KELLY NELSON V COUNTY OF WAYNE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KELLY NELSON, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ERIC ROGER JOHNSON, JR.,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 270852
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-600518-NO
WAYNE COUNTY, WAYNE COUNTY
SHERIFF, and ROBERT FICANO,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff’s decedent, Eric Johnson, Jr., was shot and killed by Bibia Redd, a Wayne
County Sheriff’s deputy, on the front porch of Redd’s home. Plaintiff obtained a $300,000
default judgment against Redd in a separate proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit,
alleging that Redd was acting in the course of her employment when she shot Johnson and
seeking to hold defendants liable for alleged gross negligence in failing to properly train,
supervise, and monitor their employees, including Redd. Plaintiff also sought to hold defendant
Wayne County vicariously liable for the $300,000 judgment obtained against Redd by asserting
that she was an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnification provision of the collective
bargaining agreement between defendant Wayne County and Redd’s union, Local 502 of the
Service Employees International Union.
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.117(C)(7) and (8). The
trial court granted the motion finding the negligence claim was barred by governmental
immunity and plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnification
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provision. On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the portion of the judgment dismissing her claim
that she is a third-party beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement.1
Plaintiff argues that the indemnification provision of the collective bargaining agreement
between defendant and its employees sets forth a clearly defined class of beneficiaries of which
plaintiff, as the holder of a judgment against defendant’s employee, is a member, and that she is
therefore entitled to enforce the indemnification provision as a third-party beneficiary. We
disagree.
A trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is reviewed de
novo. Mable Cleary Trust v Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 262 Mich App 485, 491; 686 NW2d
770 (2004). When reviewing such a motion, only the pleadings are considered, and no
documentary evidence may be examined. Id. All factual allegations in support of the claim are
accepted as true, as well as any reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from
those facts, and the facts are construed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Alan
Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 508; 667 NW2d 379 (2003).
Pursuant to MCL 600.1405, a person is a third-party beneficiary of a contract “only when
that contract establishes that a promisor has undertaken a promise directly to or for that person.”
Schmalfeldt v North Pointe Ins Co, 469 Mich 422, 428; 670 NW2d 651 (2003). Only intended,
not incidental, third-party beneficiaries may sue for a breach of a contractual promise in their
favor. Id. at 427. When a contract is primarily for the benefit of the signatories, the fact that a
third party would incidentally benefit from performance of the contract does not give him the
right to sue for its breach. Kammer Asphalt Paving Co, Inc v East China Twp Schools, 443 Mich
176, 190; 504 NW2d 635 (1993).
Whether the promisor undertook to do something directly for the person claiming thirdparty beneficiary status is an objective inquiry that is based on the form and meaning of the
contract itself. Schmalfeldt, supra at 428. For a third party to enforce a contract, the contractual
language must demonstrate that the parties “are clearly aware that the scope of their contractual
undertakings encompasses a third party, directly referred to in the contract….” Id. Although a
third-party beneficiary need not be referenced by name and may be a member of a class that
includes a person not yet in being or ascertainable, “the class must be sufficiently described.”
Brunsell v City of Zeeland, 467 Mich 293, 297; 651 NW2d 388 (2002). It must be “something
less than the entire universe” and cannot encompass “the public” as a whole. Id.
The indemnification provision at issue states:
Whenever an employee covered by this Collective Bargaining Agreement
becomes subject to a claim, a liability, a judgment, or a monetary imposition or
fine resulting from any action taken by him or her within the scope of his or her
1
Although defendants Evans and Ficano are named as parties to this appeal, the question
presented involves a claim made only against defendant Wayne County. For this reason, all
subsequent references to “defendant” will refer only to Wayne County.
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employment and during the course of his or her employment, the Employer agrees
to defend, and hold harmless and to indemnify him or her including all reasonably
related costs, except in a criminal proceeding in which the employee is found
guilty of a crime.
We conclude that this provision does not create a reasonably identified class of potential
beneficiaries. Any member of the public could become the holder of a claim or judgment against
a county employee, and “the public as a whole is too expansive a group” to qualify as a thirdparty beneficiary under MCL 600.1405. Brunsell, supra at 298.
Further, an objective analysis of the indemnification provision indicates that it is intended
to benefit the employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement rather than to protect
third parties. See Brunsell, supra at 299. The provision defines and limits the extent of coverage
that defendant will provide to employees who are subject to a claim or judgment. It does not
establish that defendant undertook an obligation “directly” to plaintiff, as required by MCL
600.1405. See Schmalfeldt, supra at 428. Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff is only an
incidental beneficiary of the indemnification provision and is not entitled to enforce the contract
as a third-party beneficiary.2
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
2
In light of our resolution on this issue, we need not address plaintiff’s additional argument.
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