection.]
A.
I believe that to be true.
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The testimony of these experts was sufficient to create a question of fact with regard to
whether plaintiff lost a greater than 50 percent opportunity to avoid fusion, arthritis, and a workending injury. The testimony cited by defendants that falls short of the requirements of MCL
600.2912a does not directly contradict any of the experts’ statements that do meet the
requirements of MCL 600.2912a. Although Dr. Sanders conceded that plaintiff continued to
work, his use of the term “working-ending injury” was accurate when the evidence demonstrated
that plaintiff would have to be retrained to perform a new and sedentary job and would not be
able to work as an electrician in the same capacity that he did before the alleged negligence. To
the extent that this testimony calls into question the weight or credibility of the experts’ opinions,
these matters are for the jury, not this Court. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App
185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). The trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for
JNOV on this ground.
2. Scientific Basis for Plaintiff’s Experts’ Opinions
Defendants next argue that the trial court should have granted JNOV because Dr. Holmes
and Dr. Sanders had no reliable scientific basis for their opinions on the standard of care and
causation. Plaintiff asserts that this Court should not review this issue because defendants failed
to challenge the scientific reliability of this evidence until after trial. Defendants suggest that
they were not required to do otherwise because “the court can still satisfy its gatekeeper role
when asked to rule on a post-trial motion.” But defendants cite no authority to support this
proposition. Defendants cite Goebel v Denver and Rio Grande West Railroad Co, 215 F3d 1083
(CA 10), which is not binding on this Court, and Badalamenti v William Beaumont Hosp, 237
Mich App 278, 286; 602 NW2d 854 (1999), which did not address whether expert opinion was
scientifically reliable, but rather, whether it was “based on assumptions that are not in accord
with the established facts.”
Plaintiff’s argument, on the other hand, finds support in Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471
Mich 67, 82; 684 NW2d 296 (2004), in which our Supreme Court held that the trial court has “an
independent obligation to review all expert opinion testimony” to determine whether it satisfied
MRE 702, but also held that, “[w]hile a party may waive any claim of error by failing to call this
gatekeeping obligation to the court’s attention, the court must evaluate expert testimony under
MRE 702 once that issue is raised.” (Emphasis in original.) Accordingly, if a party does not
challenge the expert testimony under MRE 702, the court has no duty to sua sponte conduct a
hearing and determine whether the expert testimony is admissible. Rather, the issue is waived.
We agree with plaintiff that defendants waived this issue. Plaintiff was not required by
any rule, statute, or case law to produce data and literature to support his experts’ opinions unless
and until the scientific reliability of his evidence was challenged by defendants. Defendants
posed no such challenge. Because defendants never challenged the scientific reliability of
plaintiff’s experts’ opinions, no record was created regarding this issue. Because no record was
developed, there is nothing for this Court to review.
3. Inconsistent Verdict
Defendants also argue that the trial court should have granted partial JNOV as to future
economic damages beyond 2008 because the jury awarded no noneconomic damages beyond
that time and, therefore, the verdict is inconsistent. We disagree.
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The determination of whether the evidence supports the jury award is based on objective
considerations relating to the actual conduct of the trial or to the evidence adduced. Palenkas v
Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 532; 443 NW2d 354 (1989). Our Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that “A jury’s verdict must be upheld even if it is arguably inconsistent, ‘[i]f there is an
interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation for the findings of the jury.’ ”
Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 31; 609 NW2d 567 (2000), quoting Granger v
Fruehauf Corp, 429 Mich 1, 7; 412 NW2d 199 (1987). “ ‘[E]very attempt must be made to
harmonize a jury's verdicts. Only where verdicts are so logically and legally inconsistent that
they cannot be reconciled will they be set aside[.]’ ” Lagalo v The Allied Corp, 457 Mich 278,
282; 577 NW2d 462 (1998), quoting Granger, supra at 9.
In this case, the jury awarded noneconomic damages only to 2008 and awarded economic
damages through 2021. This award was not inconsistent and it was supported by the evidence.
First, there is no necessary relationship between economic and noneconomic damages: a person
can sustain economic loss without suffering physical pain. Second, the evidence supports the
conclusion that plaintiff would do just that for some portion of his life. Dr. Sanders testified that
subsequent surgeries would address plaintiff’s pain, but would leave him unable to work as an
electrician in his former capacity. After describing the surgeries that plaintiff would require,
Sanders testified:
The – the biggest problem for him is he has to climb ladders and work on uneven
ground, and it’s difficult with this amount of work. What I’m trying to – what I
would do with this surgery is trying to get him to be painfree and comfortable on
even ground. But he has a subtalar fusion and has had these injuries to his foot,
so up and down ladders, carrying heavy cable and walking through uneven
ground in job sites is a bit difficult, and I don’t think he could do that.
Additionally, Dr. Robert Ancel testified that with plaintiff’s physical limitations, he could train
for another position and would earn a reduced salary. And Dr. Young-Iob Chung opined that
plaintiff will earn less money than he would have before the alleged injury. Defendants’
distinction that plaintiff complained that he could not work because of pain did not adequately
consider Dr. Sanders’s testimony, namely his suggestion that plaintiff should (after trial) undergo
several surgeries, which could improve his pain, but would nonetheless leave plaintiff disabled
and unable to perform his previous job. To the extent that defendants’ argument touches on
issues of the weight or credibility of the evidence, those matters are left to the jury to resolve, not
this Court. Ellsworth, supra at 194. Therefore, the jury’s award of noneconomic damages until
2008 with economic damages continuing until 2021 was supported by the record. The trial court
did not err in denying defendants’ JNOV motion in this regard.
B. New Trial
Defendants next contend that a new trial should have been granted pursuant to MCR
2.611(a) and (g) because the trial court should have excluded Dr. Sanders’s testimony about
calcaneal fractures generally and plaintiff’s counsel should not have been permitted to question
Dr. Lee about x-rays that were taken after his treatment decision was made. We again disagree.
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial. Gilbert
v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 761; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). An abuse of discretion
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occurs when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would
say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. Id. at 761-762.
Defendants first contend that Dr. Sanders should not have been permitted to testify about
calcaneal fractures generally because this was irrelevant and misleading. Reading the
complained of testimony in context, it is apparent that Dr. Sanders’s actually testified this
testimony related to “calcaneal displaced intra-articular fractures in general, not this patient’s
injury in specific.” This testimony was not inadmissible for being irrelevant or misleading.
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the
evidence.” MRE 401. Although this testimony could not be used directly to prove plaintiff’s
case because it did not relate to plaintiff’s injury in particular, it was asked in a series of
questions that covered both “calcaneal displaced intra-articular fractures in general” and
plaintiff’s injury. While some of Dr. Sanders’s answers were more helpful to proving plaintiff’s
case than others, this particular testimony, which was less helpful, was nonetheless properly
admitted. What defendants are essentially arguing is that any response a witness provides that
does not directly prove a plaintiff’s case should be struck as irrelevant. But relevant evidence is
much broader than evidence that can directly prove an element of a plaintiff’s claim.
Nor is the testimony misleading. Defendants argue that it is misleading
given that the degree of lost chance between surgical and conservative treatment
was a critical issue in this case, and that Dr. Sanders was otherwise unable to
quantify the opportunity to avoid an ankle fusion with timely surgery, given the
conceded absence of studies involving the long-term outcome of a significant
number of patients with fracture-dislocations, the injury plaintiff is claimed to
have had.
In this sentence, which comprises defendants’ entire argument on this issue, defendants argue
both that Dr. Sanders failed to provide evidence of causation and that his opinion was not
supported by adequate data (both issues discussed separately above), but they do not state why
the testimony identified in this issue is misleading. Moreover, this testimony could not be
misleading when Dr. Sanders clearly informed the jury, “I would be speaking about calcaneal
displaced intra-articular fractures in general, not this patient’s injury in specific, because it’s a
little bit different pattern . . . .” The trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.
Defendants also argue that the trial court improperly allowed plaintiff’s counsel to elicit
testimony from Dr. Lee about x-rays taken after his treatment decision. Defendants contend that
this testimony was inadmissible because Dr. Sanders testified that other x-rays taken subsequent
to Dr. Lee’s treatment decision were different in appearance from similar x-rays taken before Dr.
Lee’s treatment decision due to changes in the bone. Dr. Sanders testified:
So if one looks at these two – this is from August 2nd. I flipped it just so I could
fit it in. And you see how much mineral there is. It’s very white and dense and
sharp. And then if you look at this one from September 15th, because he’s not
using it, you can already see that some of the mineral content is lost and so it’s a
letter darker and looks a little more washed out.
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Defendants contend that this testimony renders Dr. Lee’s testimony irrelevant, misleading, and
prejudicial.
It does not. In asking these questions of Dr. Lee, plaintiff’s counsel was attempting to
prove that if Dr. Lee had ordered foot films earlier, he would have ordered a CT scan and then
properly diagnosed and treated plaintiff’s injury. In pursuing this line of questioning, plaintiff’s
counsel showed Dr. Lee foot x-rays that were taken in September, which showed the fracture
that Dr. Lee did not diagnose from looking at only ankle x-rays. The fact that x-rays showed
degenerative changes in the bone over time has little if any effect on this line of questioning. If
anything, this presents a factual issue for the jury to determine what effect this evidence had on
plaintiff’s case. It does not render Dr. Lee’s testimony inadmissible. It was clearly relevant to
the issues to be tried. Nor does it render Dr. Lee’s testimony misleading, especially when the
jury was also allowed to consider Dr. Sanders’s testimony about the bone changes shown in the
x-rays. Finally, although Dr. Lee’s testimony was prejudicial to defendants, there is no basis for
concluding that it was unfairly prejudicial. The trial court did not err in denying defendants’
motion for new trial on the basis of evidentiary errors.
C. Case Evaluation Sanctions
Defendants next argue that plaintiff should not have been awarded case evaluation
sanctions because the case evaluators improperly entered one award against Dr. Lee and
defendant hospital jointly for $750,000. Although we agree that the joint award was a violation
of the court rules, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court properly awarded case evaluation
sanctions against defendants because (1) defendants waived the error and (2) despite the
incorrect award, the trial court, by applying MCR 2.403(O)(4)(b), was able to properly determine
that plaintiff was entitled to case evaluation sanctions.
"A trial court's decision whether to grant case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)
presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich
App 179, 197; 667 NW2d 887 (2003). The construction and interpretation of a court rule is
reviewed de novo and under the general rules of construction that apply to statutory review. ISB
Sales Co v Dave’s Cakes, 258 Mich App 520, 526; 672 NW2d 181 (2003). The goal is to give
effect to the intent of the rule as expressed in the plain language. Id. at 526-527.
Defendants contend that, pursuant to MCR 2.403(K), the case evaluators were required to
render separate awards for each defendant. Indeed, MRE 2.403(K)(2) provides:
The evaluation must include a separate award as to the plaintiff’s claim against
each defendant and as to each cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim that
has been filed in the action. For the purpose of this subrule, all such claims filed
by any one party against any other party shall be treated as a single claim.
The plain language of this court rule clearly does not permit a joint award against multiple
defendants and, accordingly, the joint award against defendants for $750,000 was a violation of
this rule. The court rules do not provide any sanction in the event of such an error. However,
after reviewing the record, we conclude that defendants waived the error.
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Several uncontested facts demonstrate that defendants not only failed to object to the
error, but also contributed to it. First, MCR 2.403(H) provides that “a single fee is required of
each party, even where there are counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims.” However,
defendants, represented by the same attorney, paid only one fee. Second, MCL 2403(I)(1)
provides, “At least 14 days before the hearing, each party shall file with the ADR clerk 3 copies
of documents pertaining to the issues to be mediated and 3 copies of a consider summary setting
forth that party’s factual and legal position on issues presented by the action.” (Emphasis
added). However, defendants filed only case evaluation summary. Finally, MCL 2.403(L)(1)
provides:
Each party shall file a written acceptance or rejection of the panel’s evaluation
with the ADR clerk within 28 days after service of the panel’s evaluation. Even if
there are separate awards on multiple claims, the party must either accept or reject
the evaluation in its entirety as to a particular opposing party. The failure to file a
written acceptance or rejection within 28 days constitutes a rejection.
Defendants’ attorney filed no acceptance or rejection for either party. As a result of these
actions, defendants obtained only one case evaluation award and a single rejection was entered
for them. Curiously, although defendants deliberately acted as one party for the purpose of case
evaluation, they requested that the jury list separately their verdict against “Dr. William Lee and
Chelsea Community Hospital,” “Chelsea Hospital for Dr. Sarosi,” and “Chelsea Community
Hospital for Dr. Barbour Walker.”
“It is well-established that error requiring reversal cannot be error to which the aggrieved
party contributed by plan or negligence.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 537; 564
NW2d 532 (1997). Stated another way, this Court has also held that “A party is not allowed to
assign as error on appeal something which his or her own counsel deemed proper at trial since to
do so would permit the party to harbor error as an appellate parachute.” Dresselhouse v Chrysler
Corp, 177 Mich App 470, 477; 442 NW2d 705 (1989). Additionally, our Supreme Court has
held, when a party made no objection to the trial court’s action until after the verdict, “It seems
pretty well settled that, after one has knowledge of an irregularity, he cannot remain silent, and
take his chances of a favorable verdict and afterwards, if the verdict goes against him, base error
on it.” Samper v Boschma, 369 Mich 261, 265; 119 NW2d 607 (1963). Applying these rules to
the circumstances presented in this case, we hold that a party cannot, taking his chances on a
favorable verdict, wait until after the verdict to assert that the case evaluators’ error necessarily
precludes the trial court from applying the case evaluation rules; rather, if possible, the trial court
may apply the rules in MCR 2.403(O) and, when appropriate, award sanctions.
In this case, despite the case evaluators’ error, it was possible for the trial court to apply
MCR 2.403(O) and determine that case evaluation sanctions should be awarded against
defendants. Our determination of whether case evaluation sanctions could be determined
necessarily begins with the determination that defendants were jointly and severally liable. As
this Court has recently noted, in medical malpractice cases in which the plaintiff is not at fault,
“the liability of each defendant is joint and several.” MCL 600.6304(6)(a); Bell v Ren-Pharm,
Inc, 269 Mich App 464, 467; 713 NW2d 285 (2006). This Court previously held, however, that
despite the retention of joint and several liability in MCL 600.6304(6)(a), the finder of fact shall
allocate fault. Salter v Patton, 261 Mich App 559, 563; 682 NW2d 537 (2004). Thus, while the
jury correctly allocated fault in this case, it is nonetheless a medical malpractice case in which
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the plaintiff is not at fault and, accordingly, as defendants admitted at oral argument, defendants’
liability is joint and several.
Having determined that defendants are jointly and severally liable, we next look to the
court rule that is applied to determine a rejecting party’s liability for costs. MCR 2.403(O)(4)
governs a rejecting party’s liability for costs when multiple parties are involved and provides:
(4) In cases involving multiple parties, the following rules apply:
(a) Except as provided in subrule (O)(4)(b), in determining whether the verdict is
more favorable to a party than the case evaluation, the court shall consider only
the amount of the evaluation and verdict as to the particular pair of parties, rather
than the aggregate evaluation or verdict as to all parties. However, costs may not
be imposed on a plaintiff who obtains an aggregate verdict more favorable to the
plaintiff than the aggregate evaluation.
(b) If the verdict against more than one defendant is based on their joint and
several liability, the plaintiff may not recover costs unless the verdict is more
favorable to the plaintiff than the total case evaluation as to those defendants, and
a defendant may not recover costs unless the verdict is more favorable to that
defendant than the case evaluation as to that defendant.
(c) Except as provided by subrule (O)(10),[1] in a personal injury action, for the
purpose subrule (O)(1), the verdict against a particular defendant shall not be
adjusted by applying that defendant’s proportion of fault as determined under
MCL 600.6304(1)-(2).
Of the three rules in MCL 2.403(O)(4), it is clear that MCL 2.403(O)(4)(b) applies to this
case because the verdict is “against more than one defendant” and it “is based on their joint and
several liability.” According to this rule, “the plaintiff may not recover costs unless the verdict is
more favorable to the plaintiff than the total case evaluation as to those defendants.” Thus, in
determining whether plaintiff should be awarded sanctions in this case, the trial court was
required to compare the verdict against defendants to the total case evaluation as to those
defendants. In doing so, the trial court correctly determined that the verdict against defendants
was greater than the case evaluation award as to those defendants. This being the case,
defendants’ assertion that it could not fairly determine whether to accept or reject to award is
disingenuous. Knowing that their liability is joint and several, they needed only to review MCR
1
MCL 2.403(O)(10) provides:
In an action filed on or after March 28, 1996, for the purpose of subrule (O)(1), a verdict
awarding damages for person injury, property damage, or wrongful death shall be adjusted for
relative fault as provided by MCL 600.6304.
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2.403(O)(b) and consider whether the joint case evaluation award would be more or less than the
total verdict against them.
In sum, we conclude that the case evaluators’ failure to provide separate awards, as
plainly required to MCR 2.403, was an error that defendants waived, but, by correctly applying
the case evaluation rules, the trial court was nonetheless able to determine that plaintiff was
entitled to case evaluation sanctions.
D. Satisfaction of Damages Through Annuity Contract Pursuant to MCL 600.6307
Defendants finally argue that the trial court erred in deducting the entire amount of
attorney fees and costs from the future damages in an order allowing satisfaction of future
damages by the purchase of an annuity contract pursuant to MCL 600.6307. We disagree.
This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ayar v Foodland
Distributors, 472 Mich 713, 715; 698 NW2d 875 (2005). Clear and unambiguous statutory
language is given its plain meaning and is enforced as written. Id. at 716.
MCR 600.6307 provides:
In an action alleging personal injury, if the amount of future damages, as
described in section 6306(1)(c) and (e), in the judgment exceeds $250,000.00
gross present cash value, as determined under section 6306(2), the court shall
enter an order that the defendant or the defendant's liability insurance carrier
shall satisfy that amount of the judgment, less all costs and attorney fees the
plaintiff is obligated to pay, by the purchase of an annuity contract, if all of the
following requirements are met:
(a) The purchase price of the annuity contract shall be equal to 100% of the future
damages subject to this section, less an amount determined by multiplying the
amount of those damages by a percentage equal to the rate of prejudgment interest
as calculated under section 6013(5) or section 6455(2) on the date the trial was
commenced.
(b) The annuity contract is purchased from a life insurer authorized to issue
annuity contracts under the insurance code of 1956, Act No. 218 of the Public
Acts of 1956, being sections 500.100 to 500.8302 of the Michigan Complied
Laws. [Emphasis added.]
According to the plain language that is italicized, “that amount of the judgment” refers to
“the amount of future damages, as described in section 6306(1)(c) and (e), in the judgment [that]
exceeds $250,000.00 gross present cash value, as determined by section 6306(2).” Further, the
statute provides that “the court shall enter an order that the defendant or the defendant’s liability
insurance carrier shall satisfy that amount of the judgment, less all costs and attorney fees the
plaintiff is obligated to pay, by the purchase of an annuity contract.” This language is not
ambiguous.
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Defendants argue that the costs and fees that should be deducted from the purchase price
of the annuity should be in proportion to the purchase price. However, defendants do not cite
any portion of the statute which so provides. Defendants suggest that portions of a statute must
be construed with other sections of that statute. However, defendants do not identify what other
portion of the statute is out of harmony with the plain language above. Therefore, defendants
have failed to persuade us that the trial court erred when it correctly applied the plain language of
the statute.
E. Prejudgment Interest on Case Evaluation Sanctions
Plaintiff contends on cross-appeal that this Court should remand this case for entry of an
amended judgment adding prejudgment interest for the case evaluation sanctions.
Plaintiff timely moved for entry of judgment in the amount of the jury verdict plus case
evaluation sanctions, including attorney fees, witness fees, actual costs and prejudgment interest
on the entire amount. The trial court granted the motion in part, but refused to award
prejudgment interest on the case evaluation sanctions in light of this Court’s decision in Ayar v
Foodland Distributors, 263 Mich App 105; 687 NW2d 365 (2004). On July 6, 2005, our
Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision. Ayar, supra 472 Mich 713. In doing so, it held:
[MCL 600.6013(8)] plainly states that interest on a money judgment is
calculated from the date of filing the complaint. We find this language to be clear
and unambiguous, as we did in [Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand),
469 Mich 487; 672 NW2d 849 (2003)]. In Morales, we concluded that the statute
makes no exception for periods of prejudgment appellate delay, and that interest
on a judgment following such a delay is calculated, without interruption, from the
date the complaint is filed. Similarly, the statute makes no exception for attorney
fees and costs ordered as mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O).
***
We conclude that, under MCL 600.6013(8), judgment interest is applied to
attorney fees and costs ordered as mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) from
the filing of the complaint against the liable defendant. This results from a plain
reading of the statute. [Id. at 716-717.]
Defendants present no argument that our Supreme Court’s interpretation of MCL
600.6013 should not be applied to their case. Nevertheless, judicial decisions generally are given
full retroactive effect. Holmes v Michigan Capital Med Ctr, 242 Mich App 702, 713; 620 NW2d
319 (2000). "Prospective application is a departure from this usual rule and is appropriate only
in 'exigent circumstances.'" Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,472 Mich 562, 586; 702 NW2d 539
(2005) (citation omitted). The general rule is that prospective application is limited to decisions
that overrule clear and uncontradicted case law, id. at 587, or decisions that address an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455
Mich 56, 68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). Our Supreme Court has listed three factors to be
considered once it is determined that the decision clearly established a new principle of law: (1)
the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the
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effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice. Pohutski v City of Allen Park,
465 Mich 675, 696; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).
In Ayar, our Supreme Court stated that its reading of MCL 600.6013(8) resulted from the
plain reading of the statute. Because the statute has been determined by our Supreme Court to
have been plainly written, we cannot conclude that Ayar clearly established a new principle of
law. Therefore, we conclude that retroactive application of Ayar is appropriate.
We affirm, but remand for calculation of prejudgment interest on the case evaluation
sanctions and for amendment of the judgment to add that amount. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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