IN RE CAMPBELL/IRONS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SUMMER MICHELLE
CAMPBELL and JAMES COREY IRONS,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270610
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-706227-NA
BEVERLY DAWN CAMPBELL,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the orders terminating her parental rights to the
minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Respondent was the mother of two special needs children. Testimony revealed that respondent
failed to provide proper care for these children. School personnel expressed concern for the
children’s hygiene. Denise Sokol, the school social worker, also expressed concern with how the
son was being medicated and for his safety. According to Sokol, the school received a telephone
call from respondent, where she stated that she had hit her son. Cheryl Cnossen, a therapist with
Easter Seals, opined that respondent was overwhelmed by the care of her two children. Cnossen
further stated that, given respondent’s mental health issues, she was not able to provide a
consistent, stable, and nurturing environment for them.
Assuming the above evidence fails to support a finding that respondent caused physical
injury to her son, the facts did establish that respondent’s failure to acknowledge and address her
mental illness and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent would not be able
to provide proper care within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages or that there was
a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Thus,
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termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). Only one ground is
necessary to support termination. MCL 712A.19(b)(3).
Respondent next contends that termination of her parental rights was contrary to the
children’s best interests. Testimony revealed that respondent loved her children. However, these
children needed more than respondent’s love. As noted by Cnossen, these children needed a
high level of care and supervision. Respondent’s psychological evaluation, admitted into
evidence at the best interests hearing, supports the finding that respondent was not capable of
providing the necessary care for her children. Thus, the evidence did not demonstrate that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests.
Respondent also contends that she should have been provided more services. However,
respondent acknowledged in her testimony that she had been offered numerous services but
claimed that she could parent better without assistance. Throughout the proceedings, respondent
declined the continued assistance of various service providers and refused to address her own
mental illness. Therefore, respondent’s argument lacks merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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