IN RE KYLE HULBERT MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHLOE GEORGIADES, NICOS
GEORGIADES, JR., ASHLEY GEORGIADES,
and KYLE HULBERT, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270694
Montclam Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-023501-NA
MICHELE GEORGIADES,
Respondent-Appellant.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270695
Montcalm Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-023601-NA
MICHELE GEORGIADES,
Respondent-Appellant.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 270696
Montcalm Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-023701-NA
v
MICHELE GEORGIADES,
Respondent-Appellant.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
-1-
v
No. 270697
Montcalm Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-023801-NA
MICHELE GEORGIADES,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order of the trial court taking jurisdiction over
respondent’s children because her home was unfit by reason of drunkenness. MCL
712A.2(b)(2). We affirm.
Respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence for
its exercise of jurisdiction. We disagree. “We review the trial court’s decision to exercise
jurisdiction [over a child] for clear error in light of the court’s findings of fact.” In re BZ, 264
Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “To properly exercise jurisdiction, the trial court
must find that a statutory basis for jurisdiction exists. . . . Jurisdiction must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
MCL 712A.2(b)(2), which formed the basis for jurisdiction in the instant case, provides
that a court may take jurisdiction of a juvenile “[w]hose home or environment, by reason of
neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.” Defendant
argues that insufficient evidence was presented to meet the requirements of the statute in this
case because the term “drunkenness” implies a perpetual state rather than the occasional drunken
episode. Resolution of this issue involves a matter of statutory interpretation, which this Court
reviews de novo. In re MU, 264 Mich App 270, 276; 694 NW2d 495. “The primary goal of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. . . . If the statutory
language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended the meaning
plainly expressed and further judicial construction is neither permitted nor required.” Atchison v
Atchison, 256 Mich App 531, 535; 664 NW2d 249 (2003).
The statutory scheme does not define the noun “drunkenness.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1996) defines the adjective “drunken” as follows: “1.
Delirious with or as if with strong drink; intoxicated. 2. Habitually drunk. 3. Of, involving, or
occurring during intoxication.” Thus, the common meaning of the noun encompasses both a
single episode of intoxication and a habitual behavior pattern. Certainly, a habitual state of
drunkenness would support the conclusion that the home environment is unfit. However, this
does not preclude the possibility that a home would be unfit on a finding of a single instance of
drunkenness, or cruelty or neglect for that matter. In fact, looking to the use of the word in
context, the language of the statute does not specify that the court find that drunkenness or any of
the other listed conditions be habitual or continuous in order for the home or environment to be
found unfit. We conclude that where the interests of the child are paramount, constraining a
-2-
court from exercising jurisdiction in order to protect the child until a pattern of drunkenness or
other problematic behavior is established is not within the intent of the Legislature. Moreover,
the circumstances surrounding respondent’s arrest suggest that the state of her home that evening
was not an anomaly.
Respondent’s more general argument that petitioner presented insufficient evidence to
support the court’s decision is not supported by the record. The record establishes that three of
the four children have developmental problems. The police officer responding to respondent’s
home reported that she saw vomit on the children’s blanket and on some of the children as they
slept in the bedroom. The assigned caseworker, who also responded the night the children were
taken from the home, testified that respondent was unable to indicate whether Ashley had kidney
failure and was supposed to be taking the medication that had been prescribed for her that was
found in the home.
Respondent asserts that it was not unreasonable for Kyle, a child of eight, to be awake at
1:30 a.m. on a weekend and that it was not respondent’s fault that a teenager managed to get into
the children’s bedroom and vomit on them. However, respondent’s duty as the parent of her
children was to provide a fit environment for them, which included making sure that intoxicated,
underage guests not enter her children’s bedroom. As for Kyle being awake and eating chili at
1:30 a.m., while children may stay up later on weekends than they do on weekdays, the situation
here was that an eight-year-old child (who had either ADD or ADHD), unsupervised by his
mother, was eating chili that had been on the stove for an unspecified period of time in an area
that was littered with alcoholic containers.
Under all the circumstances, we reject respondent’s assertion that the trial court erred in
exercising jurisdiction over the minor children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
