PEOPLE OF MI V CLARENCE BERNARD ROSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266376
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-006826-01
CLARENCE BERNARD ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right the sentences imposed on his jury convictions of four counts
of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (CSC II), the victim being under 13 years of age,
MCL 750.520c(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 43 months to 15 years in
prison. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
The applicable statutory sentencing guidelines established a minimum term range of 43 to
107 months. On December 11, 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of
five years’ probation. The trial court cited the fact that defendant was the principal caregiver for
his brother, who is a paraplegic, as a substantial and compelling reason for departing below the
guidelines.
Plaintiff appealed by right. This Court found that the trial court’s reason for departure
was objective and verifiable, and could constitute a substantial and compelling reason for
departing below the guidelines under certain circumstances. However, this Court concluded that
a remand was necessary because the trial court failed to articulate on the record why that reason
justified the particular sentence imposed in this case, and how a sentence of probation would be
more proportionate to defendant’s circumstances and those of the offenses than would a sentence
within the guidelines.1
1
People v Ross, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 9, 2005
(Docket No. 253415), slip op at 2.
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During resentencing, defense counsel noted that the presentence investigation report
(PSIR) indicated that defendant was no longer his brother’s primary caregiver. Counsel argued
that defendant remained his brother’s caregiver because his mother was also permanently
disabled. Counsel informed the trial court that defendant’s mother had stated that defendant was
required to come to her house at least every other day to care for his brother. Counsel further
argued that while the report stated that defendant’s probation officer had described defendant’s
probation adjustment as “marginal,” no supporting evidence for that assertion was found in the
report. However, counsel admitted that defendant had not paid all the fees that he owed to the
court.
The trial court concluded that it could find no reason to sentence defendant outside the
guidelines. The court specifically noted defendant’s “not favorable” probation report, and the
fact that he had not paid the fees or costs that were initially assessed. The court also noted that
the report indicated that defendant was no longer his brother’s primary caregiver, although it did
find that that was “probably a matter of debate.” The court sentenced defendant to concurrent
terms of 43 months to 15 years in prison.
Defendant’s new sentence fell within the applicable guidelines scoring range. In general,
under the sentencing guidelines act, if a minimum sentence is within the appropriate sentencing
guidelines range, we must affirm the sentence and may not remand for resentencing absent an
error in the scoring of the guidelines or inaccurate information relied on in determining the
sentence. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004);
People v Garza, 469 Mich 431; 670 NW2d 662 (2003).
Defendant argues that the trial court was not permitted to revisit the pertinent facts during
resentencing, but was required to simply review the question whether the fact that he was caring
for his brother rendered his sentence proportionate. He maintains that this Court had already
determined that he was a primary caregiver, and that this role was a valid reason to depart below
the guidelines. He contends that this issue was the law of the case, and thus could not be
revisited upon remand. We disagree.
The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a trial court on remand from revisiting
legal questions and deciding them differently than the appellate court “on a subsequent appeal in
the same case where the facts remain materially the same.” People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 444445; 537 NW2d 577 (1995), quoting CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454;
302 NW2d 164 (1981). However, the trial court remains free on remand to decide, or reconsider,
legal issues that have not been decided by the appellate court. “‘The power of the lower court on
remand is to take such action as law and justice may require so long as it is not inconsistent with
the judgment of the appellate court.’” Fisher, supra at 446-447, quoting Sokel v Nickoli, 356
Mich 460, 464; 97 NW2d 1 (1959). If a case is remanded without instructions, a lower court has
the “same power as if it made the ruling itself.” Fisher, supra at 447. “However, when an
appellate court gives clear instructions in its remand order, it is improper for a lower court to
exceed the scope of the order.” K & K Const, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich
App 523, 544; 705 NW2d 365 (2005).
The law of the case doctrine is not applicable to the present appeal. First, the question
whether defendant was the primary caregiver for his brother is a factual issue, not a legal one.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, this Court did not consider the issue whether defendant was
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his brother’s primary caregiver in the previous appeal. The Ross Court found only that this
factor could properly be used as a rationale for sentence departure under the right circumstances.
Ross, slip op at 2 n 10, citing People v Babcock, 250 Mich App 463, 471; 648 NW2d 221 (2002),
rev’d on other grounds 469 Mich 247, 265; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Nor did the language of this
Court’s remand clearly limit the trial court’s ability to reconsider the fact relied on for departure,
or to consider other factors on resentencing. Instead, the opinion simply vacated the earlier
sentence. Under the law of the case doctrine, the trial court would have been prevented from
determining that defendant’s role as a primary caretaker could not, as a matter of law, constitute
a substantial and compelling reason to depart. However, it was free to decide the other issues
involved during resentencing. See People v Williams (After Second Remand), 208 Mich App 60,
65; 526 NW2d 614 (1994) (When a case is remanded from our Court because the entire sentence
is invalid, every aspect of the sentence is before the judge de novo unless the remand indicates
otherwise.).
In doing so, the trial court on remand was free to reconsider whether a departure was
warranted. A resentencing is a new sentencing, with all its included requirements. People v
Ezell, 446 Mich 869; 522 NW2d 632 (1994); Williams (After Second Remand), supra at 65.
Thus, while defendant challenges the use of a new presentence report and the trial court’s
consideration of intervening circumstances that may have occurred since the initial sentencing,
we find this was within the trial court’s responsibilities when determining the appropriate
sentence for defendant. See People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 515; 287 NW2d 165 (1980).
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing at
resentencing to determine whether he continued to be his brother’s sole caregiver. We disagree.
Once a defendant challenges the contents of the presentence report, the prosecutor must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts are as asserted. People v Ratkov (On
Remand), 201 Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993), remanded on other grounds 447 Mich
984 (1994). If the court finds the challenged information to be inaccurate, the defendant is
entitled to have the information stricken from the report. People v Britt, 202 Mich App 714, 718;
509 NW2d 914 (1993). If the record provides insufficient evidence on which to base a decision,
the court may order the presentation of further proofs. Ratkov (On Remand), supra at 126. A
court may consider all record evidence before it, including, but not limited to, testimony taken at
a preliminary examination or trial. Id. at 125.
Here, after thoroughly reviewing the trial court’s discussion on remand, we find that the
trial court relied on the fact that defendant had not complied with the terms of his probation,
rather than on whether defendant continued to be his brother’s primary caregiver. During
sentencing, defendant did not challenge the report of his lackluster probation performance, but
instead claimed that it was difficult to meet his obligations. Thus, contrary to defendant’s
argument, the trial court did not deny defendant the ability to challenge the “decisive factor”
here. Under the circumstances, we thus find that defendant has not shown that the trial court
relied on inaccurate information when determining the sentence.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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