PORTER TOWNSHIP V ROBERT FIELDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PORTER TOWNSHIP,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Nos. 269193; 271251
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000306-CZ
ROBERT FIELDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court order granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). We reverse and remand. These
appeals have been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The instant case concerns a dispute over whether defendant remains a member of the
Porter Township Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). In 2000, the Porter Township Board
(Township Board) appointed H. “Scott” Billings to serve as its representative on the ZBA. On
May 25, 2004, after Billings was recalled from his position as the township supervisor, the
Township Board appointed defendant, then a trustee on the Township Board, to serve on the
ZBA. Plaintiff asserts that the Township Board appointed defendant to serve out the remainder
of Billings’ term on the ZBA and that this term ended on November 20, 2004. Defendant denies
that his term is over and has refused to relinquish his seat on the ZBA. Plaintiff filed the instant
suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant is no longer a member of the ZBA and
enjoining him from disrupting future ZBA meetings. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
disposition to which defendant failed to reply. At a hearing on this motion, the trial court found
that, under MCL 125.288, defendant was appointed to fill the remainder of Billings’ term. The
court granted plaintiff’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10) and awarded plaintiff
costs and attorney’s fees. The instant appeal followed.
The decision to grant or deny summary disposition presents a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d
643 (2002). A trial court properly grants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) where
“the opposing party has failed to state a valid defense to the claim asserted against it.” In re
Smith Estate, 226 Mich App 285, 288; 574 NW2d 388 (1997). It must evaluate the motion based
on the pleadings alone, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true. Id. “The test is whether
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the defendant’s defenses are so clearly untenable as a matter of law that no factual development
could possibly deny a plaintiff’s right to recovery.” Id.
In the instant case, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the Township Board appointed
defendant to serve until the end of Billings’ term in November of 2004. In his answer, defendant
denied that the board appointed him to replace Billings, noting that three positions on the ZBA
were filled at the meeting where he was appointed and that the minutes of the meeting do not
specify whose position he was to fill. Based solely on the pleadings, a possibility exists that the
facts could show that the Township Board appointed defendant to fill a position other than that
held by Billings. Defendant’s defense is not so clearly untenable that no factual development
could possibly deny plaintiff’s right to recovery. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in
granting plaintiff’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9).
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Summary
disposition under this subrule is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. West v General Motors
Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A question of material fact exists “when the
record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. In deciding a motion under this rule, the trial court
must consider “the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ritchie-Gamester v City of
Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
A determination as to whether summary disposition is appropriate under MCR
2.116(C)(10) requires this Court to interpret portions of the Township Zoning Act.1 The primary
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).
The first step in determining the Legislature’s intent is to examine the specific language of the
statute itself. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the statute as written, and
judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich
230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
The portion of the Township Zoning Act in question provides that the board of each
township exercising authority under the Act “shall appoint a township board of appeals” with 3
to 5 regular members depending on the size of the township. MCL 125.288(1). One of the
regular members of this zoning board of appeals “may be a member of the township board.” Id.
The length of the terms served by members of a zoning board of appeals is set by MCL
125.288(5), which states:
1
We note that the Township Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq., was repealed by 2006 PA 110,
effective July 1, 2006. The pertinent statute at issue here is MCL 125.288, which was included
in the repealer. The current statute regarding membership on zoning boards of appeal is MCL
125.3601. However, because MCL 125.288 was effective at the time of the relevant events, it
controls our analysis. See MCL 125.3702(2).
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Terms shall be for 3 years, except for members serving because of their
membership on the zoning board, planning commission, or township board,
whose terms shall be limited to the time they are members of the zoning board,
planning commission, or township board, respectively, and the period stated in the
resolution appointing them. When members are first appointed, the appointments
may be for less than 3 years to provide for staggered terms. A successor shall be
appointed not more than 1 month after the term of the preceding member has
expired. Vacancies for unexpired terms shall be filled for the remainder of the
term.
Under the statute, members of a zoning board of appeals generally serve a three-year
term. But an exception exists concerning the term of a member who also serves on a township
board. Such a person’s term is limited to (1) the time he serves on the township board, or (2) the
period stated in the resolution appointing him. Here, the Township Board appointed Billings to
serve as its representative on the ZBA on December 12, 2000. Based on the plain language of
MCL 125.288(5), Billings’ term on the ZBA expired when he lost his position as supervisor on
the Township Board. This occurred before the Township Board appointed defendant to the ZBA
on May 25, 2004. Because Billings’ term had already expired, the trial court erred in finding that
the Township Board appointed defendant to serve out the remainder of his term on the ZBA.
Defendant was a trustee on the Township Board at the time of his appointment to the
ZBA. Since his appointment, defendant has been elected to continue serving on the Township
Board as the township supervisor. The parties do not dispute that the Township Board appointed
defendant to serve as its representative on the ZBA. Thus, under MCL 125.288(5), defendant’s
term on the ZBA ends when he is no longer a member of the Township Board or at the
expiration of the “period stated in the resolution appointing” him to the ZBA. Because defendant
remains a member of the Township Board, whether his term on the ZBA has ended depends on
the period set forth in the resolution appointing him to the ZBA.
The minutes of the meeting at which the Township Board appointed defendant to the
ZBA do not state the length of his term. Further, neither party has submitted a copy of the actual
resolution appointing defendant to the ZBA. In support of its motion for summary disposition,
plaintiff submitted a copy of the minutes of the March 8, 2005, meeting of the Township Board.
These minutes show that the Township Board attempted “to correct [its] error in not assigning
term ending dates to those recently appointed” to the ZBA. To accomplish this goal it provided a
list of such end dates, which included a statement that defendant’s term on the ZBA ended on
November 20, 2004.
Based on the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff, it is apparent that the
resolution appointing defendant to the ZBA failed to specify an end date for his term. Although
the Township Board attempted to provide an end date at its March 8, 2005, meeting, this
occurred more than nine months after it issued the resolution appointing defendant to the ZBA.
The unambiguous language of MCL 125.288(5) provides that the term length of a township
board’s representative on a zoning board of appeals must be “stated in the resolution appointing”
him. Because the Township Board did not provide an end date in the original resolution, the
only factor limiting defendant’s term on the ZBA is the length of his term on the Township
Board.
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Because the resolution appointing him to the ZBA did not state an end date, under MCL
125.288(5), the length of defendant’s term on the ZBA is coextensive with that of his term on the
Township Board. Further, because defendant remains a member of the Township Board, the trial
court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff and declaring that defendant’s
term on the ZBA ended on November 20, 2004.
“If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled
to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party.” MCR 2.116(I)(2);
Auto-Owners Ins Co v Allied Adjusters & Appraisers, Inc, 238 Mich App 394, 397; 605 NW2d
685 (1999). Here, no genuine issue of material fact exists and defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Consequently, we reverse the order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition to defendant.
In light of our ruling that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to plaintiff,
we likewise vacate the order awarding costs and fees to plaintiff. Defendant’s defense was not
frivolous as defined by MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(i) – (iii). Therefore, the trial court clearly erred in
awarding costs and attorney fees to plaintiff as sanctions under MCR 2.625(A)(2). Kitchen v
Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661-662; 641 NW2d 245 (2002); In re Attorney Fees & Costs, 233 Mich
App 694, 702; 593 NW2d 589 (1999).
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant under MCR 2.116(I)(2) and vacating the award of costs and fees to plaintiff. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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